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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation consists of three empirical studies on the role of investment banks in Chinese 
domestic IPOs.  My research period covers the IPOs from 1995 to 2011.  The Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges were re-established in 1990 and 1991, respectively.  By the end of 2011, 
2,342 firms became listed in these two markets, with a total market capitalization of RMB 21.48 
trillion (USD 3.4 trillion), ranking as the second largest stock market and the largest IPO market 
globally.  Nowhere else in the world has seen such explosive development in stock market in a mere 
20 years.  As an important intermediary in IPOs, investment banks offer their service by bridging 
investors and issuers.  Our research offers a sketch on the behaviour of investment banks in Chinese 
domestic IPOs during this explosive development period, and thus is able to infer policy 
implications and draw lessons from it.  
 The first chapter examines how Chinese investment banks have grown their market share 
over the period 1995–2010, thereby providing insights into the functions (not) performed by those 
investment banks in Chinese financial markets. Chinese investment banks have built up their market 
share from scratch over the past two decades.  During this process, the regulator at first has put 
investment banks under heavy administration and has intervened directly in the IPO market to guide 
banks to gradually take up a role in certifying the quality of issuers.  Our empirical results indicate 
that prior to 2005 only political connections significantly positively affected the market share of 
lead underwriters in IPOs.  After 2005, this favourable effect declined, but remains significant at 
about five percentage points.  Meanwhile, investment banks applying a low evaluation standard on 
IPO candidates and/or investment banks charging low underwriting fees were able to expand their 
market share.  In my view, the most interesting findings of this chapter is that, unlike in Western 
IPO markets, setting a high evaluation standard on IPO candidates has never helped Chinese 
investment banks to grow their market share.  We argue that the unique Chinese IPO pricing 
mechanism – the issue price was capped by a fixed P/E ratio set by the regulator – has lead to such 
outcome.  At one hand, with a fixed P/E ratio cap, the only way for issuers to ensure a higher offer 
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price was to boost their historical and/or forecasted earnings and thus incentivized issuers to seek 
underwriters with low evaluation standard.  On the other hand, the fixed P/E ratio mechanism cut 
the link between the reputation of underwriter and issue price, and thus offers no incentive for 
issuers to seek underwriters with high evaluation standard.  This finding offers a typical example on 
how regulations offer wrong incentives to market agents. 
The up-mentioned P/E cap mechanism was abolished on June 10, 2009.  Our second chapter 
explored an interesting phenomenon in the two years since the abolishment: the capital raised in 
Chinese domestic IPOs hugely exceeds the capital requirements disclosed by issuers in IPO 
application documents, i.e. over-issuance.  In 587 IPOs during 2010–2011, the average issuer raised 
2.55 times the amount needed.  We checked the post-IPO usage of over-issued capital and find that 
it is spent neither on extra investments nor on debt retirement, but kept in the cash and cash 
equivalents account.  We find it a puzzle why firms issue unnecessary capital in IPOs at the 
presence of high issuing costs that is proportional to total proceeds. We propose an explanation of 
investor exploitation based on behavioural finance theories which contend that issuers, together 
with their investment banks, may price IPO shares above intrinsic value at a time that stock market 
investors are overly optimistic.  As those windows of opportunity are transitory in nature, issuers 
could try to fully exploit them by raising more finance than needed for their investment projects. 
We examine several predictions arising from this behavioural finance explanation.  Also, we 
contrast those conjectures with inferences made from rational-agents and semi-strong efficient-
markets theory.  Our empirical results support the former, while they reject the latter.  First, if the 
investor-exploitation explanation is true, we should be able to form investment portfolios based on 
over-issuance to realize an abnormal return under the investor-exploitation explanation for over-
issuance.  Conversely, under the rational-agents and efficient-markets theory, realizing an abnormal 
return based on publicly available information should then simply be impossible.  Using over-
issuance to proxy for the market sentiment as regards the IPO firm, we construct portfolios with a 
short (half a year) and a long (over one year) investment horizon after the IPO.  The results point at 
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a significant alpha after estimating Fama-French three-factor regression models.  Second, under the 
investor-exploitation explanation, over-issuance, the investment-bank fee rate, and the first-day 
abnormal return likely become endogenous.  In contrast, under the rational-agents and efficient-
markets theory, over-issuance is not expected; it should therefore have no explanatory power for fee 
rates and first-day abnormal returns, ceteris paribus.  Our empirical results show that over-issuance 
correlates positively with the fee rate, while it correlates negatively with the first-day abnormal 
return.  We thus conclude that in the two years after the abolishment of issuing P/E cap, investment 
banks, together with issuers, exploited overoptimistic investors by over-issuance. This chapter 
shows investment banks may not always properly behave to maximize total welfare. 
The third chapter explores the link between IPO underwriting and post-IPO earnings 
forecasts by affiliated analysts (i.e. the analysts that are hired by the lead underwriter in IPOs).  We 
proposed three possible links.  First, investment banks with a more optimistic view about the 
issuing firm tend to obtain IPO mandates and thus, affiliated analysts naturally offer more 
optimistic forecasts than non-affiliated analysts (analyst-optimism view).  Second, by underwriting, 
investment banks obtain better insides into the issuing firm’s business and establish better 
relationship with issuing firm’s management; thus, affiliated analysts obtain more timely private 
information and offer more accurate/less biased forecasts (information-advantage view).  Third, to 
avoid a rapid reduction in stock price in a short period after IPO, affiliated analysts may issue 
overoptimistic forecasts to support stock price in the aftermarket (post-IPO price-supporting view).  
The abolishment of issue price P/E cap again offers us a good natural experiment opportunity.  The 
precondition for investment banks to offer post-IPO price support is that issue price is largely set by 
investment banks.  Before the regulatory change, investment banks had little influence on issue 
price and thus had no incentive to offer post-IPO price support, while after regulatory change, 
investment banks set issue price and need to support aftermarket price.  So, if post-IPO price-
supporting view is true, we should observe affiliated analyst to offer more optimistic forecasts only 
after regulatory change.  On the other hand, under analyst-optimism view and information 
  
4 
 
advantage view, the difference between the forecasts made by affiliated analysts and by non-
affiliated analysts should keep similar across the regulatory change. Our empirical findings 
overwhelmingly confirm the post-IPO price-supporting view.  Specifically, we find that over the 
full sample period (2004–2012), both affiliated and non-affiliated financial analysts issue severely 
positively distorted forecasts.  However, we detect no significant difference in the forecast bias 
between affiliated and non-affiliated analysts before the regulatory change.  Conversely, after the 
regulatory change, the forecast error of analysts affiliated with the IPO lead manager is on average 
33 percentage points bigger than that of non-affiliated analysts.  Moreover, in the 90 days after 
listing, this relative bias even increases to 63 percentage points and enlarges further when the 
issuer’s stock price dropped in the aftermarket.  We thus conclude that investment banks may use 
the earnings forecast of their financial analysts to offer post-IPO price support to the firms they 
underwrote.   
Overall, I did not find a very positive role of investment banks in Chinese domestic IPOs.  
However, those misbehaviours are not unique in China.  Many literatures find similar behaviours by 
investment banks in the developed markets.  By using Chinese data, we are able to explore such 
behaviours more clearly.  Our three chapters show that in financial market, both regulation and free 
market are important mechanisms to offer agents the correct incentives to maximize social welfare; 
totally relying on or neglecting either mechanism leads to unintended (bad) outcomes.  The 
difficulty lies in how to implement these two mechanisms at a proper time, on proper targets, with a 
proper combination.      
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CHAPTER 1   
What determines the market share of investment banks in Chinese domestic 
IPOs? 
1.1  Introduction 
Since 1978, China has undergone unprecedented reforms to re-model its centrally planned economy 
into a more market-oriented one.  A focal point in those reforms has been to establish well-
functioning financial markets, as market prices can contribute to a more efficient allocation of 
financial resources.  Through an initial public offering (IPO), a firm lists itself for the first time on a 
stock exchange.  Also, it raises extra capital to finance prospective investment projects.  Firms that 
are able to list and sell their shares at an attractive price likely find it easier to finance their growth 
opportunities.  Well-functioning stock markets are therefore essential for the development of those 
listing companies as well as the economy as a whole (e.g., King and Levine, 1993; Levine and 
Zervos, 1998).  According to the figures compiled by the National Bureau of Statistics, 2,104 firms 
became listed in Shanghai or Shenzhen by the end of 2010, with total market capitalization reaching 
RMB 26.5 trillion.  Correspondingly, China’s domestic stock markets now rank as the world’s 
second largest. 
Along the re-foundation of the stock exchanges in Mainland China at the beginning of the 
1990s, the government has also allowed a whole new indigenous industry of investment banking to 
develop.
1
  Yet, academic research on the role and the growth of investment banks in Chinese 
domestic IPOs is non-existent to date.  Nonetheless, investment banks, as repetitive agents in the 
IPO market, play a crucial role in the process of certifying, promoting, placing, and supporting an 
                                                          
1
 Chinese investment banks were all established by local owners.  Foreign investment banks have had little, if any, 
influence on the development of the industry.  At present, investment banks still have to be majority-owned by a 
domestic owner in order to be able to underwrite IPOs in Mainland China.  Morgan Stanley founded the first jointly 
owned investment bank in 1996.  Other foreign investment banks (Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, LCL, SMBC, and 
UBS) were allowed to set up joint ventures only as of 2004.  Yet, those joint ventures have advised only 60 A-share 
IPOs (2.9%) up till the end of 2010. 
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offering (Chitru et al., 2005; Brau and Fawcett, 2006).  Indeed, as the IPO is a one-time event, 
issuing firms face lots of questions, like the choice on the appropriate exchange to list and on how 
to satisfy the listing requirements, the decision on the offer price for their stock, the choice on 
potential investors and on how to convince them to buy and hold the IPO shares, etc.  For an IPO 
firm, becoming listed only once, it is too costly to acquire the required expertise to solve all those 
questions by itself.  Moreover, a huge asymmetry in information exists between issuers and 
investors at the time of the IPO.  So, investors could be concerned about buying a ‘lemon’ when 
shares are sold directly by the issuer (Akerlof, 1970).  Besides, there is also a conflict of interests 
between issuers and investors, as issuers want to sell their shares at a high offer price, while 
investors have an interest in buying at a low price.  Brealey et al. (1977) were the first to argue that 
an intermediary can mitigate those information and incentive problems in the IPO market.  Due to 
the repetitive nature of its operations, this agent has to maximize its utility not just on one IPO, but 
on a series of future IPOs.  In other words, it should not behave opportunistically in any single IPO 
to avoid jeopardizing its chances to attract future IPO business.  It therefore has to develop and 
maintain a good reputation among issuers and investors, which is crucial for its growth and survival 
(see also Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994).  By providing high-quality 
services at a reasonable price, investment banks also contribute to well-functioning financial 
markets. 
Our paper tries to fill the current void in the literature by examining how Chinese investment 
banks have grown their market share over the period 1995–2010, thereby providing insights into the 
functions (not) performed by those investment banks in Chinese financial markets.  For this 
purpose, we examine how the government’s visible hand vis-à-vis the market’s invisible hand have 
affected investment banks’ market share in Chinese domestic IPOs.  We thereby account for the 
major institutional changes that took place over our sample period.  Several features about the 
Chinese IPO market make this research interesting.  First, Chinese investment banks have built up 
their market share from scratch over the past two decades.  During this process, the regulator at first 
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has put investment banks under heavy administration and has intervened directly in the IPO market 
to guide banks to gradually take up a role in certifying the quality of issuers.  Yet, those heavy 
regulatory procedures may also have opened the door for an unequal treatment across investment 
banks, thereby favouring the ones with better political connections.  While prior research has 
documented the impact of political connections on firms’ financing decisions and firm value (e.g., 
Faccio, 2006; Li et al., 2008; Du and Girma, 2010), we analyse their effects on investment-bank 
market shares.  Besides, this institutional aspect makes the Chinese IPO market different from any 
Western IPO market, where the market mechanism itself plays a major role in rewarding and 
punishing investment banks based on their behaviour in the IPO market.  For IPOs in the U.S.A., 
Dunbar (2000) indeed finds that investment banks performing poorly in terms of IPO certification, 
pricing, and research coverage lose market share over time.
2
  Nonetheless, along with the growth of 
the Chinese IPO market, the regulator has gradually reduced its direct market intervention and has 
allowed market forces to become more influential.  Those institutional changes now enable us to 
explore whether and how the nature and price of underwriting services provided by investment 
banks have become influential in determining their market share in the IPO market. 
Our empirical results indicate that prior to 2005 only political connections significantly 
positively affected the market share of lead underwriters in IPOs.  On average, an investment bank 
controlled by the central government had a market share that was about seven percentage points 
larger than that of a bank controlled by a local-level government or by a private owner.  As the 
average market share in that period was only 3.7%, strong political connections thus created a huge 
advantage for investment banks.  After 2005, this favourable effect declined, but remains significant 
                                                          
2
 Dunbar (2000) is the only study to date that has examined how the quality and the price of underwriting services affect 
investment-bank market shares in IPOs.  His sample consists of U.S. IPOs on the New York Stock Exchange, American 
Stock Exchange, and Nasdaq between 1984 and 1995.  He finds that underpricing too much, being associated with IPOs 
with poor long-run performance and with withdrawn offers, experiencing a decline in analyst reputation, and charging 
too high underwriting fees all reduce the subsequent market share of investment banks.  He further detects that non-
established investment banks choose to focus on a specific industry, while the more established banks diversify their 
industry focus. 
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at about five percentage points.  Meanwhile, investment banks applying a low evaluation standard 
on IPO candidates and/or investment banks charging low underwriting fees were able to expand 
their market share.  The above findings are in line with the policy changes that took place in the 
Chinese IPO market.  Up till Dec. 31, 2004, the regulator restricted competition among investment 
banks by imposing a maximum number of IPO applications that could be handled at once.  Also, 
before March 1, 2004, underwriting fees were restrained to be between 1.5% and 3% of gross IPO 
proceeds.  Those early policies thus limited the ability of investment banks to set up their own 
marketing strategy for IPOs.  With the abolition of restrictions, investment banks could start to 
compete more freely against each other, thereby selecting a business model that best reflects their 
specific characteristics and the regulatory conditions in the IPO market. 
One of the most interesting findings of our study is that, unlike Western IPO markets, setting 
a high evaluation standard on IPO candidates has never helped Chinese investment banks to grow 
their market share.  Before 2005, IPO evaluation standards simply displayed no relation with market 
shares.  Surprisingly, after 2005, investment banks adopting a high standard actually lost market 
share.  We argue that the unique Chinese IPO pricing mechanism – the issue price was capped by a 
fixed P/E ratio set by the regulator – has incentivized IPO firms to hire an investment bank that 
applies a low evaluation standard.  With a fixed P/E ratio cap, the only way for issuers to ensure a 
higher offer price was to boost their historical and/or forecasted earnings.  So, by involving a lead 
underwriter with a low IPO evaluation standard, the odds that the bank would either not detect or 
turn a blind eye on earnings exaggeration were considerably larger.  Our findings on the role of the 
IPO evaluation standard are somewhat related to those of DeFond et al. (1999), who examine the 
audit market for Chinese IPO firms.  They show that with the introduction of stricter audit standards 
in 1995, the top-10 audit firms that subsequently applied those standards lost market share.  
However, DeFond et al. do not explain in detail why issuers may lack incentives to demand 
certification from independent auditors.  In this article, we dig deeper into the institutional reasons 
driving this phenomenon in the IPO market. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 1.2, we briefly review the 
regulation of the Chinese IPO market; we focus on those policies that may have affected the market 
shares of investment banks during 1995–2010.  We develop our hypotheses in Section 1.3 and 
describe the data and variable measurements in Section 1.4.  In Section 1.5, we present and discuss 
our multivariate regression results and the results of some robustness checks.  Section 1.6 concludes 
the paper. 
 
1.2. Historical review 
1.2.1. The Chinese domestic IPO mechanism 
The stock exchanges of Shanghai and Shenzhen were re-established in 1990 and 1991, respectively 
to facilitate securities transactions.  In Oct. 1992, the central government founded the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) to regulate Chinese securities markets.  Since then, the 
IPO rules have been designed, changed, and enforced by the CSRC, which falls under the direct 
supervision of the central government.  From 1993 till June 30, 1999, stock offerings in China were 
subject to a quota system.  Under this system, the State Planning Commission, in cooperation with 
the People’s Bank of China and the CSRC, every year decided on the number of new shares to be 
issued.  These quotas were subsequently allocated to provinces and to national ministries and 
committees which recommended the companies under their jurisdiction for listing.  The local 
securities authorities, i.e. the CSRC’s local branches, invited the enterprises in their region to apply 
for a stock market quotation and made a first selection among IPO candidates.  After their selection, 
firms had to engage an investment bank, which would prepare and submit their IPO application to 
the central CSRC.  Such an application had to include a detailed description of the IPO candidate’s 
operations, financial performance, and internal control procedures and a first draft of the IPO 
prospectus.  Based on those application materials, the central CSRC made a final decision on 
whether the IPO candidate could become listed.  In this way, the CSRC itself was heavily involved 
in examining the quality of IPO firms.  Meanwhile, the CSRC required investment banks to verify 
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the validity and accuracy of all information in the IPO application, as a way to prepare them to take 
up a role in issuer-quality certification.  As of July 1, 1999, with the introduction of the China 
Securities Law, this quota system was formally abolished.  Also, firms eligible for listing were no 
longer picked by the CSRC’s local branches.  Every company satisfying the criteria specified in the 
Securities Law could henceforth apply for a stock market quotation; and firms satisfying those 
criteria could not be refused.  The listing criteria remained as demanding as under the quota system.  
Specifically, the applicant had to show positive earnings (net income) in each of the three years 
before its IPO.  Also, it had to establish adequate internal control procedures and operate 
independently from other firms controlled by the same ultimate owner.  As of July 1, 1999, the 
CSRC fully relied on investment banks to check whether those conditions were fulfilled. 
The formula to calculate the IPO offer price was changed several times in history.  
Nonetheless, the issue price has always been capped at the product of a fixed P/E ratio and a 
weighted average of pre-IPO earnings and forecasted earnings for the IPO year.  Every year, this 
fixed P/E ratio cap was set by the CSRC and applied to all IPOs in that year.  To attract the interest 
of the general public for IPOs, the CSRC deliberately set the P/E ratio cap considerably below the 
prevailing market P/E ratio.  P/E ratio caps were within the range of 13 to 16 during 1994–1999, 
much below the secondary-market P/E ratio of 15 to 58 (Francis et al., 2009).  During 2000–2004, 
the P/E ratio cap was about 20, while the market P/E ratio was between 24 and 58 (Tian, 2011).  
After Dec. 31, 2004, with the publication of Circulation No. 162, this official P/E ratio cap was 
given up.  However, the CSRC continued to manage IPO offer prices to some extent, relying on an 
implicit P/E ratio cap of 30 for most IPOs (Gao, 2010).  On June 10, 2009, with the publication of 
‘The guiding advice on further reform of the IPO pricing method’, the CSRC announced that it 
would no longer interfere in the pricing of IPO shares. 
The above IPO pricing mechanism has provoked extremely high first-day abnormal returns.  
According to the numbers compiled on Jay Ritter’s website, the first-day abnormal return in 
Chinese domestic IPOs is the third largest in the world, averaging to 133% in 1990–2010.  Yet, 
  
11 
 
studies report different numbers in different time periods.  Su and Fleisher (1999) obtain 949% in 
1987–1995, while Chi and Padgett (2005) find 129% in 1996–2000; Guo and Brooks (2008) report 
93.49% between 2001 and 2005.  These high first-day abnormal returns have created a ‘new-issue 
fetish’, as it was called by the Chinese media.  Investors almost blindly bought any new shares, 
paying only little attention to the quality of the IPO firm, as the CSRC virtually guaranteed them to 
make money.
3
  Not surprisingly, Chinese IPOs have been severely oversubscribed.  The GTA IPO 
research database reveals an average (median) oversubscription rate equal to 2,250 (219) between 
1995 and 2010, much higher than in any Western IPO market.  For comparison, using a unique 
database containing 39 IPOs in the U.S.A. and in Europe, Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) find that 
the oversubscription rate averages 5.2 (median of 3.0). 
The rules for allocating oversubscribed IPOs to investors – including retail as well as 
institutional – have changed several times in history as well.  Before Jan. 1, 1999, lottery cards were 
sold to investors and IPO shares were allocated randomly, based upon the serial number of those 
cards.  After 1999, buyers have to make full prepayment and initial shares are rationed according to 
the amount of prepayment.  In other words, after the IPO offer price has been set and publicly 
announced, both retail and institutional investors first subscribe to buy a certain number of IPO 
shares at this offer price and make the corresponding down payment.  Subscription is not limited to 
the branches of the IPO underwriter, as it can be made to the branches of any investment bank, 
which then deposits the down payments into a special account at the stock exchange on which the 
issuer plans to list.  If total subscription exceeds the total number of shares offered, IPO shares are 
allocated proportionally among subscribers based upon their subscription and down payments.  So, 
unlike Western IPO markets, investment banks in China never have had any discretionary allocation 
                                                          
3
 Investors in Chinese domestic stock markets are typically small and unsophisticated.  A study published on the 
website of the China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation (CSDCC) shows that small retail investors 
accounted for about 80% of the transaction volume in the year 2007.  About 56 million Chinese citizens traded stocks; 
70% of them had monthly income below RMB 5,000; over 50% of them held stocks for less than three months.  Many 
investors thus invest in stocks for speculative purposes rather than for long-term investment purposes. 
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rights.  This specific allocation mechanism hence has also prevented investment banks from 
competing for IPO mandates by means of their sales channels. 
 
1.2.2. Investment banks in Chinese domestic IPOs 
The first investment bank, Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Securities Firm, was founded only in 
1987.  During 1987–1992, three types of financial institutions could underwrite IPOs: securities 
firms, trust and investment corporations, and commercial banks.  However, public offerings were 
not required to involve an investment bank.  Yet, of the 180 firms that made an IPO between 1987 
and 1992, about 80% engaged one.  Those investment banks were ultimately owned by either the 
central government or a local-level government.  So, they all started with state ownership.
4
 
On June 24, 1993, the CSRC issued ‘The circulation on enhancing the role of securities 
underwriters and professional intermediaries in stock offerings’, which henceforth mandated every 
issuer to select an investment bank as lead underwriter for its IPO.  Upon receiving a qualification 
from the CSRC, investment banks had to organize the whole IPO process and were responsible for 
the validity and accuracy of IPO application materials.  Regulation also stipulated that the lead 
underwriter would be punished by the CSRC if the IPO documents contained serious misleading 
information or were fraudulent.  This punishment included fines, a suspension of the investment 
bank’s qualification, and even disqualification.  Besides, the lead underwriter had to buy any unsold 
IPO shares at the offer price if the IPO could not attract enough investor interest; this never 
happened in the history of Chinese domestic IPOs, however.  Also in 1993, the CSRC instructed 
that commercial banking and investment banking should be separated.  This regulation was further 
strengthened by the Law of Commercial Banking, passed by the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress on May 10, 1995, imposing that financial groups with a commercial 
                                                          
4
 To protect a domestic industry, the CSRC never allowed financial institutions majority-owned by foreigners to 
underwrite IPOs in Mainland China.  Besides, privately owned investment banks are still scarce today.  By the end of 
2010, only five investment banks are controlled by private owners; they have underwritten 57 IPOs, i.e. 2.7% of the 
total number of IPOs. 
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banking license could no longer carry out any investment banking business.  Hence, for the 
investment banks in our sample, the IPO mandate is likely to be the very first relationship between 
with listing firms.  A few years later, in 1999, trust and investment corporations were asked to split 
their investment banking business into independent legal entities, engendering a new wave of 
industry reorganizations in 1999–2001. 
On June 17, 1996, to further regulate the behaviour of lead underwriters in Chinese domestic 
IPOs, the CSRC issued ‘The circulation on issuing measures for the management of stock 
underwriting by securities firms’.  Under this regulation, the CSRC henceforth would review the 
performance of investment banks at the end of every year and determine whether they could 
continue their underwriting business in the subsequent year.  Investment banks that had committed 
serious errors or fraud could thus lose their qualification.  This same regulation also required 
underwriting expenses, including the sponsor fee, to be between 1.5% and 3% of gross IPO 
proceeds.  The latter policy was maintained until the CSRC implemented ‘The interim measures for 
stock issuance and listing recommendation’.  As of March 1, 2004, investment banks became free to 
set their fees in IPOs. 
On Dec. 31, 2003, the CSRC released the trial implementation of the price inquiry system 
for IPOs.  Investment banks no longer needed to obtain a yearly underwriting qualification but 
could set up their business upon registration with the CSRC and upon meeting certain criteria.  The 
investment banks eligible for registration had to be comprehensive securities firms with a registered 
capital of at least RMB 500 million and employing at least two sponsors.
5
  The CSRC required 
those investment banks to be “…bound by principles of good faith and due care and skill; they 
should make a full investigation into the issuer to fully understand its financial and operating 
position as well as its risks and problems” and “conduct a prudent verification of the information 
obtained in the due diligence”. 
                                                          
5
 Sponsors are individuals certified by the CSRC.  A firm should be recommended for listing by one qualified 
investment bank and by two sponsors.  In China, sponsors are usually investment-bank employees. 
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With the abolition of the quota system on June 30, 1999, the CSRC became less involved in 
checking the quality of IPO firms (see Section 1.2.1).  To ensure that investment banks would 
presume their certification role, the CSRC resorted to direct market intervention.  From 2001 till the 
end of 2004, the CSRC granted a number of ‘channels’ to every investment bank, thereby directly 
influencing its market share.  Those channels indeed limited the number of IPOs an investment 
bank could apply for at once.  For example, if an investment bank obtained four channels, it could 
handle at most four IPOs at the same time.  So, the number of IPOs an investment bank could 
underwrite in one year depended on two factors: its number of channels and the speed at which the 
CSRC handled its ongoing IPO applications.  On average, an application took about half a year to 
be handled.  If the CSRC had doubts on the validity and accuracy of the application documents, it 
could extend the approval period by asking for more information.  The number of channels a bank 
could obtain varied from one to eight, depending upon the CSRC’s assessment of the investment 
bank’s capacity.  On Dec. 31, 2004, this channel mechanism for IPOs was formally abolished. 
 
1.3. Hypotheses 
Direct empirical tests on the various determinants of investment-bank market shares are scarce in 
the literature to date.  Dunbar (2000) is the only study that has analysed how the quality and price of 
underwriting services provided by investment banks affects their market share in U.S. IPOs.  
Somewhat related, Rau (2000) examines how acquiring-firm performance and contingent fees 
impact the market share of investment banks acting as advisor in U.S. M&As.  In this article, we 
wish to examine how the government’s visible hand vis-à-vis the market’s invisible hand have 
affected investment banks’ market share in Chinese domestic IPOs.  So, we develop five hypotheses 
to explore how the investment bank’s political connections and it reputation in certifying, 
promoting, and supporting IPOs at a reasonable price influence its market share.  By doing so, we 
examine the conditions under which investment banks competed for market share by their services 
(certification, pricing, and research coverage) and price (fee rates) and when they did not.  As many 
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institutional changes took place over our sample period, we account for a potential structural break 
at the end of 2004, which is when the IPO channel mechanism was formally abolished.  In the 
empirical analyses, we subsequently test the robustness of our results when using other potential 
structural break dates. 
 
1.3.1. The political connections of investment banks 
Faccio (2006) points out that political connections could be valuable to firms in various ways, 
including a preferential treatment in government contracts, a preferential treatment by other state-
owned enterprises, a relaxed regulatory oversight of the firm itself, or a stiffer regulatory oversight 
of its rivals.  For China, which is still characterized by weak legal and market institutions, many 
scholars have shown that political connections matter for firm value and financing decisions.  For 
example, Li et al. (2008) demonstrate that Communist Party membership helps private 
entrepreneurs to obtain loans from state-owned banks and to enjoy better legal protection.  They 
also detect that Party membership is particularly valuable in regions with a lower institutional 
development.  Du and Girma (2010), using data on 106,000 Chinese firms, conclude that political 
connections, measured by a government ownership stake, significantly enhance a firm’s survival 
chances.  Interestingly, they observe that the benefits from political connections follow a political 
hierarchy.  Firms with a stake held by the central government are better off than firms with any 
other (lower) level of government ownership. 
In China, investment banks had to develop their market share in IPO underwriting from 
scratch, at a time when the quality of institutions was very poor.  Moreover, the IPO process was 
subject to heavy government administration and direct market intervention, especially before 2005.  
In such a context, investment banks could have relied on their political connections to initiate and 
enforce contracts (see also Li et al., 2008).  This may also have opened the door for an unequal 
treatment across investment banks.  As an example, investment banks with better political 
connections may have been able to obtain more channels under the channel system and/or to reduce 
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the application period for their IPOs.  Besides, political connections may have helped investment 
banks to evade punishment after serious errors or fraud in prior IPOs.  Those networks could have 
helped investment banks to attract more IPO underwriting business.  However, on Dec. 31, 2004, 
the CSRC considerably reduced its direct intervention in the IPO market.  In this study, we 
therefore posit that political connections were extremely valuable for investment banks to build 
their market share in the early years after stock market re-establishment, while their importance 
may have declined over time, along with the institutional reforms.  In summary, we postulate the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Political connections positively influenced the market share of investment banks in 
Chinese domestic IPOs; the strength of this relation may have declined after 2005. 
 
 
1.3.2. The certification role of investment banks 
Booth and Smith (1986) argue that investment banks, as repeated participants in the IPO market, 
offer certification for issuing firms.  By putting their reputation at stake, they can assure the quality 
of IPO firms to investors.  Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) develop a dynamic model to show that 
the evaluation standard adopted by an investment bank affects its reputation among investors.  This 
reputation in turn influences its market share.  The essence of this theoretical model is that investors 
update their beliefs on the skills of an investment bank by examining the quality of the IPO firms it 
recently advised, given that the true quality of issuers eventually becomes known in the aftermarket.  
If the bank applies a high evaluation standard, it is better able to find out the true quality of IPO 
candidates and correspondingly decides to stay away from low-quality issuers.  In this model, IPO 
candidates subsequently choose an investment bank with a high evaluation standard to underwrite 
their IPO, as this helps them to  market the IPO shares as well as to increase the IPO offer price.  
So, an investment bank that assists high-quality IPO firms should gain market share over time. 
  
17 
 
However, an investment bank’s reputation of strictly evaluating IPO candidates could not 
help issuers in China to increase their offer price and, thus, was not demanded by IPO firms.  The 
reason is that the CSCR largely set the issue price by imposing a fixed P/E ratio cap to all IPOs in 
one year, thereby allowing investors to realize large IPO returns, regardless of issuer quality.  In 
fact, we claim that issuers had strong incentives to hire a lead underwriter with a low evaluation 
standard, as firm earnings could then be exaggerated more easily; this, in turn, could help to raise 
the IPO offer price.
6
  So, we conjecture that in China especially investment banks adopting a low 
evaluation standard were able to gain market share over time.  This prediction seems to oppose the 
theoretical model of Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994), but arises exactly after implementing its 
rationale to the Chinese context.  IPO candidates will choose a bank with either a high or a low 
evaluation standard, depending upon which standard helps them to increase the issue price.  In 
China, a low evaluation standard achieved this objective during our period of analysis.  As investors 
had only limited opportunities to sue misbehaving issuers and underwriters, government 
administration and direct market intervention were the only forces that could impede investment 
banks from competing with a low evaluation standard.  While the CSRC relied on a strict 
supervision to hold lead underwriters responsible for the quality of IPO firms before 2005, it 
reduced its role after 2005.  Some investment banks may thus have modified their evaluation 
standard over time, to attract more underwriting business.  The above arguments result in the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: An investment bank’s evaluation standard on IPO candidates did not significantly 
influence its market share in Chinese domestic IPOs prior to 2005; after 2005, investment banks 
with a low evaluation standard were able to gain market share. 
 
1.3.3. The pricing role of investment banks 
The IPO literature has pointed out that IPOs are generally underpriced at the firm’s stock market 
                                                          
6
 Aharony et al. (2000), Ding et al. (2007) and Kao et al. (2009) find evidence of earnings management in Chinese 
IPOs. 
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introduction, i.e. issuers sell shares at a price below the firm’s fundamental value, thereby leaving 
some money on the table for investors.  Different theories have been put forward to explain this 
phenomenon and its underlying drivers (for a good review, see Ritter and Welch (2002)).  For 
example, Rock (1986) claims that uninformed investors demand IPOs to be underpriced to 
compensate them for their possible loss arising from a ‘winner’s curse’.  As the IPOs of issuers 
surrounded by more information asymmetries are riskier, those firms should sell their shares at a 
larger discount, ceteris paribus.  Benveniste and Spindt (1989) contend that issuers leave money on 
the table to reward informed investors for revealing their private information.  Tinic (1988) 
considers underpricing as a protection against possible future litigation from investors.  Investment 
banks, as repeated participants in the IPO market, play a crucial role in setting offer prices and 
hence can ensure that an IPO is appropriately underpriced.  Beatty and Ritter (1986) and 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994), among others, therefore conjecture that the investment banks that 
set a wrong price, by offering too much or too little underpricing compared to the expected level, 
will subsequently lose market share.  The reason is that underpricing too much reduces the 
attractiveness of an investment bank from the issuers’ point of view, while underpricing too little 
annoys investors.  The effect of abnormal underpricing on market share therefore depends on the 
relative importance of these two forces. 
For China, we expect to find no evidence of such a relation.  Indeed, in order for a relation 
to arise between abnormal underpricing and investment-bank market shares in IPOs, it is necessary 
that IPO underwriters have full discretion in setting the offer price, so that they can be blamed for a 
wrong pricing (and wrong underpricing).  Up till June 10, 2009, the CSRC has been making final 
decisions on the offer price in IPOs.  So, in the history of Chinese domestic IPOs, the pricing role of 
investment banks has been largely overtaken by the regulator.  Any incorrect pricing could then not 
be attributed to the incompetence of investment banks.  Moreover, even if investment banks could 
influence the offer price to some extent (by lowering their evaluation standard), this does not need 
to imply that they were able to correctly underprice an IPO.  Given the P/E ratio cap that existed, it 
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indeed created an incentive for IPO candidates to inflate their earnings (as we argue in Hypothesis 
2), but this did not provide investment banks with the necessary tools to accommodate realized 
underpricing and expected underpricing.  In line with this argument, many researchers studying 
IPOs in China have failed to find a significant relation between issuer-specific characteristics and 
IPO underpricing (e.g., Guo and Brooks, 2008; Gao 2010; Tian 2011).  On the contrary, Tian 
(2011) argues that the first-day abnormal return in Chinese IPOs largely results from excessive 
demand created by the gap between the issuing P/E ratio cap and the prevailing market P/E ratio.  
So, although underwriters could influence offer prices to some extent, they never obtained the 
power to fix a ‘good’ underpricing level.  In fact, because the issuing P/E ratio was always 
substantially below the market P/E ratio, this goal was never achievable.  We therefore conclude 
that leaving too much or too little money on the table should not affect investment banks’ market 
share in Chinese domestic IPOs.  So, we put forward the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Abnormal underpricing did not significantly influence the market share of investment 
banks in Chinese domestic IPOs. 
 
1.3.4. Research coverage provided by investment banks 
Arbel (1985) and Merton (1987) develop an asset pricing model for financial markets characterized 
by incomplete information.  Both scholars show that, because of incomplete information, investors 
may ignore particular assets, which reduces the investor base for those assets and, hence, their 
equilibrium price in financial markets.  Merton (1987) further suggests that firm managers might be 
willing to spend some resources in order to increase their firm’s visibility and hence its investor 
base.  Loughran and Ritter (2004) point out that analyst coverage, especially by star analysts, is 
essential to increase the visibility of listing firms among investors.  They further find that as of the 
1990s, issuers in the U.S.A. have put more weight on hiring lead underwriters with highly ranked 
financial analysts to ensure research coverage after the firm’s first listing.  Likewise, Krigman et al. 
(2001) show that one of the main reasons why issuers in the U.S.A. change their underwriters in 
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seasoned equity offerings is better analyst coverage.  In sum, issuers seem to highly value star-
analyst coverage by their investment banks. 
In China, the Certified Security Analyst Committee was not established until 2001.  Also, 
the first report with the names of outperforming financial analysts was made public only at the end 
of 2003.  Nonetheless, it is interesting to check the influence of star analysts on investment-bank 
market shares in the second subperiod.  Indeed, stock markets in Mainland China remain largely 
dominated by small retail investors, who might be highly responsive to analyst reports and 
investment recommendations.  Having star-analyst coverage could then be highly beneficial to the 
stock market value of listed firms, thereby inducing IPO candidates to select an underwriter that 
employs those star analysts.  We expect this relation to arise only in the second subperiod, after star 
analysts were able to establish their reputation among issuers and investors. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Employing star analysts positively influenced the market share of investment banks in 
Chinese domestic IPOs after 2005. 
 
1.3.5. Fees charged by investment banks 
Investment banks charge fees to issuers for the services that they provide in the IPO process, such 
as performing the due diligence, drafting the IPO prospectus, pricing the offer, distributing the 
shares, providing price support in the aftermarket, etc.  Holding constant the actual and perceived 
underwriting services provided, the price charged for those services likely is another important 
aspect of competition among investment banks.  Underwriting fees could therefore be another major 
determinant of investment-bank market shares (Dunbar, 2000; Rau, 2000).  In order to expand their 
market share, investment banks may initially set low fees.  Once their market share has been 
established, they could then adjust their fees to a more normal rate or even an abnormally high rate 
when enjoying market power.  Moreover, investment banks anticipating corporate bond issues, 
seasoned equity offerings, merger and acquisition activity after an issuer’s first listing may have an 
incentive to further limit underwriting fees in the IPO, as underwriting a firm’s IPO may enhance 
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the odds of advising on that firm’s subsequent corporate finance transactions (e.g., Jegadeesh et al., 
1993; Krigman et al., 2001; Ljungqvist et al., 2006).  How effective an investment bank’s fee-rate 
policy is for growing its market share is an empirical question; it likely depends on the elasticity of 
demand (for IPO underwriting) as to the price (the fee rate).  Besides, likewise abnormal 
underpricing, we expect that especially the deviation of actual fees from normal fees, given the 
characteristics of the IPO firm and its offering, should matter to explain investment-bank market 
shares. 
In China, investment banks quote their fees as a percentage of gross proceeds when 
competing for IPO underwriting business.  However, before March 1, 2004, the CSRC restricted 
underwriting fees to be between 1.5% and 3% of gross IPO proceeds.  This likely has limited an 
investment bank’s ability to use fees to compete for IPO mandates.  After March 1, 2004, 
investment banks became free to set their underwriting fees, making it much easier to rely on fee 
rates to build their market share in IPOs.  As it takes about six months to list a firm, while IPO fee 
rates are typically set at the beginning of the IPO process, we expect that this change in regulation 
may not have affected many of the issuers becoming listed in the period between March 1, 2004 and 
Dec. 31, 2004.  We therefore rely on the same structural break date as before, but then re-run the 
regressions using Feb. 28, 2004 as another breakpoint in the robustness checks later on.  In sum, we 
postulate the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Abnormal fee rates bore no relation with the market share of investment banks in 
Chinese domestic IPOs before 2005; after 2005, investment banks setting a fee rate below the 
normal rate were able to gain market share. 
 
1.4. Data and variable measurements 
We collected the data on all Chinese domestic IPOs between 1990 and 2010.  Our sample includes 
all A-share offerings on the stock exchanges of Shanghai and Shenzhen; A shares are traded in 
RMB and target domestic investors.  Foreign investors have been allowed to invest in A shares 
since Dec. 1, 2002, but only through qualified foreign investment funds that, together, cannot hold 
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more than 10% of a firm’s stock.7  We collected the offer date, the offer price, gross IPO proceeds, 
the lead underwriter(s), underwriting fees, and total floating costs from the GTA IPO research 
database.  As the data on some of the explanatory variables were still missing in the early years 
after stock market re-establishment, we had to restrict our sample period to 1995–2010.  We also 
obtained pre-IPO accounting data from the GTA database.  Post-IPO accounting data were collected 
from the CSMAR financial reports database.  When pre-IPO accounting data were available in 
GTA as well as in CSMAR, we used the CSMAR records.  Next, we cross-checked the offer 
information with the records published on finance.sina.com.cn.  In case of discordance (1.49% of 
IPOs), we manually checked the IPO prospectus to correct the data.  Stock price information was 
retrieved from Datastream. 
In the following subsections, we explain the measurement of our dependent and explanatory 
variables.  We also report and discuss descriptive statistics on these variables. 
 
1.4.1. The market share of investment banks 
The GTA IPO research database includes 174 different names of investment banks that underwrote 
at least one IPO during 1990–2010.  However, that database did not develop a coding system to 
uniquely identify each bank, which gave rise to a number of ambiguities.  Moreover, any newly 
developing industry is characterized by entry, exit, and restructuring of existing firms.  So, we 
detected name changes, ownership changes, and mergers and acquisitions of investment banks from 
investigating their website and annual reports.  We applied the following coding system for the 174 
initial banks: 
1. If one investment bank owns another by more than 50%, we used the same code for both banks.  
The reason is that to the CSRC, to the issuers, and to the investors, these two banks are actually 
                                                          
7
 B shares are offered to foreign investors and are traded in USD or in HKD.  By the end of 2010, only 108 firms 
became listed in the B-share market, typically a few months before the firm’s A-share offering.  The market value of 
these B shares is typically less than 1% of the market capitalization of the firm’s A shares. 
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one entity: they have the same ultimate owner and they even consolidate their annual accounts.  
We identified 5 such cases. 
2. Name changes arising from ownership changes, with the new owner not being an investment 
bank.  We assigned the same code to the investment bank before and after its name change, 
treating it as one entity, as the new non-bank owner inherits the business, the staff, and the 
reputation of the old investment bank.  We identified 41 such cases. 
3. Takeover by another investment bank.  We used different codes for the acquired bank and the 
acquirer before the takeover.  Yet, as of the takeover date, we assigned the acquirer’s code to 
the combined bank.  We identified 10 such cases.  None of the acquired banks was involved in 
an IPO in the two years before its takeover. 
4. Merger.  If two existing investment banks combine to form a new bank (under a new name), we 
assigned separate codes to the banks before and after their merger.  We identified 3 such cases.  
As we use lagged explanatory variables in the regressions, we computed these variables for the 
merged bank as weighted averages from the IPOs underwritten by the stand-alone banks. 
Applying the above coding system resulted in a final sample of 126 investment banks that advised 
2,064 IPOs as lead underwriter in the period 1990–2010.  Like Megginson and Weiss (1991), we 
subsequently calculated the market share of each investment bank in every year by first summing 
the gross IPO proceeds underwritten by that bank in that year and then dividing this sum by the 
year’s total gross IPO proceeds.8  17 IPOs had two lead underwriters, while six IPOs had three lead 
underwriters and two IPOs had four lead underwriters.  For those IPOs, we determined each bank’s 
stake by dividing the gross IPO proceeds by the number of lead underwriters.  Table 1.1 reports a 
year-by-year summary of market shares.  The Herfindahl index of market concentration was rather 
                                                          
8
 We examined the robustness of our results when calculating market shares based upon the number of IPOs rather than 
the amount of gross IPO proceeds underwritten by a bank, but found that our results are not robust, except for the effect 
of political connections.  We relate this finding to the fact that many banks advised only one or two IPOs per annum 
(see also Table 1.1).  Carter and Manaster (1990) suggest another measure based on tombstone announcements in U.S. 
news outlets.  However, we could not compute this measure, as tombstone news announcements are not used in Chinese 
domestic IPOs. 
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high in 1990–1992, which can be considered as the infant period of Chinese domestic stock 
markets.  From 1993 to 2000, the Herfindahl index dropped below 0.1 in most of the years.  We 
note an increase in market concentration after 2001, resulting mostly from the M&As in 1999–
2001.  Finally, the huge increase in the number of IPOs in 2010, which can be linked to the launch 
of the Growth Enterprise Market for SMEs in Oct. 2009, engendered a sharp decline in the 
Herfindahl index. 
 
Table 1.1: Summary statistics on the market share of investment banks in Chinese domestic 
IPOs. 
This table summarizes the market share of investment banks in Chinese A-share IPOs.  The market share of an investment bank in a 
given year is the sum of the gross IPO proceeds advised by that bank as lead underwriter divided by the total gross proceeds raised in 
all IPOs in that year.  When multiple lead underwriters were involved, each bank’s stake is calculated by dividing the gross IPO 
proceeds by the number of lead underwriters.  The Herfindahl index of market concentration is the sum of the squared market shares 
of all investment banks in a given year. 
 Investment banks enter and drop out from the market between 1990 and 2010.  Calculating an average and median market share and 
an overall Herfindahl index in this 21-year period is thus not useful. 
 
 
Year Number of 
IPOs  
Gross IPO 
proceeds 
(million 
RMB) 
Number of 
underwriters that 
advised at least 
one IPO 
Average 
number of 
IPOs per 
underwriter 
Median 
number of 
IPOs per 
underwriter 
Average 
market share 
per 
underwriter 
Median 
market share 
per 
underwriter 
Herfindahl 
index of 
market con-
centration 
1990 7 594 7 1.00 1 14.3% 3.4% 0.5728 
1991 17 872 13 1.31 1 7.7% 3.6% 0.1441 
1992 110 35,900 36 3.06 2 2.8% 0.2% 0.2736 
1993 142 23,600 43 3.35 2 2.3% 1.0% 0.0855 
1994 38 5,230 22 1.73 1 4.5% 2.9% 0.0753 
1995 13 2,190 10 1.30 1 10.0% 5.7% 0.3064 
1996 170 22,300 36 4.72 2 2.8% 1.1% 0.0806 
1997 188 65,500 44 4.27 2 2.3% 0.9% 0.0636 
1998 102 40,900 34 3.00 2 2.9% 1.6% 0.1158 
1999 92 49,600 33 2.79 2 3.0% 1.7% 0.0716 
2000 138 83,900 33 4.18 2 3.1% 1.3% 0.0706 
2001 67 56,300 20 3.35 2 5.0% 3.3% 0.1042 
2002 70 55,200 32 2.19 2 3.1% 1.4% 0.1969 
2003 67 45,400 35 1.94 2 2.9% 1.3% 0.1021 
2004 98 37,100 46 2.13 2 2.2% 1.7% 0.0375 
2005 15 57,600 12 1.25 1 8.3% 6.9% 0.1584 
2006 70 158,000 30 2.53 2 3.3% 0.4% 0.1737 
2007 121 459,000 37 3.65 2 2.7% 0.2% 0.1681 
2008 78 106,000 29 2.79 2 3.4% 1.1% 0.1281 
2009 112 202,000 41 2.80 1 2.4% 0.6% 0.1637 
2010 349 482,000 56 6.34 3 1.8% 0.6% 0.0505 
1990
— 
2010 
2,064 1,989,186 126 17 6 # #  
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1.4.2. The political connections of investment banks 
A common measure of a firm’s political connections is the presence (or number) of politically 
connected directors (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001; Hillman, 2005; Faccio, 2006).  
Unfortunately, the resumes of board members in Chinese investment banks are only scarcely 
disclosed.  Yet, we could identify each bank’s ultimate owner rather easily from its website or 
financial reports, which is usually either the central government or a local-level government.  In 
general, the government that controls the investment bank appoints its board members, who are 
mostly current or former government officials (Fan et al., 2007).  Correspondingly, the board 
members in central-government-owned banks tend to have a higher political hierarchy, providing 
them with better access to CSRC officials.  So, in line with Du and Girma (2010), we create a 
political hierarchy dummy equal to one if the investment bank is ultimately controlled by the central 
government, and zero otherwise.  Considering the small number of private-owned banks in our 
sample, we include them in the same group as the banks controlled by a local-level government.  In 
a (non-reported) robustness check, we excluded those five private banks from our sample and 
obtained similar results.  In Section 1.5.3, we also test the robustness of our results when 
considering the political hierarchy of the city in which the investment bank has its headquarter. 
We collected bank ownership information in every year, as ownership structure could 
change over time.  Each of the 126 investment banks in our sample had an ultimate owner with a 
stake of at least 50%.  The central government is the controlling shareholder in 8.1% of bank-year 
observations.  Investment banks are thus mostly controlled by a local-level government.  However, 
the stake of local governments has declined over time, especially as a result of the 1999–2001 
M&A wave.  They held majority control in 93.6% of bank-year observations before 2005; this was 
reduced to 81% afterwards. 
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1.4.3. The evaluation standard applied by investment banks 
According to Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994), issuers and investors assess an investment bank’s 
evaluation standard by the after-listing performance of its IPO firms.  Dunbar (2000) uses the first-
year abnormal return in the aftermarket as a proxy.  However, many scholars have argued that stock 
prices in China do not reflect the fundamental value of listed firms (Allen et al., 2005; Pistor and 
Xu, 2005).  One reason is that domestic stock exchanges are dominated by speculative retail 
investors, resulting in abnormally high stock turnover rates.  Besides, many listed firms have (or 
had) a large fraction of non-tradable shares, owned by the State or by legal persons.  We therefore 
relied on accounting data to calculate our main measure of a bank’s evaluation standard.  This 
choice was also justified by the direct link between accounting profits (earnings) and the IPO offer 
price, because of the fixed P/E ratio cap.  Due to this unique IPO pricing mechanism, issuers had 
strong incentives to exaggerate their earnings to increase the offer price.  Investment banks with a 
low evaluation standard may then either not detect or turn a blind eye on this earnings exaggeration.  
We use the industry-adjusted return on sales (ROS) as our main metric and implement a robustness 
check using industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA).  Industry adjustments are based on the 
average ROS (ROA) for the 13 industry categories established by the CSRC.  For every IPO firm, 
we calculated the change in industry-adjusted ROS (ROA) from one year before to one year after 
first listing.  Finally, like Dunbar (2000), we also rely on post-IPO abnormal stock returns. 
We proxy an investment bank’s evaluation standard in a year by the average change in 
industry-adjusted ROS of the IPO firms it underwrote in the previous two years.  A small decline in 
the industry-adjusted ROS of its issuers thus indicates that the bank adheres to a relatively strict 
standard.  In this calculation, we weighed each IPO by its gross proceeds to account for the larger 
visibility of big IPOs.  Besides, we report results when all IPOs are equally weighed.  The choice on 
how many lags to include is an empirical one.  Including too many lags levels out any changes in 
the bank’s evaluation standard over time, while including too few lags could introduce noise into 
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our measures.  We therefore relied on a two-year time frame, but find that results are largely robust 
when using alternative lags. 
Table 1.2, Panel A reports the average change in industry-adjusted accounting profitability 
of IPO firms between 1993 and 2010.  In line with previous studies (e.g., Wang, 2005; Kao et al., 
2007), firm performance deteriorates significantly after first listing.  To verify our earnings-inflation 
conjecture, we compare total accruals scaled by sales in the IPO year with this same variable in the 
post-IPO year (see also Teoh et al., 1998).
9
  Due to data limitations, we could obtain accruals data 
only as of 1998.  We find that for the firms listed in 1998–2010, accruals amplified earnings much 
more in the IPO year than in the year thereafter.  This finding, shown in Panel B of Table 1.2, 
suggests that the deterioration in industry-adjusted ROS (ROA) indeed came from earnings 
manipulation.  Next, Panel A reveals that the decline in firm performance is significantly larger for 
the firms listed after 2005.  The industry-adjusted ROS of those IPO firms drops by seven 
percentage points on average; this number was only three percentage points before.
10
  A simple t-
test rejects the null hypothesis that these averages are identical (p-value < 0.001).  Interestingly, the 
after-IPO industry-adjusted ROS (ROA) is not significantly different across both subperiods.  
Rather, it is the before-IPO industry-adjusted ROS (ROA) that differs: firms listed after 2005 
exhibit significantly better pre-IPO accounting performance than those listed before.  Arguably, 
these results suggest that issuers have inflated their before-IPO earnings to a larger extent in the 
second subperiod of our analysis, after the regulatory changes. 
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 We have no accruals data for the pre-IPO year.  Yet, Teoh et al. (1998) show that earnings exaggeration by accruals is 
strongest in the IPO year itself.  Similar conclusions were obtained for China by Aharony et al. (2000), Ding et al. 
(2007) and Kao et al. (2009). 
10
 In China, all listed firms had to implement IFRS after 2007.  However, we find that the firms becoming listed as of 
2007 still show a significant decline in their industry-adjusted ROS from one year before to one year after their IPO. 
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Table 1.2: Comparison of firm performance from before to after the IPO. 
Panel A reports summary statistics on the industry-adjusted ROS and industry-adjusted ROA.  Those measures of firm performance 
are shown for the year before the IPO and for the year after the IPO.  The change in firm performance is subsequently calculated by 
subtracting the before-IPO performance measure from the after-IPO measure.  Results are shown for IPOs in the period 1993 till 
2010 and for two subperiods: 1993–2004 and 2005–2010.  We also perform a test on the equality of means; the p-values of this t-test 
are reported in the column ‘Comparison of the means’. 
Panel B reports summary statistics on sales-scaled total accruals, which is calculated as the difference between the IPO firm’s 
operating cash flow and its earnings divided by sales.  We calculate sales-scaled accruals in the IPO year and in the year after the 
IPO.  The data necessary to calculate this variable are available only as of 1998.  Results are shown for the period 1998 till 2010 and 
for two subperiods: 1998–2004 and 2005–2010.  We also perform a test on the equality of means; the p-values of this t-test are 
reported in the column ‘Comparison of the means’. 
 
Panel A: Changes in industry-adjusted ROS and ROA 
 1993–2010 
 
1993–2004 2005–2010 Comparison 
of the means 
Variables Obs. Mean  Median Obs. Mean  Median Obs. Mean  Median p-value 
H0=equal 
means 
Industry-adjusted ROS one 
year before IPO 
1,674 0.10 0.08 1,011 0.08 0.06 663 0.13 0.11 <0.01 
Industry-adjusted ROS one 
year after IPO 
1,686 0.05 0.04 1,023 0.04 0.04 663 0.05 0.05 0.29 
Change in industry-adjusted 
ROS from one year before to 
one year after the IPO 
1,602 -0.04 -0.03 973 -0.03 -0.02 629 -0.07 -0.06 <0.01 
           
Industry-adjusted ROA one 
year before IPO 
1,652 0.07 0.06 1,000 0.05 0.04 652 0.09 0.08 <0.01 
Industry-adjusted ROA one 
year after IPO 
1,744 0.03 0.03 1,082 0.02 0.02 662 0.04 0.04 0.30 
Change in industry-adjusted 
ROA from one year before to 
one year after the IPO 
1,652 -0.04 -0.03 1,000 -0.03 -0.02 652 -0.06 -0.05 <0.01 
 
Panel B: Sales-scaled accruals 
 1998–2010 1998–2004 2005–2010 Comparison 
of the means 
Variables Obs. Mean  Median Obs. Mean  Median Obs. Mean  Median p-value 
H0=equal 
means 
Sales-scaled accruals in the 
IPO year 
851 0.059 0.031 484 0.068 0.042 367 0.048 0.022 0.25 
Sales-scaled accruals one 
year after the IPO 
851 0.016 0.001 484 0.031 0.006 367 -0.002 -0.005 <0.01 
Change in sales-scaled 
accruals from the IPO year to 
one year after the IPO 
851 -0.043 -0.031 484 -0.037 -0.036 367 -0.051 -0.028 <0.01 
 
 
1.4.4. The abnormal underpricing offered by investment banks 
We rely on a standard model to explain IPO underpricing, typically proxied by the first-day 
abnormal return in every A-share IPO.  Following Huyghebaert and Quan (2009) and Tian (2011), 
this model includes seven explanatory variables: the log of gross IPO proceeds, a dummy equal to 
one if the firm issued B, H, N or S shares
11
 before its A-share offering, a dummy equal to one if the 
                                                          
11
 H shares are listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange.  N shares are listed on the New York stock exchange.  S shares 
are listed on the Singapore stock exchange. 
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firm is privately owned, a dummy equal to one if the firm operates in a regulated industry, the log 
of the number of days between share offering and share listing, the market return from one year 
before listing to the actual listing date, and a dummy equal to one if the firm becomes listed in 
Shanghai.  We run the regression for every sample year, using all IPOs in the previous two years.  
This modelling thus allows accounting for potential changes in the determinants of IPO 
underpricing over time, as stock markets became more developed.  Table 1.3 reports the results.  In 
line with prior research, the explanatory variables can explain up to 57% of the total variation in 
first-day abnormal returns.  Thereby, the log of gross IPO proceeds has a significant negative effect 
in all years, while the market return has a significant positive impact in eleven years.  The other 
variables are significant in only two to five years. 
For every IPO, we calculate its normal underpricing level using the parameter estimates in 
Table 1.3.  The IPO’s abnormal underpricing is then computed by subtracting its expected 
underpricing level from the realized first-day abnormal return.  For every investment bank in every 
year, we proxy its accuracy as regards IPO underpricing by averaging the abnormal underpricing in 
all IPOs it advised in the previous two years, using gross IPO proceeds as weighting factor.  Again, 
we also report results when all IPOs are equally weighted.  In a (non-reported) robustness check, we 
relied on the average realized first-day abnormal return of all IPOs advised by a bank in the 
previous two years (without subtracting the conditional mean) to avoid a generated-regressor bias 
and found no impact on results. 
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Table 1.3: OLS regression results on first-day abnormal returns. 
This table reports the results of an OLS regression model that explains the first-day abnormal return for the firms listed in years t–1 
and t–2.  The first-day abnormal return is calculated as the realized first-day return minus the market return between share issuing 
and share listing.  We regress those first-day abnormal returns on the log of gross IPO proceeds, a dummy equal to one if the firm 
issued B, H, N or S shares before its A-share offering (Foreign), a dummy equal to one if the firm is majority-owned by private 
owners (Private-firm IPO), a dummy equal to one if the firm operates in a regulated industry (Regulated industry), the log of the 
number of days between share issuing and share listing, the market return from one year before listing till the listing day, and a 
dummy equal to one if the firm becomes listed in Shanghai (Market dummy).  p-values are reported between parentheses.  
Coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are indicated with ***, **, *, respectively. 
Year Intercept Log of  
gross 
proceeds 
Foreign Private- 
firm IPO 
Regulated 
industry 
Log of 
listing lag 
Market 
return 
Market 
dummy 
Adjusted    
R-squared 
Number  
of obs.  
1995 16.223** 
(0.012) 
-0.940*** 
(0.008) 
0.615 
(0.121) 
-0.032 
(0.856) 
0365 
(0.921) 
0.438* 
(0.070) 
0.722 
(0.213) 
0.713** 
(0.039) 
40% 27 
1996 7.079*** 
(0.010) 
-0.379*** 
(<0.001) 
0.592** 
(0.017) 
0.226 
(0.540) 
0.248*** 
(0.001) 
0.044 
(0.731) 
0.620*** 
(<0.001) 
0.586*** 
(<0.001) 
57% 140 
1997 4.350*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.159** 
(0.020) 
0.276 
(0.115) 
0.295 
(0.138) 
0.175* 
(0.097) 
-0.098 
(0.292) 
0.311*** 
(<0.001) 
0.037 
(0.702) 
16% 294 
1998 13.396*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.668*** 
(<0.001) 
0.174 
(0.292) 
0.167 
(0.389) 
-0.044 
(0.734) 
0.313 
(0.199) 
0.879*** 
(0.001) 
0.090 
(0.116) 
41% 257 
1999 15.908*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.798*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.181 
(0.392) 
0.247 
(0.146) 
0.309* 
(0.072) 
0.197 
(0.417) 
1.626*** 
(0.001) 
-0.052 
(0.649) 
41% 181 
2000 13.302*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.580*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.489*** 
(0.001) 
0.118 
(0.368) 
0.222 
(0.111) 
-0.178* 
(0.067) 
0.942** 
(0.013) 
0.026 
(0.821) 
26% 198 
2001 17.163*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.802*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.306** 
(0.033) 
0.094 
(0.449) 
0.009 
(0.938) 
0.151 
(0.229) 
-0.163 
(0.611) 
-0.049 
(0.821) 
44% 167 
2002 15.262*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.691*** 
(<0.001) 
0.043 
(0.822) 
-0.296** 
(0.034) 
0.108 
(0.339) 
0.084 
(0.617) 
0.899** 
(0.041) 
0.340 
(0.248) 
49% 116 
2003 11.289*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.468*** 
(<0.001) 
0.072 
(0.740) 
-0.395*** 
(0.001) 
0.174 
(0.160) 
-0.275 
(0.238) 
-0.608 
(0.266) 
-0.284 
(0.158) 
37% 122 
2004 5.956*** 
(0.001) 
-0.290*** 
(0.001) 
0.276* 
(0.094) 
-0.149* 
(0.068) 
0.070 
(0.433) 
0.187 
(0.457) 
0.906 
(0.116) 
0.011 
(0.935) 
15% 137 
2005 5.933** 
(0.033) 
-0.299** 
(0.032) 
0.258*** 
(0.001) 
-0.093 
(0.349) 
0.108 
(0.412) 
0.283 
(0.313) 
2.866*** 
(0.001) 
-0.236 
(0.277) 
20% 88 
2006 6.922*** 
(0.002) 
-0.290** 
(0.011) 
0.014 
(0.951) 
0.085 
(0.387) 
0.420* 
(0.093) 
-0.268 
(0.372) 
0.464*** 
(0.005) 
0.212 
(0.464) 
35% 75 
2007 8.299*** 
(0.001) 
-0.420*** 
(0.001) 
0.332 
(0.309) 
-0.003 
(0.984) 
0.301 
(0.190) 
0.077 
(0.847) 
1.290*** 
(<0.001) 
0.461 
(0.157) 
46% 175 
2008 10.015*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.458*** 
(0.001) 
0.405 
(0.227) 
-0.055 
(0.759) 
0.105 
(0.529) 
0.115 
(0.569) 
0.652*** 
(<0.001) 
0.399 
(0.259) 
40% 174 
2009 9.719*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.470*** 
(<0.001) 
0.306 
(0.557) 
-0.184 
(0.119) 
-0.090 
(0.428) 
0.296 
(0.123) 
0.123 
(0.242) 
0.653** 
(0.029) 
26% 173 
2010 6.012*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.271*** 
(<0.001) 
0.143 
(0.540) 
0.187** 
(0.011) 
0.010 
(0.814) 
0.060 
(0.323) 
0.334*** 
(<0.001) 
0.055** 
(0.029) 
23% 436 
 
1.4.5. The number of star analysts employed by investment banks 
At the end of 2003, the magazine New Fortune first published its annual report on previous-year 
star analysts, based upon the votes from peers and buy-side fund managers.  For every investment 
bank in every year, we construct a dummy variable that equals one when it employed at least one 
star analyst in that year.  Besides, we relate its number of star analysts to the total number of star 
analysts in that year.  Table 1.4 reports summary statistics.  Between 2004 and 2010, the number of 
star analysts increased by a factor four, while the number of investment banks employing at least 
one star analyst doubled.  A more detailed analysis of the data (not shown) reveals that the ranking 
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of star analysts became more stable after 2008, suggesting that financial analysts were able to build 
their reputation over time. 
Table 1.4: Summary statistics on the number of star analysts. 
This table summarizes the number of star analysts employed by Chinese investment banks in 2004–2010.  Information on the number 
of star analysts was obtained from New Fortune’s annual report of financial analysts. 
 
1.4.6. The abnormal underwriting fees charged by investment banks 
IPO lead underwriters receive an underwriting fee and a sponsor fee.  We could obtain the data on 
total floating costs – including the underwriting fee, sponsor fee, lawyer fee, auditing fee, and other 
listing costs – for 1,823 IPOs.  As total floating costs were not always broken down into their 
components, we had no alternative but to relate an IPO’s total floating costs to its gross proceeds.  
For the 180 IPOs on which we could collect the detailed information, we find that the underwriting 
fee and the sponsor fee accounted for about 81% of total floating costs.  For the full sample, the 
floating cost rate averages to 4.3% (median of 4.7%).  Prior to 2005, this average equals 4.0%, 
while it is 6.1% in 2005–2010.  A parametric t-test (p-value < 0.001) as well as a non-parametric 
Kruskal-Wallis test (p-value < 0.001) reject the null hypothesis that floating cost rates remained 
constant over time.  These findings indicate that fee rates in Chinese domestic IPOs fall in between 
those of European IPOs (average around 4%) and U.S. IPOs (average around 7%) (e.g., Torstila 
2001; Abrahamson et al., 2011). 
Building on Bohren et al. (1997) and Dunbar (2000), we develop a model to explain the fee 
rate in Chinese domestic IPOs.  So, we include the log of gross IPO proceeds and its quadratic term.  
This specification allows for a U-shaped relation between gross IPO proceeds and IPO fee rates (see 
also Altinkilic and Hansen, 2000).  Next, to account for the special features of Chinese domestic 
Year Total number of star 
analysts 
Total number of 
investment banks that 
employ at least one star 
analyst in that year 
Average number of star 
analysts among invest-
ment banks that employ at 
least one star analyst 
Maximum number of star 
analysts employed by an 
investment bank, if 
positive 
2004 26 6 4.3 11 
2005 84 10 8.4 25 
2006 34 4 8.5 16 
2007 104 14 7.4 28 
2008 97 16 6.1 22 
2009 134 13 10.3 21 
2010 116 13 8.9 24 
  
32 
 
IPOs, we add a dummy equal to one for firms with B, H, N or S shares outstanding, a dummy equal 
to one for privately owned firms, a dummy equal to one for firms in regulated industries, the log of 
the number of days between share offering and share listing, and a dummy equal to one if the firm 
becomes listed in Shanghai.  We again run year-by-year regressions, using all observable floating 
cost rates in the previous two years.  In line with Dunbar (2000), Table 1.5 reveals a significant 
negative coefficient on the log of gross IPO proceeds, while its quadratic term has a significant 
positive sign.  The variables accounting for the specific characteristics of Chinese domestic IPOs 
are usually not significant.  Overall, the adjusted R-squared is quite high for most annual 
regressions. 
Table 1.5: OLS regression results on fee rates. 
This table reports the results of an OLS regression model that explains the floating cost rate for the firms listed in years t–1 and t–2.  
We regress those floating cost rates on the log of gross IPO proceeds and its quadratic term, a dummy equal to one if the firm issued 
B, H, N or S shares before its A-share offering (Foreign), a dummy equal to one if the firm is majority-owned by private owners 
(Private-firm IPO), a dummy equal to one if the firm operates in a regulated industry (Regulated industry), the log of the number of 
days between share issuing and share listing, the market return from one year before listing till the listing day, and a dummy equal to 
one if the firm becomes listed in Shanghai (Market dummy).  p-values are reported between parentheses.  Coefficients significant at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level are indicated with ***, **, *, respectively. 
Year Intercept Log of gross 
proceeds 
Square of log 
of gross  
proceeds 
Foreign Private-firm 
IPO 
Regulated 
industry 
Log of listing 
lag 
Market 
dummy 
Adjusted 
R-squared 
Number 
of obs. 
1995 0.244* 
(0.085) 
-0.119 
(0.113) 
0.003 
(0.139) 
-0.006* 
(0.087) 
0.002 
(0.516) 
0.000 
(0.919) 
-0.003 
(0.138) 
-0.014*** 
(0.001) 
24% 38 
1996 0.936 
(0.376) 
-0.079 
(0.425) 
0.002 
(0.898) 
0.014 
(0.155) 
0.001 
(0.935) 
0.004 
(0.650) 
0.003 
(0.372) 
-0.003 
(0.696) 
6% 156 
1997 1.018*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.089 
(0.381) 
0.002 
(0.469) 
0.004 
(0.139) 
0.004 
(0.307) 
-0.000 
(0.825) 
0.001 
(0.436) 
-0.000 
(0.887) 
33% 264 
1998 1.147*** 
(0.001) 
-0.101*** 
(<0.001) 
0.002*** 
(<0.001) 
0.001 
(0.739) 
0.002 
(0.360) 
-0.001 
(0.668) 
0.001 
(0.623) 
-0.000 
(0.655) 
62% 249 
1999 1.340*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.020*** 
(<0.001) 
0.003*** 
(<0.001) 
0.000 
(0.747) 
-0.002 
(0.106) 
-0.001 
(0.291) 
0.002*** 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.299) 
73% 160 
2000 0.1.185*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.102*** 
(<0.001) 
0.002*** 
(<0.001) 
0.000 
(0.898) 
-0.002 
(0.204) 
-0.002 
(0.158) 
0.001 
(0.221) 
0.001 
(0.420) 
75% 199 
2001 1.192*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.012*** 
(<0.001) 
0.002*** 
(<0.001) 
0.002 
(0.420) 
-0.001 
(0.225) 
-0.000 
(0.979) 
-0.001 
(0.154) 
0.001 
(0.532) 
62% 163 
2002 1.299*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.113*** 
(<0.001) 
0.0025*** 
(<0.001) 
0.003* 
(0.061) 
-0.003** 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.613) 
-0.001 
(0.192) 
0.002 
(0.127) 
62% 116 
2003 1.129*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.096*** 
(<0.001) 
0.002*** 
(<0.001) 
0.003 
(0.171) 
0.001 
(0.646) 
-0.002 
(0.173) 
-0.002 
(0.138) 
_ 64% 120 
2004 0.739*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.618*** 
(<0.001) 
0.001*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.805) 
0.003** 
(0.050) 
-0.002 
(0.368) 
0.007 
(0.188) 
_ 52% 131 
2005 0.509 
(0.238) 
-0.036 
(0.394) 
0.001 
(0.549) 
-0.006 
(0.779) 
-0.001 
(0.691) 
0.001 
(0.799) 
0.006 
(0.259) 
-0.007 
(0.101) 
40% 89 
2006 1.126*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.094 
(0.291) 
0.002 
(0.375) 
-0.003 
(0.986) 
-0.001 
(0.994) 
-0.002 
(0.575) 
0.006 
(0.155) 
-0.004 
(0.182) 
36% 75 
2007 2.818*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.246*** 
(<0.001) 
0.005*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.295) 
0.002 
(0.409) 
-0.006* 
(0.074) 
-0.004 
(0.345) 
0.010 
(0.170) 
82% 175 
2008 2.556*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.220*** 
(<0.001) 
0.005*** 
(<0.001) 
0.001 
(0.930) 
-0.002 
(0.384) 
0.001 
(0.824) 
-0.006* 
(0.077) 
0.004 
(0.283) 
80% 174 
2009 2.689*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.230*** 
(<0.001) 
0.005*** 
(<0.001) 
0.001 
(0.786) 
-0.003 
(0.133) 
0.001 
(0.525) 
-0.001 
(0.120) 
-0.001 
(0.971) 
80% 173 
2010 2.324*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.199*** 
(<0.001) 
0.004*** 
(<0.001) 
0.001 
(0.981) 
-0.001 
(0.815) 
0.004 
(0.194) 
-0.004 
(0.204) 
-0.005 
(0.564) 
62% 436 
Note: in 2001–2003, only one firm became listed in Shenzhen; therefore, the market dummy was omitted from the 2003 and 2004 
regressions.  
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1.4.7. Summary 
Our panel data set includes information on 126 investment banks and 16 years.  As not all 
investment banks existed in all years and as data on some of the explanatory variables are missing 
in some of the years, the panel is unbalanced.  Table 1.6 reports summary statistics on the 
explanatory variables.  From the correlation matrix (not reported), we infer that multicollinearity 
problems are unlikely.  This conclusion also arises from examining the variance inflation factors, 
which are always less than five.  In a non-reported robustness check, we removed the 5% most 
influential observations and found that our results are qualitatively unchanged. 
 
Table 1.6: Summary statistics for the variables used in the multivariate analyses. 
This table reports summary statistics on the investment-bank market share, the political hierarchy dummy, the gross-proceeds 
weighted average change in industry-adjusted ROS, the gross-proceeds weighted average abnormal underpricing, the star analysts 
dummy, and the gross-proceeds weighted average abnormal fee rate.  In Panels A and B, the summary statistics cover the two 
subperiods: 1995–2004 and 2005–2010, respectively. 
Panel A: 1995–2004 
Variable Obs. 
Bank year 
Mean Median Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. 
Investment-bank market share 229  0.037  0.022  0.049  0.000  0.422  
Political hierarchy dummy 229 0.279 - - - - 
Gross-proceeds weighted average change in 
industry-adjusted ROS  
229  -0.017  -0.015  0.067  -0.310  0.288  
Gross-proceeds weighted average abnormal 
underpricing 
229 -0.023 -0.053 0.572 -2.902 2.428 
Gross-proceeds weighted average abnormal 
fee rate  
229  0.009  0.020  0.058  -0.111  0.287  
Panel B: 2005–2010 
Variable Obs. 
Bank year 
Mean Median Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. 
Investment-bank market share 149  0.036  0.009  0.063  0.000  0.344  
Political hierarchy dummy 149 0.362 - - - - 
Gross-proceeds weighted average change in 
industry-adjusted ROS  
149  -0.069  -0.053  0.075  -0.488  0.096  
Gross-proceeds weighted average abnormal 
underpricing 
149 0.023 -0.009 0.369 -0.967 1.791 
Star analysts dummy 149 0.436 - - - - 
Gross-proceeds weighted average abnormal 
fee rate 
149 -0.007  0.018  0.202  -0.186 0.333  
 The star analyst dummy is not included in the regressions for the subperiod 1995–2004.  
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1.5. Multivariate analyses and results 
We rely on a system GMM model to run the multivariate analyses; this model is based on Arellano 
and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998).  We first introduce 
the methodology and discuss the regression output thereafter.  We end this section with a discussion 
of the results from various robustness checks. 
 
1.5.1. Methodology 
Our main regression model looks as follows: 
                                                                        
                                                      
(1) 
with: 
MSi,t: Market share of investment bank i in year t. 
Pol.Conni,t–1: Dummy equal to one if the investment bank is ultimately controlled by the 
central government in year t1, and zero otherwise. 
Eval.Standi,t–1: Weighted average of the change in industry-adjusted ROS of all IPOs 
advised by investment bank i in years t1 and t2.  All IPOs are weighed by their gross 
proceeds. 
Abn.Underpri,t–1: Weighted average of the abnormal underpricing of all IPOs advised by 
investment bank i in years t1 and t2, using gross IPO proceeds as weighting factor. 
SAi,t–1: Dummy equal to one if investment bank i employed at least one star analyst in year 
t1. 
Abn.Feei,t–1: Weighted average of abnormal fee rates in all IPOs advised by investment bank 
i in years t1 and t2, using gross IPO proceeds as weighting factor. 
iC : Individual effect of investment bank i. 
Yeart: Year dummy for year t. 
 
Dunbar (2000) uses the change in market share over a one-year window as dependent variable.  
This treatment is equivalent to fixing the coefficient on the lagged market share variable to one in 
equation (1).  In well-funtioning financial markets, this assumption can still be defended.  However, 
in China, where stock exchanges were only recently re-established, the influence of one-year lagged 
market share on current-year market share may be far less than one.  We therefore add the lagged 
market share variable as an extra regressor (see also Rau, 2000). 
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We adopt a panel data methodology to estimate equation (1), with observations identified by 
investment bank and by year.  A standard way to account for the investment-bank individual effect 
is by using either a random-effects or a fixed-effects specification.  However, these models may 
produce biased parameter estimates once the lagged dependent variable is added to the model 
(Nickell, 1981; Beggs and Nerlove, 1988).  Anderson and Hsiao (1981) offer a solution based on a 
first-difference transformation, from which the individual effect iC  drops out.  To deal with the 
correlation between , 1 , 2( )i t i ty y   and , , 1( )i t i t   , the variable , 2i ty   can be used as an instrument 
for , 1 , 2( )i t i ty y  .
12
  Arellano and Bond (1991) point out that this instrument construction method 
applies to any other predetermined explanatory variable whose current value may be affected by 
past shocks in the dependent variable.  We consider Eval.Standi,t–1, Abn.Underpri,t–1, SAi,t–1 and 
Abn.Feei,t–1 as such predetermined variables.  To check the validity of the instruments, we rely on 
the Arellano-Bond test. 
Based on Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998) develop a more efficient estimation method by including level equations into the GMM.  
Specifically, they construct a system GMM with two parallel equations: the first-difference 
equation and the level equation.  They show that if the individual effects are not correlated with the 
first observation of the first-differenced explanatory variables, the lagged first difference can be 
used as an instrument for the level explanatory variables, while the lagged values of the levels can 
serve as instrument in the first-difference equation.  The joint estimation of the level equation and 
the first-difference equation can improve efficiency.  So, we opted for a two-step system GMM 
estimation, which also accounts for possible heteroskedasticity and correlations among the error 
terms.  As Arellano and Bond (1991) note that the standard errors are often under-estimated in a 
                                                          
12
 We use only one lag of the explanatory variable as instrument, but implemented robustness checks using two lags; 
results proved similar.  However, we do find that the significance level of the instrumented variables drops considerably 
when using more than two lags, which can be attributed to the considerably smaller sample size to estimate the ensuing 
models. 
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two-step GMM dynamic panel data model, we calculate p-values using Windmeijer-adjusted 
standard errors (Windmeijer, 2005). 
Table 1.7: Determinants of investment-bank market shares in Chinese domestic IPOs. 
Model 1 in this table reports the OLS regression results when the current-year market share is regressed on the last-year market share.  
Next, model 2 reports the results of a two-step system GMM regression, where current-year investment-bank market share is 
regressed on the bank’s previous-year market share, a dummy that equals one if the bank is ultimately controlled by the central 
government in the previous year, the average change in industry-adjusted ROS of all IPOs advised by the bank in the previous two 
years, the average abnormal underpricing of all IPOs advised by the bank in the previous two years, a dummy that equals one if the 
bank employs at least one star analyst in the previous year, and the average abnormal fee rate in all IPOs advised by the bank in the 
previous two years.  In this model, all explanatory variables are weighted by the IPO’s gross proceeds.  Model 3 reports the results 
when all explanatory variables are calculated using equal weights for all IPOs in the two-year historical window.  The regression 
models always include year dummies.  p-values are reported between parentheses.  The p-values are calculated using Windmeijer-
adjusted standard errors.  We also report the p-value from the Arellano-Bond test to verify the validity of the instruments; a high p-
value means that the validity of the instruments cannot be rejected.  Coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are 
indicated with ***, **, *, respectively.  Finally, the last two columns in the table (Coefficient comparison) report the p-values from a 
t-test that examines the null hypothesis that the parameter estimates in the two subperiods are identical to one another. 
 1995–2004 2005–2010 Coefficient comparison 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 0.020*** 
(<0.001) 
0.033** 
(0.049) 
0.080 
(0.365) 
 
0.009* 
(0.060) 
-0.026** 
(0.017) 
-0.011 
(0.343) 
  
Last-year market share 0.456*** 
(<0.001) 
0.147 
(0.231) 
0.112 
(0.367) 
0.737*** 
(<0.001) 
0.382*** 
(<0.001) 
0.325** 
(0.013) 
0.009*** 0.021** 
Political hierarchy 
dummy  
 0.074** 
(0.013) 
0.069* 
(0.059) 
 0.058** 
(0.030) 
0.049** 
(0.035) 
0.050** 0.069* 
Gross-proceeds 
weighted average 
change in industry-
adjusted ROS 
 0.090 
(0.413) 
  -0.210** 
(0.050) 
 0.036**  
Equally weighted 
average change in 
industry-adjusted ROS 
  0.038 
(0.891) 
  -0.134*** 
(0.001) 
 0.001*** 
Gross-proceeds 
weighted average 
abnormal underpricing  
 0.014 
(0.157) 
  0.000 
(0.998) 
 0.554  
Equally weighted 
average abnormal 
underpricing 
  0.015 
(0.302) 
  -0.010 
(0.551) 
 0.206 
Star analysts dummy     0.015 
(0.500) 
0.017 
(0.455) 
  
Gross-proceeds 
weighted average 
abnormal fee rate  
 0.064 
(0.719) 
  -0.051* 
(0.086) 
 0.061*  
Equally weighted 
average abnormal fee 
rate 
  0.050 
(0.843) 
  -0.108* 
(0.087) 
 0.065* 
Year dummies 
 
 Yes Yes  Yes Yes   
p-value of Wald Chi-
square test 
 <0.001 <0.001  <0.001 <0.001   
p-value of Arellano-
Bond test 
 0.592 0.961  0.320 0.275   
Adjusted R-squared 0.221   0.658     
Number of observations 953 229 229 543 149 149   
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Table 1.7 reports the output of three regression models.  Model 1 is an OLS model that only 
includes the last-year market share as explanatory variable.  Model 2 is a system GMM model that 
uses a gross-proceeds weighted average calculation for the change in industry-adjusted ROS, 
abnormal underpricing, and the abnormal fee rate, while Model 3 relies on equally weighted 
averages. 
 
1.5.2. Discussion of the results 
When the lagged market share is the only explanatory variable, we find that it has a significant 
positive effect in both subperiods.  However, the coefficient is far smaller in the first subperiod.  
Also, once the full set of test variables is added to the model, the lagged market share variable 
becomes insignificant in 1995–2004.  These results thus indicate that market shares were far from 
stable in the early years after stock market re-establishment.  Yet, following repeated market 
interactions, market shares started to show at least some persistency in more recent years.  After 
2005, we indeed find a parameter estimate of about 0.35 in Models 2–3.  This number is still far 
smaller than one, implying that a high market share in one year is hardly a guarantee for an equally 
high market share in the subsequent year. 
Before 2005, political connections significantly positively influenced investment-bank 
market shares.  Specifically, Models 2 and 3 show that an investment bank ultimately controlled by 
the central government could expect a market share that was about 7% larger than that of an 
investment bank with other owners, ceteris paribus.  This advantage is economically meaningful, as 
the average market share in the years 1995–2004 was only 3.7%.  After 2005, investment banks 
controlled by the central government still enjoyed a competitive advantage, but at a lower level 
(about 5%).  Standard t-tests in the table point out that the influence of political connections is 
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significantly larger in the first subperiod.
13
  Overall, our results on the role of political connections 
are in line with Hypothesis 1. 
Next, all models reveal that an investment bank’s evaluation standard is not significant 
before 2005.  In support of Hypothesis 2, this variable becomes significantly and negatively 
associated with investment-bank market shares after 2005.  Also, the effect is more pronounced 
when accounting for the larger visibility of big IPOs, i.e. in Model 2.  Based upon Model 2, we 
conclude that an investment bank can expect a 0.21% increase in its market share for a 1% 
reduction in its evaluation standard (measured by the average change in industry-adjusted ROS 
from one year before to one year after the IPO for all IPOs it underwrote in the previous two years).  
This outcome contradicts the theoretical predictions of Booth and Smith (1986) and Chemmanur 
and Fulghieri (1994).  Then again, incentives to hire lead underwriters with a high evaluation 
standard were largely absent in China over the last two decades.  Rather, investment banks with a 
low evaluation standard allowed IPO candidates to inflate their earnings to increase the IPO offer 
price.  When running robustness checks using the average change in industry-adjusted ROS of IPO 
firms advised in a three-year historical window (not reported), results are similar to those in Table 
1.7.  However, when using a one-year lag, the evaluation standard variable still has a negative 
coefficient, but is no longer significant (p-value of 0.371).  Nonetheless, we have to consider that 
about half of the investment banks underwrote less than two IPOs in most years (Table 1.1), which 
could reduce the validity of the latter test.  Next, we calculated the average change in industry-
adjusted ROS up to two years after the IPO.  The latter variable also has a significant negative sign 
(coefficient of -0.135; p-value of 0.082).  The magnitude of the latter parameter estimate probably 
                                                          
13
 As the Chinese domestic IPO market changed dramatically over time, one may worry that changes in firm 
characteristics (average and standard deviation) produce or contribute to the changes in parameter estimates from before 
to after 2005.  In a (non-reported) robustness test, we standardized all variables – except for the dummy variables – in 
each subperiod and re-run the regressions on those standardized variables, to obtain the standardized regression 
coefficients.  We then again compared the corresponding parameter estimates in the two subperiods, finding that results 
are similar to those in Table 1.7. 
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indicates that part of the earnings (accruals) have already reversed by the end of the first post-IPO 
year. 
As expected, the coefficient on average abnormal underpricing is significant neither in the 
first subperiod nor in the second.  This outcome thus confirms Hypothesis 3, as the CSRC was a 
highly influential factor in setting the IPO offer price up till June 10, 2009.  During almost the entire 
sample period, investment banks in China had only limited influence on how much money was left 
on the table by setting IPO offer prices.  Consequently, investment banks’ market share in Chinese 
domestic IPOs did not depend upon whether IPOs were properly underpriced.  In a non-reported 
robustness check, we left out the data as of June 10, 2009.  Average abnormal underpricing remains 
insignificant in this case, with a p-value that is now even larger (p-value of 0.925).  Unfortunately, 
the size of our dataset does not allow running these same regressions using only the IPOs as of June 
10, 2009. 
We fail to find supporting evidence for the idea that star analysts significantly enhance the 
market share of investment banks in the second subperiod (Hypothesis 4).  When we measure this 
variable in an alternative way, i.e. the fraction of total star analysts employed by the investment 
bank, we still find no significant effect.  Two arguments could explain these results: 1) Possibly, 
star analysts in China need more time to build their reputation; issuers also need extra time to 
realize that research coverage by star analysts can sustain stock prices. 2) Many listed firms in 
China are still controlled by the State; managers in those firms are not exposed to the threat of an 
external takeover as much as managers in private-controlled firms in Western economies.  In sum, 
we recognize that data over a longer time interval, possibly also including more data on private-firm 
IPOs, is needed to draw more definite conclusions on the relation between star analysts and 
investment-bank market shares in China. 
Finally, the abnormal fee rate in Chinese domestic IPOs has no significant impact on the 
market share of investment banks in the first subperiod.  In the second subperiod, the abnormal fee 
rate does become significant, thereby confirming Hypothesis 5.  Model 2 reveals that after 2005, an 
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investment bank could gain about 0.05% in market share when setting its fee rate 1% below the 
normal fee rate. 
As a further robustness check (not reported), we split the sample period by Dec. 31, 2003, 
which is when the CSRC stopped its annual verification of underwriters.  Results prove similar, 
except that the average change in industry-adjusted ROS no longer meets the 10% significance level 
(p-value of 0.260).  Next, we split the sample by Feb. 28, 2004, which is when constraints on 
underwriting fees were lifted.  The above results again remain valid, yet the significance level for 
the coefficient on the investment bank’s evaluation standard again increases (p-value of 0.251).  
The above changes in significance levels are understandable, as we now include the IPOs in either 
the 12- or 10-month period during which the CSRC still directly influenced IPO market shares 
under the channel mechanism in the second subperiod.  As regards the abnormal fee rate, we find 
no major change in parameter estimate/ significance level when using Feb. 28, 2004 as structural 
break date, which is in line with our argument that the abolition of the fee restrictions enabled 
investment banks to compete for market share by differentiating their fee rates only for firms 
becoming listed a few months later. 
 
1.5.3. Robustness checks 
Table 1.8 shows the output of a number of additional robustness checks.  Models 1–3 present the 
results when using alternative variables to proxy for the theoretical constructs.  Models 4–6 report 
on several extensions of the base model.  The results from those extra analyses generally confirm 
those in Table 1.7. 
Du et al. (2012) use the political hierarchy of the city in which an SOE has its headquarter to 
examine the relation between political connections and SOE annual performance rankings by the 
State Asset Council.  As Beijing is the political center of China and as Shanghai is the economic 
and financial center, Du et al. assign the highest political hierarchy to these two cities.  They find 
that SOEs with a head office in either Beijing or Shanghai obtain a higher performance ranking, 
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everything else constant.  So, as an alternative way to measure political connections, we collected 
the data on the head-office location of investment banks.  About 25% of the investment banks in our 
sample have their headquarter in Beijing or in Shanghai.  Table 1.8, Model 1 shows that this allows 
them to secure a larger market share in IPOs.  Again, this effect proves strongest in the first 
subperiod. 
Next, we explore how alternative measurements of the investment bank’s evaluation 
standard influence the results.  In Model 2 of Table 1.8, we use the average change in industry-
adjusted ROA.  Results are in line with those in Table 1.7.  Besides, we implement a robustness 
check using the average one-year post-IPO market-adjusted return of IPO firms underwritten in the 
previous two years.  The results, displayed in column 3 of Table 1.8, reveal that this variable is 
never significant.  While a non-significant parameter estimate is not in line with our findings based 
on accounting measures of firm performance (ROS and ROA), we have to keep in mind that stock 
prices in China may not always reflect the fundamental value of listed firms (e.g., Allen et al., 2005; 
Pistor and Xu, 2005). 
Dunbar (2000) argues that investment banks just entering the IPO underwriting market may 
focus on one specific industry to develop their expertise, while the more established banks may 
want to diversify their underwriting business across various industries to secure a more constant 
IPO flow.  To examine the impact of industry specialization on investment-bank market shares, we 
classify an investment bank’s IPOs in years t–1 and t–2 into each of the 13 industry categories 
established by the CSRC, from which we calculate a Herfindahl concentration index.  We then add 
this index as an extra explanatory variable to our models.  Model 4 in Table 1.8 shows that industry 
concentration is never significant.  The Herfindahl index remains insignificant when calculated over 
a three-year historical window (p-value of 0.983; not reported). 
We further note an increasingly larger number of privately owned firms becoming listed 
over time.  Specifically, 83% of IPO firms in 2010 had a private controlling shareholder, compared 
to only 16% in 2000.  So, and as an extension of the previous analysis on industry specialization, 
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we wish to examine whether investment banks building expertise on private issuers could expand 
their market share more easily.  To test this idea, we construct a new variable Private-IPO fraction, 
which is the ratio of an investment bank’s private-firm IPOs to its total number of IPOs in the 
previous two years.  A higher value on this variable thus indicates that the investment bank focuses 
more on underwriting private-firm IPOs.  Model 5 in Table 1.8 reveals that this variable is never 
significant; it remains non-significant when calculated over a three-year historical window (p-value 
of 0.707; not reported). 
 
1.6. Conclusions 
This paper examines the forces that have influenced the market share of investment banks in 
Chinese domestic IPOs between 1995 and 2010.  In those 16 years, the market for A-share IPOs has 
grown from RMB 2 billion to RMB 482 billion in terms of gross IPO proceeds.  Also, Chinese 
domestic IPOs accounted for 45% of the number and 39% of the gross proceeds of worldwide IPOs 
in 2010.  Our results reveal that prior to 2005, stronger political connections alone were sufficient to 
ensure a considerable stake in IPO underwriting.  After 2005, this effect declined, yet remains 
statistically and economically significant.  Meanwhile, investment banks could further expand their 
market share by competing on services and fees.  By setting a fee rate lower than the expected rate, 
investment banks were able to attract extra underwriting business.  A more interesting result is that, 
unlike the findings for Western economies, investment banks that used a lower evaluation standard 
on IPO candidates were able to increase their market share in subsequent IPOs.  We view this 
phenomenon as a result of the unique Chinese IPO pricing mechanism, which distorted the offer 
price in the primary market. 
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Table 1.8: Robustness checks on the determinants of investment-bank market shares in 
Chinese domestic IPOs. 
This table reports the results of robustness checks using a two-step system GMM regression.  Model 1 tests an alternative proxy for 
political connections, i.e. a dummy equal to one if the investment bank’s headquarter is in Beijing or in Shanghai.  Model 2 measures 
the investment bank’s evaluation standard by the average change in industry-adjusted ROA from one year before to one year after the 
IPO for all IPOs advised by the bank in the previous two years, while model 3 relies on the average one-year post-IPO market-adjusted 
return of its previous IPOs.  Model 4 explores the influence of industry concentration by adding the Herfindahl index for IPOs advised 
in the previous two years.Likewise, model 5 examines the influence of private-firm IPOs by adding the fraction of IPOs involving 
privately owned firms in a two-year historical window.  The p-values are calculated using Windmeijer-adjusted standard errors.  We 
also report the p-value from the Arellano-Bond test to verify the validity of the instruments.  Coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level are indicated with ***, **, *, respectively. 
 
 
By focusing on the evolution of investment-bank market shares in Chinese domestic IPOs, 
our paper analyses a small, yet crucial aspect of Chinese reforms over the past 20 years.  In the 
early years after stock market re-establishment, the regulator chose to directly interfere in the IPO 
market by assuming the role of market participants.  By selecting the firms eligible for listing 
(before July 1999), the CSRC largely replaced the investment banks in examining the quality of 
IPO candidates.  By approving IPO applications, the regulator also repealed investor demand for 
firm-quality certification by lead underwriters.  By setting a fixed P/E ratio cap (before June 10, 
 1995–2004 2005–2010 
Models 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Intercept 0.026 
(0.807) 
0.026 
(0.693) 
0.052 
(0.673) 
0.079 
(0.298) 
 
0.056 
(0.655) 
 
0.016 
(0.780) 
-0.020 
(0.122) 
0.026** 
(0.017) 
0.041 
(0.871) 
-0.017 
(0.266) 
Last-year market share 0.195 
(0.514) 
0.141 
(0.739) 
0.043 
(0.629) 
0.104 
(0.666) 
0.066 
(0.845) 
0.348** 
(0.022) 
0.350**
* 
(0.001) 
0.389**
* 
(0.006) 
0.300* 
(0.100) 
0.347**
* 
(<0.001
) Political hierarchy dummy   0.067**
* 
(<0.001
) 
0.076** 
(0.048) 
0.053** 
(0.014) 
0.073* 
(0.082) 
 0.055** 
(0.029) 
0.040** 
(0.034) 
0.036 
(0.519) 
0.054* 
(0.057) 
Political hierarchy dummy (by 
head-office location) 
0.051**
* 
(0.003) 
    0.044** 
(0.035) 
    
Gross-proceeds weighted 
average change in industry-
adjusted ROS 
0.051 
(0.754) 
  0.057 
(0.882) 
0.013 
(0.934) 
-0.192* 
(0.076) 
  -
0.201** 
(0.014) 
-
0.180** 
(0.034) 
Gross-proceeds weighted 
average change in industry-
adjusted ROA 
 -0.190 
(0.739) 
    -
0.233** 
(0.015) 
   
Gross-proceeds weighted 
average abnormal return in 
the aftermarket 
  -0.026 
(0.125) 
    0.005 
(0.312) 
  
Gross-proceeds weighted 
average abnormal 
underpricing 
0.007 
(0.451) 
0.143 
(0.680) 
0.029 
(0.356) 
0.016 
(0.419) 
0.011 
(0.578) 
0.011 
(0.651) 
0.004 
(0.693) 
0.001 
(0.970) 
0.004 
(0.942) 
-0.002 
(0.198) 
Star analysts dummy      0.035* 
(0.099) 
0.041 
(0.220) 
0.023 
(0.329) 
0.013 
(0.935) 
0.019 
(0.320) 
Gross-proceeds weighted 
average abnormal fee rate 
0.067 
(0.693) 
0.037 
(0.825) 
0.044 
(0.831) 
-0.036 
(0.932) 
0.019 
(0.897) 
-
0.065** 
(0.048) 
-0.045 
(0.135) 
-
0.053** 
(0.020) 
-0.075 
(0.353) 
-
0.055** 
(0.035) 
Industry concentration    -0.031 
(0.717) 
    0.005 
(0.954) 
 
Private-IPO fraction     -0.026 
(0.305) 
    -0.001 
(0.585) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
p-value of Wald Chi-square test <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
p-value of Arellano-Bond test 0.651 0.820 0.967 0.920 0.909 0.276 0.336 0.243 0.259 0.310 
Number of observations 229 230 229 226 229 149 150 152 149 149 
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2009), the CSRC restrained the pricing role of investment banks.  By confining fee rates within a 
narrow range (before March 2004), the CSRC largely deprived investment banks from setting a 
price for their services.  Possibly, such interferences were indispensable when financial markets 
were still immature; their side effects are obvious too, as shown in this article.  First, we have 
clearly pointed out that although the CSRC undertook administrative efforts to incite investment 
banks to assume a certification role, its efforts achieved only little.  Investment banks never gained 
market share by applying a strict evaluation standard on IPO candidates.  Rather, CSRC 
intervention only prevented that banks with a high evaluation standard lost market share in the 
period 1995–2004.  Once this visible hand was relaxed, those investment banks indeed started to 
lose market share.  We therefore conclude that government intervention is hardly as efficient as the 
market mechanism in disciplining market participants.  Next, we have demonstrated that 
government intervention has favoured investment banks with better political connections, which 
further questions its effectiveness.  This mechanism remains non-trivial in most recent years.  
Finally, our results may also help to explain why the joint ventures established by foreign 
investment banks could obtain only a tiny stake in IPO underwriting, thereby putting a further 
constraint on competitive forces in the Chinese domestic IPO market.  Indeed, foreign investment 
banks typically have a competitive advantage in terms of IPO certification and issuer valuation; 
those are skills that were accumulated over a long period of time and that underlie their reputation.  
However, our study demonstrates that those skills were appreciated neither by issuers nor by 
investors in Chinese domestic IPOs over the last two decades. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Over-issuance in Chinese domestic IPOs 
 
2.1. Introduction 
As of June 10, 2009, the Chinese regulator has fully ended its control over offer prices in Chinese 
domestic IPOs.  Ever since, IPOs on the stock exchanges of Shanghai and Shenzhen have topped 
the world in terms of number and gross IPO proceeds (Ernst & Young, 2012).  Recently, a new 
phenomenon has caught the attention of the regulator and the media: issuers raise much more 
finance than needed for their planned investment projects, as shown in their IPO application 
documents.  We henceforth call this phenomenon ‘over-issuance’.  Moreover, issuers seem to pay 
larger fees to their investment banks when raising excessive capital at IPO-time.  One of the largest 
financial newspapers in China, the China Securities Times, revealed in its June 2010 edition: 
“…most issuing firms include an ‘over-issuance clause’ in their underwriting contract with 
investment banks; this clause allows fee rates to increase with over-issuance....”  Despite media 
attention for over-issuance, academic research on this topic still falls short. 
In this paper, we first provide empirical evidence on the importance of over-issuance in 
Chinese domestic IPOs during the period Jan. 1, 2010 – Dec. 31, 2011.  During this time frame, 
Chinese IPOs were all primary share offerings by law, thereby raising new funds for the firms 
becoming listed.  Issuers, together with their investment banks, have to apply for IPO permission by 
the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC).  In their IPO application documents, they 
have to specify the amount of capital needed for their planned investment projects and the number 
of shares they intend to sell.  Deceiving the regulator by including unrealistic information as to the 
firm’s investment projects could induce severe punishment on the issuer and on its underwriter(s).  
As IPO application documents are downloadable from the CSRC website, we were able to collect 
the data on the capital needed for prospective investment projects from those documents.  After 
obtaining listing approval, issuers and investment banks conduct a price inquiry among institutional 
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investors in a bookbuilding procedure and decide on the final offer price and on the number of IPO 
shares to be sold.  We define over-issuance as the ratio of net proceeds raised in the IPO to total 
capital required for the firm’s planned investment projects, as disclosed in its IPO application 
documents.  Net proceeds are gross proceeds minus investment-bank fees, auditing fees, lawyer 
fees, and any other IPO expenses.  Among the 607 firms that listed as of Jan. 1, 2010 up till the end 
of 2011, we removed the IPOs of financial institutions, resulting in a final sample of 587 IPOs.  For 
those firms, the average over-issuance equals 2.55 (median of 2.36).  In total, RMB 299 billion of 
capital was raised without corresponding investment projects.  Only 25 issuers (4.2% of sample 
firms) collected less funds than initially planned. 
Next, we follow Kim and Weisbach (2008) to examine the usage of capital raised.  We show 
that the over-issued capital is spent neither on extra investment outlays nor on paying down debt, 
but rather is accumulated in the cash and cash equivalents account.  By the end of the second post-
IPO year, the average issuer’s cash holdings still amount to 78% of funds raised at IPO-time 
(median of 70%).  On average, the cash-to-total-assets ratio equals 29% for IPO firms by the end of 
their second post-IPO year (median of 25%), while the average cash ratio for all listed firms is only 
18% (median of 15%).  In all industries, the cash ratio of IPO firms is significantly larger than the 
industry average.  Together, this evidence suggests that issuers have raised too much capital at IPO-
time, with no correspondence to real investment projects. 
Why do issuers raise so much unnecessary capital in their IPO?  Under the rational-agents 
framework and the (semi-strong) efficient-markets theory, raising external equity is costly, 
particularly at IPO-time.  Ritter (2012) estimates that over the last decade the average issuer in the 
U.S.A. gave up 18 cents for every dollar raised, consisting of investment-bank fees and IPO 
underpricing (proxied by the first-day abnormal return).  For China, the average investment-bank 
fee rate as of Jan. 2010 equaled 5.2%, while the average first-day abnormal return amounted to 
33%.  Issuers in China thus gave up 38.2 cents for every Yuan raised, either to investment banks or 
to primary-market investors.  With such a huge issuing cost, one would expect issuers to avoid 
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raising excessive capital at IPO-time, to minimize the wealth losses for the firm’s initial owners 
(Habib and Ljungqvist, 2001).  The reality in the Chinese domestic IPO market has been quite the 
opposite.  Over-issuance therefore seems like another anomaly under the rational-agents and 
efficient-markets framework.  This anomaly may exist not only in China, though.  Using a global 
database covering 38 countries (but not including Mainland China), Kim and Weisbach (2008) find 
that for every dollar raised in IPOs, firms’ cash holdings had increased by 38.8 cents five years after 
the IPO.  Raising too much capital at the IPO thus seems like a worldwide phenomenon.  However, 
as far as we know, no other market has such strict disclosure requirements on prospective 
investment projects as China.  By using data on Chinese domestic IPOs, we can examine the drivers 
of this over-issuance anomaly. 
In this article, we propose an explanation of investor exploitation based on behavioral 
finance theory.  Behavioral finance argues that capital markets misprice securities from time to time 
and that firms – or their managers – can take advantage of investors by issuing stock at a time it is 
overvalued (e.g., Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Rajan and Servaes, 2003).  
In the context of IPOs, behavioral finance theory would contend that issuers, together with their 
investment banks, may price IPO shares above intrinsic value at a time that stock market investors 
are overly optimistic.  As those windows of opportunity are transitory in nature, issuers could try to 
fully exploit them by raising more finance than needed for their investment projects and, thus, 
accept the associated issuing costs.  Indeed, while limiting the size of the primary offering and, 
hence, collecting extra funds in a subsequent seasoned offering could reduce the overall cost of 
raising a particular amount of external finance, the window of opportunity may be gone by that 
time.  In other words, firms may no longer be able to sell their shares at the same high price if they 
stage their funds-raising process. 
We examine several predictions arising from this behavioral finance explanation.  Also, we 
contrast those conjectures with inferences made from rational-agents and semi-strong efficient-
markets theory.  Our empirical results support the former, while they reject the latter.  First, if the 
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investor-exploitation explanation is true, primary shares will be sold above their intrinsic value to 
the overly optimistic investors in the IPO market (Miller, 1977).  Strong investor optimism could 
then push stock prices even higher shortly after the IPO (Daniel et al., 1998; Purnanandam and 
Swaminathan, 2004); when investor overoptimism eventually fades away, stock prices will drop.  
Considering over-issuance as an appropriate indicator of investor enthusiasm for a firm’s offering, 
we should be able to form investment portfolios based on over-issuance to realize an abnormal 
return under the investor-exploitation explanation for over-issuance.  Conversely, under the 
rational-agents and efficient-markets theory, stock prices will incorporate all relevant information 
about the issuer at the time of first listing.  Realizing an abnormal return based on publicly available 
information should then simply be impossible.  Using over-issuance to proxy for the market 
sentiment as regards the IPO firm, we construct portfolios with a short (half a year) and a long (over 
one year) investment horizon after the IPO.  The results point at a significant alpha after estimating 
Fama-French three-factor regression models.  Those abnormal returns thus confirm the incidence of 
short-term investor overoptimism and the possibility to exploit it, in line with the behavioral finance 
literature. 
Second, under the investor-exploitation explanation, over-issuance, the investment-bank fee 
rate, and the first-day abnormal return likely become endogenous.  The reason is that higher over-
issuance requires investment banks to exercise more marketing efforts to place the IPO shares.  
Besides, underwriting contracts usually include an engagement by the investment banks to buy any 
unsold IPO shares.  Higher over-issuance thus also increases the odds that the IPO firm will 
exercise this option.  Last but not least, investment banks associated with substantial over-issuance 
might suffer a reputation loss once the issuer’s intrinsic value becomes known in the aftermarket.  
In order to deal with the above direct and indirect costs of over-issuance, investment banks could 
require a larger fee rate for higher over-issuance.  In turn, when their fee rate depends on over-
issuance, banks may price the IPO shares more aggressively and, thus, add to over-issuance.  Next, 
investment banks usually underprice the IPO to some extent, to ensure primary-market investors’ 
  
53 
 
participation in future IPOs.  However, to realize a higher over-issuance, IPO firms and their 
underwriters have to increase the offer price, which will diminish the first-day abnormal return.  
Conversely, underpricing the IPO to a larger extent implies a lower offer price and, thus, lower 
over-issuance.  Over-issuance should thus correlate negatively with the first-day abnormal return.  
In contrast, under the rational-agents and efficient-markets theory, over-issuance is not expected; it 
should therefore have no explanatory power for fee rates and first-day abnormal returns, ceteris 
paribus.  Overall, our empirical results do confirm the endogeneity among over-issuance, 
investment-bank fee rates, and first-day abnormal returns.  Specifically, over-issuance correlates 
positively with the fee rate, while it correlates negatively with the first-day abnormal return. 
We thus conclude that investor exploitation is a plausible explanation for over-issuance in 
Chinese domestic IPOs.  However, investor exploitation is not unique to China.  As an example, 
Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) find that the median IPO firm in the U.S.A. in 1980–1997 
was overvalued by 14% to 50% relative to its industry peers.  They further conclude that issuers sell 
overvalued IPO shares to take advantage of transitory windows of opportunity in the stock market.  
Likewise, Pagano et al. (1998) document that Italian firms in 1982–1992 were more likely to go 
public when the price-to-book ratio in their industry was peaking.  They explain this finding by 
issuers’ attempt to exploit sectoral mispricing by stock market investors.  Nonetheless, this earlier 
evidence on market timing and investor exploitation is subject to criticism, as it compares the 
multiples of IPO firms with those of already-listed industry peers (Kim and Ritter, 1999; Zheng, 
2007).  One could argue that the firms aiming for a stock market quotation have better growth 
prospects than their well-established industry peers.  Other researchers have examined the 
performance of IPO firms in the aftermarket.  In general, they find that issuing firms perform worse 
than benchmark firms in the long run (e.g., Ritter, 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Teoh et al., 
1998; Chan et al., 2004).  Yet, Ritter (2003) also stresses that finding evidence of ex-post 
underperformance does not necessarily imply ex-ante overvaluation.  For one thing, issuers may 
become less risky after their stock market floatation and so their required return tends to decline as 
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well (Carlson et al., 2006).  Standard matching procedures typically fail to capture those dynamics 
in risk and return after a firm has become publicly listed. 
The other, more important question that has remained unanswered in the literature so far is: 
even when IPOs are overvalued, does this overvaluation necessarily imply that issuers and 
investment banks deliberately time the market so as to exploit the overly optimistic investors?  Or 
could issuers themselves also overvalue their firm, just like stock market investors do?  Finding 
empirical evidence as regards this latter question is difficult.  The reason is simple: no issuer would 
publicly announce his (true) valuation of the firm if he considers it to be overvalued by outside 
investors.  Our research, using data on Chinese domestic IPOs, provides compelling evidence as to 
this investor-exploitation intention.  The uniqueness of our study is its focus on the issue amount, 
which the IPO literature has generally treated as exogenous.  Once considering investor-exploitation 
arguments, the issue amount may be set to take advantage of the overly optimistic investors in the 
stock market.  Over-issuance is thus a decision made by issuers and their investment banks after 
bookbuilding has revealed investors’ valuation of the IPO firm.  Under the rational-agents and 
efficient-markets framework, raising external equity engenders costs at IPO-time; raising 
unnecessary finance thus engenders unnecessary costs.  If issuers had agreed on the valuation of 
their firm by investors, they should have reduced the number of IPO shares to raise just enough 
capital for their planned investment projects.  Only when issuers consider their firm to be 
overvalued by outside investors will raising excessive capital at the IPO be a profitable event, as 
predicted by investor-exploitation arguments.  Investment banks, being afraid of harming their 
reputation among investors, could still limit the issue amount by setting a somewhat lower offer 
price (compared to the maximum price overoptimistic investors are willing to pay), thereby 
enhancing the first-day abnormal return; and/or they may charge a larger fee rate for higher over-
issuance.  Then, the issue amount, the fee rate, and the first-day abnormal return become 
endogenously related.  Arguably, our findings add evidence to the investor-exploitation intention by 
both issuers and investment banks in the Chinese domestic IPO market. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2.2, we briefly review the 
institutional aspects of Chinese domestic IPOs that are relevant to our analysis.  In Section 2.3, we 
document the over-issuance phenomenon from Jan. 1, 2010 to Dec. 31, 2011 and examine whether 
the over-issued capital is really excessive.  In Section 2.4, we present our potential explanations for 
over-issuance and infer the corresponding predictions.  In Section 2.5, we empirically examine 
those conjectures.  Section 2.6 concludes the paper. 
 
2.2. Institutional background 
The Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges were re-established in 1990 and 1991, respectively.  
In Oct. 1992, the central government founded the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
to regulate Chinese securities markets.  Since then, IPO rules have been designed, changed, and 
enforced by the CSRC, which falls under the direct supervision of the central government.  By the 
end of 2011, 2,392 Chinese companies became listed in Shanghai or Shenzhen, with a total market 
capitalization of RMB 21.5 trillion.  In the early years after stock market re-establishment, IPO 
firms were mainly state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that implemented a share issuing privatization 
(see Huyghebaert and Quan, 2009).  In more recent years, private-controlled enterprises dominate 
the population of IPO firms.  According to the CSMAR database, 83.8% of firms listing in either 
2010 or 2011 had non-state owners controlling at least 50% of the firm’s stock.  Another special 
feature of Chinese domestic IPOs is that up till Dec. 31, 2013, issuers were only allowed to sell 
primary, i.e. newly issued shares at IPO-time. 
Chinese investment banks had to develop their market share in IPO underwriting from 
scratch, along with the re-establishment of Chinese domestic stock exchanges.  In 1993, the CSRC 
issued ‘The circulation on enhancing the role of securities underwriters and professional 
intermediaries in stock offerings’, which henceforth mandated every issuer to select an investment 
bank as lead manager for its IPO.  Upon receiving a qualification from the CSRC, investment banks 
have to organize the whole IPO process, including an assessment of whether the IPO candidate 
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fulfils the issue conditions stipulated by the CSRC, preparing the IPO application materials and 
holding responsibility for their validity and accuracy, and – together with the issuer – fixing the 
final offer price and the number of shares offered.  Though not required by regulation, investment 
banks in general commit themselves to buy any unsold IPO shares at the offer price under a firm-
commitment underwriting contract.  Next, as Chinese stock exchanges are organized on a 
computerized order-matching system, IPO underwriters are not asked to act as a market maker for 
the issuer’s stock.  However, in more recent years, particularly as of 2003, more and more 
investment banks do provide analyst research coverage after the firm’s first listing. 
The Chinese IPO mechanism was changed several times in recent history.  As of July 1, 
1999, with the enforcement of the China Securities Law, firms eligible for listing are no longer 
picked by the CSRC’s local branches.  Every company satisfying the listing criteria specified in the 
Securities Law can henceforth apply for a stock market quotation; and firms satisfying those criteria 
cannot be refused.  Specifically, the applicant has to show positive earnings (net income) in each of 
the three years before its IPO.  Also, it has to establish adequate internal control procedures and 
operate independently from other firms controlled by the same ultimate owner.  Thereby, the CSRC 
fully relies on the firm’s lead manager to check whether those conditions are fulfilled.  This 
investment bank also has to submit the firm’s IPO application documents, including a first draft of 
the prospectus, with the CSRC.  In those documents, issuers have to provide details on their 
prospective investment projects, the amount of finance needed, and the number of primary shares 
they intend to sell.  Once their application has been approved, issuers can still offer less shares than 
permitted, but can no longer increase the number of IPO shares.  The information on planned 
investments has to be included in the IPO prospectus as well.  This action is not gratuitous, as the 
CSRC claims that it will follow up on the progress of issuers’ projects.  Also, deceiving the CSRC 
in the IPO application can bring about severe punishment by the regulator, including a cancellation 
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of the IPO or even the firm’s delisting.14  For investment banks, leaving a bad impression with the 
regulator could jeopardize their future business.  After having received the IPO application 
materials, the CSRC usually takes about six months to decide upon approving the firm’s listing.  
Arguably, and in contrast to Western IPO markets, issuers and investment banks in China have 
fewer opportunities to time the market as regards the final listing date.  Yet, this is not to say that 
such opportunities are nonexistent.
15
  Besides, investment banks could try to boost investor 
enthusiasm for an issuer’s stock and subsequently relate the offer price to (realized) investor 
overoptimism. 
Since Dec. 31, 2004, IPO offer prices are to be determined after a bookbuilding exercise.  
After obtaining approval for listing, issuers, together with their investment banks, formally present 
the IPO candidate to potential investors.  Specifically, they release a preliminary draft of the 
prospectus with an indicative price range and conduct a price inquiry among institutional investors.  
Relying on the tentative price quotations from institutional investors, issuers and their investment 
banks decide on the final offer price and on the number of shares offered; this process takes about 
two to three weeks.  Once the offer price and the number of IPO shares have been publicly 
announced, investment banks start to accept subscriptions from institutional as well as retail 
investors; at this stage, all investors have to pre-pay the shares demanded.  According to Circulation 
No. 37, imposed by the CSRC in 2006, at least 50% of IPO shares are to be sold to retail investors.  
However, issuers never reveal any details as to their plans to distribute shares among retail vs. 
institutional investors.  Retail investors can sell their allocated IPO shares as of the first public 
trading day, while institutional investors face a 90-day lock-up period.  Retail investors also play a 
major role in the secondary market.  A report by the International Organization of Securities 
                                                          
14
 As of 2009, the CSRC has cancelled two IPOs because of the IPO application documents containing incorrect 
information as regards the issuer’s earnings and related-party transactions. 
15
 According to the SEC, it even takes about 10 to 15 weeks from the S-1 form filing to the final public offering in the 
U.S.A. 
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Commissions (IOSC) shows that retail investors held 83% of market capitalization and were 
responsible for 86% of trading volume in 2010.
16
 
Article 127 of the Company Law, passed by the People’s Council on Dec. 29, 2003, 
prohibits offer-price discrimination: “The price of each share … shall be the same.”  Up till June 
10, 2009, the IPO offer price has been capped by a fixed P/E ratio.  Every year, this fixed P/E ratio 
cap was set by the CSRC and applied to all IPOs in that year.  To attract the interest of the general 
public for IPOs, the CSRC deliberately set the P/E ratio cap considerably below the prevailing 
market P/E ratio (see also Gannon and Zhou, 2008; Francis et al., 2009; Tian, 2011).  After Dec. 31, 
2004, with the publication of Circulation No. 162, this official P/E ratio cap was given up.  
Nonetheless, the CSRC continued to manage IPO offer prices to some extent up till June 10, 2009, 
relying on an implicit P/E ratio cap of 30 for most IPOs (Gao, 2010).  On June 10, 2009, the CSRC 
publicly announced that it would no longer interfere in the pricing of IPO shares and henceforth left 
the fixing of offer prices to issuers, investment banks, and investors.  So, it was only as of June 10, 
2009 that offer prices became uniquely determined by a process of price inquiry.  Since that date, 
the IPO offer price as well as the number of IPO shares can be set so as to account for market 
receptiveness to the offering. 
Finally, investment banks in China can discretionally allocate the IPO shares to investors 
only since Jan. 1, 2014.  In theory, allowing banks to decide freely on IPO allocation rules enables 
them to reward investors who revealed their favourable information about the issuer in the 
bookbuilding and, thus, can increase the efficiency of IPO pricing.  Nonetheless, during our sample 
period, IPO shares had to be allocated pro rata, according to the amount of pre-payment made by 
primary-market investors.  This applied to institutional investors as well as to retail investors.  
Besides, the maximum number of shares an individual investor could obtain cannot exceed 0.1% of 
the offering.  The green-shoe mechanism – which can be included in IPOs since Dec. 31, 2004 – is 
only scarcely used; in our sample, it was even never embraced.  As compensation for their services, 
                                                          
16
 For comparison, as revealed in this same report, retail investors in the U.S.A. only held 36.2% of market 
capitalization and were responsible for 2% of total trading volume in 2010. 
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investment banks charge a fee that is proportional to gross IPO proceeds.  This fee provides 
compensation for underwriting and sponsoring services, including marketing efforts.  With the 
implementation of ‘The interim measures for stock issuance and listing recommendation’ on March 
1, 2004, investment banks became free to negotiate their fees with issuers.  This negotiation usually 
takes place about six months before the IPO, when issuers sign an underwriting contract with their 
investment bank(s). 
 
2.3. Over-issuance 
2.3.1. Over-issuance 
For each of the 607 firms becoming listed on a stock exchange in Mainland China between Jan. 1, 
2010 and Dec. 31, 2011, we hand-collected the IPO application documents to compute its over-
issuance.
17
  After excluding the IPOs of financial institutions, whose capital raised is largely 
determined by regulatory considerations,
18
 we could calculate over-issuance for 587 IPO firms.  
The offer price and other IPO-related information were collected from the CSMAR Chinese A-
share IPO research database, while the accounting data were obtained from the CSMAR Chinese A-
share financial reports database.  Finally, we downloaded the stock price data from Datastream. 
We define over-issuance as the ratio of net proceeds raised in the IPO to total capital 
required for the firm’s prospective investment projects.  Net proceeds are gross IPO proceeds from 
which we deduct investment-bank fees, auditing fees, lawyer fees, and any other IPO expenses.  
Those net proceeds can then be utilized to finance investment outlays after the firm’s first listing.  
Table 2.1, Panel A reveals that the average over-issuance equals 2.55 in our sample (median of 
2.36).  In other words, about 60% of finance raised by the average IPO firm was without 
corresponding investment projects.  In total, RMB 582 billion of capital was raised, while capital 
                                                          
17
 As of June 10, 2009, IPO offer prices are fixed based upon the results of a bookbuilding exercise.  We start our 
sample period only as of Jan. 1, 2010, as it typically takes about six months for a firm to finalize the IPO application 
procedure.  The IPOs in the second half of 2009 may therefore still have been approved under the old system.  As we 
need at least two years of post-IPO financial information, we stop our sample period on Dec. 31, 2011. 
18
 Not surprisingly, the amount of planned investments is not specified in their IPO application documents. 
  
60 
 
required equaled only RMB 283 billion.  So, RMB 299 billion of capital was raised without 
corresponding investment projects.  In only 25 IPOs (4.2% of the sample) is over-issuance smaller 
than one.  Next, we split our sample into state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private-controlled 
firms, depending upon the identity of the firm’s controlling shareholder before the IPO.19  Panel B 
shows that over-issuance emerges in both subsamples.  It is slightly higher for the private-controlled 
firms, yet not significantly so (neither under a t-test nor under a Wilcoxon rank-sum test).  Finally, 
Panel C reveals that the 55 IPOs in Shanghai are associated with an average over-issuance of 2.02 
(median of 1.75), which is significantly smaller than the average over-issuance of 2.60 (median of 
2.44) for the 532 firms becoming listed in Shenzhen. 
Figure 2.1 shows the average and median over-issuance month by month over our sample 
period.  It also shows a monthly market P/E ratio, obtained from weighing the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen P/E ratio by their corresponding market capitalization at month-end.  Arguably, over-
issuance seems to follow the pace of stock market valuation.  To further substantiate this claim, we 
calculate the correlation of the monthly average over-issuance with the market P/E ratio at the end 
of the previous month.  It equals 0.53 (p-value <0.001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 
We follow the definition of SOEs/private-controlled firms used by the CSRC database.  In that database, both direct 
and indirect ownership by the state are taken into account.  For example, if the state directly owns 30% of a firm, while 
another state-owned company owns 21% of it, this firm will be classified as an SOE, given that state ownership equals 
51%. 
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Table 2.1 
Summary statistics on over-issuance 
In this table, we show summary statistics on over-issuance from January 1, 2010 to December 31, 2011.  Over-issuance 
is obtained by dividing the net proceeds raised in every IPO by the capital required for the firm’s investment projects, as 
stated in its IPO application documents.  Net IPO proceeds are gross IPO proceeds from which we deduct investment-
bank fees, auditing fees, lawyer fees, and any other IPO expenses.  In Panel A, we show summary statistics on over-
issuance by year.  In Panel B, we show summary statistics for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private-controlled 
firms.  We use a 50% pre-IPO ownership cutoff to identify SOEs and private-controlled firms.  Thereby, we account for 
each owner’s direct and indirect stake in the firm.  In Panel C, we report summary statistics for IPOs in Shanghai vs. 
Shenzhen. 
 
Panel A 
Year Obs. Total net 
proceeds 
(billion 
RMB) 
Total 
capital 
required 
(billion 
RMB) 
Over-
issuance 
(mean) 
Over-
issuance 
(median) 
Over-
issuance 
(minimum) 
Over-
issuance 
(maximum) 
Number of 
IPOs with 
over-
issuance≤1 
2010 337 355 157 2.80 2.61 0.36 11.69 7 
2011 250 227 126 2.21 2.06 0.60 5.49 18 
2010—
2011 
 
587 582 283 2.55 2.36 0.36 11.69 25 
Panel B 
Firm 
type 
Obs. Total net 
proceeds 
(billion 
RMB) 
Total 
capital 
required 
(billion 
RMB) 
Over-
issuance 
(mean) 
Over-
issuance 
(median) 
Over-
issuance 
(minimum) 
Over-
issuance 
(maximum) 
Number of 
IPOs with 
over-
issuance≤1 
SOEs 81 141 89 2.39 2.24 0.36 11.69 10 
Private 
firms 
506 441 194 2.57 2.39 0.62 8.41 15 
Panel C 
Market Obs. Total net 
proceeds 
(billion 
RMB) 
Total 
capital 
required 
(billion 
RMB) 
Over-
issuance 
(mean) 
Over-
issuance 
(median) 
Over-
issuance 
(minimum) 
Over-
issuance 
(maximum) 
Number of 
IPOs with 
over-
issuance≤1 
Shanghai 55 153 97.6 2.02 1.75 0.36 11.69 5 
Shenzhen 532 429 185.4 2.60 2.44 0.60 5.53 20 
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Figure 2.1. 
Monthly over-issuance 
In this figure, we show the average and median over-issuance for IPO firms listing in each of the months between 
January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2011.  Over-issuance is calculated by dividing the net proceeds raised in the IPO by 
the total capital required for the firm’s investment projects.  We also show the corresponding monthly market P/E ratio.  
The market P/E ratio is a weighted average of the month-end P/E ratios in Shanghai and Shenzhen, using the market 
capitalization in each market as weighting factor.  The market P/E is shown on the right-hand-side vertical axis of the 
chart. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3.2. Is the over-issued capital really excessive? 
Over-issuance presents nothing but the ratio of capital actually raised in the IPO relative to the 
amount of capital needed for planned investment projects.  One can imagine numerous reasons why 
over-issued capital may not really be excessive capital.  For example, one might argue that issuers 
intentionally limit information on their investment projects in the IPO application documents to 
prevent competitors from learning about the firm’s strategic choices.  Although understating 
projects could be a dangerous deception of the regulator, we cannot rule out this possibility at this 
stage.  Alternatively, during the price-inquiry process, investors reveal their private information 
about the issuer (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989).  When this news is good, issuers may realize that 
more valuable investment opportunities exist than the ones they had identified at their (higher) 
estimate of the firm’s cost of capital.  They could then raise more finance than initially planned to 
start those extra projects.  In a similar vein, they could collect more funds at the IPO when macro-
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economic conditions improved since IPO application.  Third, corporate finance theories point out 
that firms have an optimal capital structure (Modigliani and Miller, 1963; DeAngelo and Masulis, 
1980; Bradley et al., 1984).  When their debt ratio is too high, firms could also use the extra capital 
to pay down outstanding loans after their IPO (e.g., Pagano et al., 1998). 
To examine whether or not the over-issued capital is really excessive, we need to explore 
how it is used once the firm has become listed.  If the over-issued capital is not excessive, it should 
correlate positively with either capital expenditures or debt repayment after the IPO; it should not 
be kept in the firm’s cash account for a sufficiently long period after listing.  Conversely, if the 
over-issued capital is really excessive, it should not correlate positively with either capital 
expenditures or debt repayment.  Rather, it might positively influence the firm’s post-IPO cash 
holdings. 
We follow the methodology developed by Kim and Weisbach (2008) to examine the post-
IPO usage of over-issued capital.  First, we calculate Total sources of funds for each firm in its IPO 
year (Y0) and in the two years thereafter (Y1, Y2).  Total sources of funds is the sum of the net cash 
inflow from operations, the cash inflow from disposing investments and other fixed assets, the cash 
inflow from raising bank loans and from issuing bonds and seasoned equity.  We split this Total 
sources of funds into three parts: Planned investments, which is obtained from the IPO application 
documents; Over-issued capital, which is the net IPO proceeds minus the planned investment 
amount; Other sources of funds, which is Total sources of funds minus net IPO proceeds.  We then 
add up the cash outflow on capital expenditures in Y0, Y1 and Y2 to obtain Capital expenditures.
20
  
Likewise, we also combine the debt repayment in Y0, Y1 and Y2 to obtain Debt repayment.
21
  
Finally, we subtract the cash and cash equivalents number at the end of year Y-1 from that at the end 
                                                          
20
 Like Kim and Weisbach (2008), we include acquisitions in our main measure of Capital expenditures.  Nonetheless, 
all results continue to hold when acquisition outlays are removed from Capital expenditures. 
21
 Kim and Weisbach (2008) only include the repayment of long-term debt in their definition of Debt repayment.  
Unfortunately, the cash flow statement of Chinese listed firms makes no distinction between short-term loans and long-
term loans.  However, from a conceptual point of view, it might even be better to include the repayment of short-term 
debt in our definition of Debt repayment, particularly as long-term finance is only scarcely available in developing 
countries.  Moreover, firms may find it much easier to repay their short-term loans in order to quickly adjust their 
capital structure. 
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of year Y2 to obtain the Change in cash holdings.  Following Kim and Weisbach (2008), we 
normalize all variables by the issuer’s total assets at the end of year Y-1.  Table 2.2 presents 
summary statistics on those variables. 
Table 2.2 
Summary statistics on the variables used in the ‘usage of over-issued capital’ regressions 
In this table, we show summary statistics on the variables used in the ‘usage of over-issued capital’ regressions in Table 
2.3.  The IPO firms included in the sample became listed between January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2011.  Financial 
institutions are excluded from the sample.  Planned investments is the total planned investment amount, as shown in the 
firm’s IPO application documents.  Over-issued capital is the amount of net proceeds raised in the IPO minus Planned 
investments.  Other sources of funds is the total sources of funds the firm obtains in the IPO year and in the two years 
thereafter minus the net proceeds raised in the IPO.  The total sources of funds is the sum of the net cash inflows from 
operations plus the cash inflow from disposing investments and other fixed assets plus the cash inflow from bank loans, 
bonds issuance, and seasoned equity offerings.  Capital expenditures is the sum of capital expenditures (including 
acquisitions) in the IPO year and in the two years thereafter.  Debt repayment is the sum of debt repayments in the IPO 
year and in the two years thereafter.  Change in cash holdings is the cash and cash equivalents at the end of the second 
year after IPO minus the cash and cash equivalents at the end of the year before IPO.  All variables are scaled by total 
assets in the year before IPO.  Capex ratio is the ratio of Capital expenditures to Planned investments for each IPO 
firm. 
 
Variable Obs. Mean 
 
Median 
 
Standar
d 
deviation 
Min. 25% 75% Max. 
 
Planned investments 562 0.589 0.518 0.371 0.021 0.302 1.130 3.775 
Over-issued capital 562 0.832 0.621 0.794 -0.392 0.351 0.754 5.019 
Other sources of funds 562 1.125 0.783 1.138 0.010 0.367 1.391 11.029 
Capital expenditures 562 0.648 0.523 0.521 -0.006 0.311 0.855 5.334 
Debt repayment 562 0.707 0.457 0.736 0 0.168 1.037 4.398 
Change in cash holdings 562 0.801 0.518 0.979 -0.519 0.175 1.097 6.690 
Capex ratio 562 1.303 0.988 1.142 0.010 0.621 1.570 8.926 
 
Next, we run regressions to explain Capital expenditures, Debt repayment, and Change in 
cash holdings.  In those regressions, we control for firm size, measured by the log of total assets at 
the end of year Y-1.  Besides, we include an SOE dummy that equals one if the state – directly or 
indirectly – controls more than 50% of the firm’s stock at IPO-time (12.8% of sample firms).  We 
further include a market dummy that equals one if the firm lists in Shanghai.  Finally, we add 
industry dummies, relying on the CSRC industry classification, and a dummy for the year 2011.  
Like Kim and Weisbach (2008), we use equation-by-equation regressions to estimate the various 
models.  Our tests on the usage of over-issued capital thus look as follows: 
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One concern with this test is that investment projects may consist of various phases.  Kim 
and Weisbach (2008) remedy this problem by using data for two and five years after the IPO.
22
  As 
the most recent cash flow statements for our sample firms end in 2013, we can only follow issuers 
up to their second post-IPO year.  Arguably, if planned investments have not been fully realized yet 
by that time, over-issued capital may bear no relation with capital expenditures.  To deal with this 
concern, we first calculate the ratio of actual investments over our two-year window to planned 
investments.  This Capex ratio averages 1.30 (median of 0.99).  49% of issuers have thus spent less 
than their planned investment amount by the end of year Y2.  Then, in addition to running the 
regressions for the full sample, we also estimate the models for the IPO firms with a Capex ratio > 
1.  This subsample analysis only includes the data on the 278 firms that have completed their 
planned investment program two years after the IPO.  If over-issued capital remains uncorrelated 
with capital expenditures in this subsample, we can safely conclude that over-issued capital 
corresponds to no real investment opportunities and, hence, is really excessive.  Table 2.3 reports 
the results for both the full-sample and the subsample analyses. 
First, we find no significant association between Over-issued capital and Capital 
expenditures, neither in the full sample nor in the subsample.  Correspondingly, the over-issued 
capital is not used for extra investments after the IPO.  This finding thus allows to refute the idea 
that firms deliberately limit the disclosure of initially planned investments in their IPO application 
documents.  Likewise, we can rule out that firms collect a larger amount of finance at their actual 
                                                          
22
 However, they find that their results do not depend upon the post-IPO window being used. 
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listing date because they have learnt since their IPO application that more projects have a positive 
NPV.
23
  Next, we do find a significant positive association between Planned investments and 
Capital expenditures, which is not surprising as the finance raised at IPO is supposed to be spent on 
real investment projects.  However, the relation between Planned investments and Capital 
expenditures is far smaller than one in the full sample regression.  The coefficient on Planned 
investments indeed equals only 0.17.  Interestingly, it rises to 0.82 in the subsample regression.  
Together, the above results indicate that investment progress may have been rather slow on average.  
In line with this inference, Table 2.2 already revealed that about half of the firms didn’t carry out all 
investments they had planned by the end of their second post-IPO year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23
 We can also repudiate the idea that improved macro-economic conditions since IPO application incite firms to raise 
more finance at their IPO.  In a more direct test of the role of macro-economic conditions, we calculated the correlation 
between provincial GDP growth in the IPO years (i.e. year 2010 and year 2011) and the over-issuance of IPO firms in 
that province.  For the firms that operate nationally, we use the Chinese national GDP growth rates.  We find that the 
correlation is only 0.05 and not significant (p-value of 0.274). 
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Table 2.3 
The usage of over-issued capital after IPO 
This table reports the OLS regressions results as to the usage of over-issued capital after the IPO.  The dependent 
variables are Capital expenditures, Debt repayment, and Change in cash holdings, respectively.  Capital expenditures is 
the sum of capital expenditures (including acquisitions) in the IPO year and in the two years thereafter.  Debt repayment 
is the sum of debt repayments in the IPO year and in the two years thereafter.  Change in cash holdings is the cash and 
cash equivalents at the end of the second year after IPO minus the cash and cash equivalents at the end of the year before 
IPO.  The research variables include Over-issued capital, Planned investments, and Other sources of funds.  Over-issued 
capital is the amount of net proceeds raised in the IPO minus Planned investments.  Planned investments is the total 
planned investment amount as shown in the firm’s IPO application documents.  Other sources of funds is the total 
sources of funds the firm obtains in the IPO year and in the two years thereafter minus the net proceeds raised in the IPO.  
The total sources of funds is the sum of the net cash inflows from operations plus the cash inflow from disposing 
investments and other fixed assets plus the cash inflow from bank loans, bonds issuance, and seasoned equity offerings.  
We further include the log of total assets by the end of the year before IPO.  SOE dummy equals one if the Chinese state 
controls more than 50% of the firm’s voting rights before IPO.  Market dummy equals one if the firm lists on the 
Shanghai stock exchange.  Finally, we account for industry and year fixed effects by means of industry dummies (CSCR 
industry classification) and a year dummy for 2011.  The full-sample regressions are run on the IPO firms listed between 
January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2011.  The subsample regressions are run on the firms with Capital 
expenditures/Planned investments  1.  p-values are reported between parentheses.  Coefficients significant at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level are marked with *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 Full sample Subsample 
 
Capital 
expenditures 
Debt 
repayment 
Change in 
cash holdings 
Capital 
expenditures 
Debt 
repayment 
Change in 
cash holdings 
Intercept 3.297*** 0.205 -1.611** 1.809** 1.096 -0.299 
 (<0.001) (0.800) (0.031) (0.049) (0.377) (0.788) 
Over-issued capital 
-0.015 -0.276*** 0.869*** 0.060 -0.267*** 0.776*** 
 (0.580) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.205) (0.002) (<0.001) 
Planned investments 
0.165*** -0.300*** 0.694*** 0.822*** -0.441** 0.044 
 (0.010) (0.001) (<0.001) (0.003) (0.022) (0.790) 
Other sources of funds 0.165*** 0.312*** 0.110*** 0.237*** 0.419*** 0.168*** 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Ln(Total assets-1) 
-0.121*** 0.022 0.043 -0.067* -0.036 -0.007 
 
(<0.001) (0.562) (0.210) (0.100) (0.529) (0.898) 
SEO dummy -0.104* -0.200*** 0.142** -0.092 -0.170 0.100 
 (0.081) (0.010) (0.041) (0.261) (0.149) (0.312) 
Market dummy 0.048 -0.094 -0.038 0.022 0.137 -0.111 
 (0.554) (0.366) (0.697) (0.834) (0.360) (0.399) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2 
0.35 0.46 0.74 0.59 0.59 0.62 
Number of 
observations 
563 563 562 279 279 278 
 
Next, the results from the debt-repayment regressions are also quite comparable across the 
full sample and the subsample.  They show that the over-issued capital is not used to retire the 
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outstanding debt either.  On the contrary, the coefficient on Over-issued capital is significantly 
negative, thereby indicating that higher over-issuance is associated with a smaller debt repayment in 
the first two years after listing.  We notice that the coefficient on Planned investments is negative, 
too.  We thus infer that the more capital is raised in the IPO, the smaller is the debt repayment.  This 
result complies with what Kim and Weisbach (2008) find, although they did not split IPO proceeds 
into planned investments and over-issued capital. 
Finally, the regressions explaining the Change in cash holdings indicate that the IPO firms 
transfer the excessive capital to their cash and cash equivalents account.  Even among the firms that 
invested more than their planned investment amount (the subsample regression), a one Yuan 
increase in over-issued capital engenders a 87 cents increase in cash holdings by the end of the 
second post-IPO year.  Over-issuance thus results in extra cash holdings.  To further examine the 
latter outcome, we trace the cash and cash equivalents of the IPO firms after their stock market 
introduction.  We scale a firm’s cash holdings from one quarter before the IPO to the 8th post-IPO 
quarter by its net IPO proceeds.  Figure 2.2 shows the results.  Two years after listing, the cash and 
cash equivalents held by the average issuer still represent 78% of funds raised at IPO-time (median 
of 70%).  This finding thus once more reveals that a large part of net IPO proceeds remains stored 
in the cash account. 
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Figure 2.2. 
Cash and cash equivalents before and after IPO 
In this figure, we show the average and median of cash and cash equivalents held by the IPO firms listing between 
January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2011, over a period from one quarter before the IPO (Q-1) to the 8
th
 post-IPO 
quarter (Q8).  For every IPO firm at the end of every quarter, we scale its cash and cash equivalents by its net IPO 
proceeds.  We subsequently calculate the average and median of this variable across all IPO firms. 
 
 
 
We subsequently compare the cash-to-total-assets ratio of the IPO firms at the end of their 
second post-IPO year with the average for all listed firms in the corresponding industry.  As the IPO 
firms became listed in the year 2010 or 2011, the end of their second post-IPO year is either 2012 or 
2013.  So, the corresponding cash-to-total-assets ratios of established industry peers are calculated 
using the 2012 or 2013 annual reports.  Table 2.4 reports the results, emphasizing once more that 
the cash holdings of the IPO firms remain exceptionally high two years after listing.  Indeed, the 
average cash ratio is 29% for the IPO firms (median of 25%), while the average for all listed firms 
is a much smaller 18% (median of 15%).  In all industries, the cash ratio of IPO firms is 
significantly larger than the industry average, based upon a t-test as well as a non-parametric 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test. 
Considering the above empirical evidence, we can safely conclude that the over-issued 
capital is indeed excessive, corresponding to no real investment projects. 
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Table 2.4 
Summary statistics on the cash-to-total-assets ratio  
In this table, we show summary statistics on the cash-to-total-assets ratio by the end of the second post-IPO year for the 
firms listed in 2010 and 2011 and the corresponding industry mean and median for already-listed firms.  The industry 
classification is according to the CSRC standard industry classification.  We calculate the cash-to-total-assets ratio at 
the end of the second year after IPO for the firms listed from Jan. 2010 to Dec. 2011.  We compare the mean and 
median of these cash-to-total-assets ratios with their industry means using annual financial reports of the firms in the 
same industry in 2012 to 2013.  We perform a t-test for mean equality and a non-paramteric Wilcoxon rank-sum test for 
median equality.  We also report the p-value of these tests. 
 
Industry Firm category 
Number of  
IPO firms 
Mean Median 
p-value of  
t-test 
p-value of 
Wilcoxon test  
Agriculture, forestry, livestock 
farming, fishery 
IPO firms 11 26% 25% 
0.042 0.003 
All listed firms  16% 12% 
Mining 
IPO firms 9 30% 32% 
0.001 <0.001 
All listed firms  15% 14% 
Manufacturing 
IPO firms 425 28% 24% 
0.001 <0.001 
All listed firms  17% 15% 
Utilities 
IPO firms 3 25% 23% 
0.002 0.017 
All listed firms  11% 7% 
Construction 
IPO firms 12 24% 24% 
0.067 0.009 
All listed firms  18% 14% 
Wholesale and retail 
IPO firms 5 32% 32% 
0.070 0.027 
All listed firms  19% 15% 
Transportation 
IPO firms 66 43% 32% 
<0.001 <0.001 
All listed firms  26% 22% 
Hotel and catering 
IPO firms 13 32% 28% 
0.057 0.052 
All listed firms  23% 20% 
Real estate 
IPO firms 14 30% 25% 
<0.001 <0.001 
All listed firms  21% 17% 
Leasing and commercial service 
IPO firms 11 38% 42% 
0.005 0.002 
All listed firms  25% 29% 
Scientific research and 
technology service 
IPO firms 2 32% 32% 
0.010 0.040 
All listed firms  16% 15% 
Overall 
IPO firms 571 29% 25% 
<0.001 <0.001 
All listed firms  18% 15% 
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2.4.  An explanation for over-issuance 
2.4.1. Exploring the theoretical literature and propose an explanation 
The over-issuance phenomenon is hard to reconcile with traditional corporate finance theories based 
on rational agents and (semi-strong) efficient markets.  Under the rational-agents and efficient-
markets framework, an IPO is costly because of the fees to be paid to investment banks and IPO 
underpricing.  The literature has explained investment-bank fees as either a certification cost (Booth 
and Smith, 1986) or a compensation for the risk that underwriters will have to buy any unsold IPO 
shares in a firm-commitment offering (Bae and Levy, 1990).  Besides, the literature has put forward 
a number of explanations for why IPO shares should be priced below their intrinsic value, i.e. IPO 
underpricing.
24
  Ritter (2012) estimates that over the last decade the average issuer in the U.S.A. 
gave up 18 cents for every dollar raised, including investment-bank fees and the first-day abnormal 
return.  In China, the average investment-bank fee rate as of Jan. 1, 2010 equaled 5.2% of gross IPO 
proceeds, while the average first-day abnormal return amounted to 33%.  So, for every Yuan raised, 
issuers actually gave up 38.2 cents to either investment banks or primary-market investors.
25
  With 
such a huge issuing cost, one would expect issuers to avoid raising excessive capital at IPO-time, 
i.e. no over-issuance (Habib and Ljungqvist, 2001).  However, we observe quite the opposite in the 
Chinese domestic IPO market.
26 
 
Another strand of the literature raises questions about whether IPOs really provoke a cost to 
issuers.  The reason is that stock market investors are not always rational and, hence, they may 
misprice securities from time to time (Miller, 1977; Daniel et al., 2001).  This irrationality or 
                                                          
24
 Those theories include but are not limited to the winner’s curse theory by Rock (1986), the signaling theory by Welch 
(1989), the litigation theory by Tinic (1988), the bookbuilding theory by Benveniste and Spindt (1989).  For a good 
review, see Ritter and Welch (2002).
 
25
The other costs in Chinese IPOs contain audit costs, lawyer cost, registration costs &etc.  Comparing to underwriting 
fee and underpricing, total other costs only contributes about 3% of total issuing costs in our sample firms.  Among the 
3% of other costs, 80% also (partly) increases with issue amount, such as audit fee. So, we do not think fixed cost is a 
major concern in determining IPO amount.. .  
26
 A limited post-IPO access to the stock market seems unlikely to explain the phenomenon of over-issuance.  Indeed, 
listed firms can implement a seasoned equity offering in Chinese domestic stock markets as long as they have three 
consecutive years of positive pre-SEO earnings.  In our sample, over 95% of firms fulfil this requirement.  Besides, 
among the 2,392 firms becoming listed in Chinese domestic stock markets till the end of 2011, 546 (23%) made a 
seasoned equity offering within three years after their IPO.  This percentage is quite comparable to that in the U.S. 
market.  Krigman et al. (2001) find that 28% of the firms becoming listed in the U.S.A. between 1993 and 1995 made a 
SEO in the three years as of listing. 
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limited rationality on the part of the investors arises from certain psychological aspects of human 
behavior, such as overweighting one’s own information and overconfidence in one’s own expertise.  
We consider those theories as potentially highly relevant in the Chinese context, where small retail 
investors account for a major fraction of trading volume.  Compared to institutional investors, retail 
investors are more prone to irrational behavior (De Bondt, 1998).  Hence, issuers and their 
investment banks could actively time the market by selling overvalued shares to exploit those 
overly optimistic investors.  From a survey, Graham and Harvey (2001) conclude that two-thirds of 
CFOs of Fortune 500 companies agreed that the magnitude by which their stock was over-/under-
valued was an important or very important consideration in deciding on when to issue shares.  
Likewise, Pagano et al. (1998) note that firms in Italy are more likely to go public when the price-
to-book ratio in their industry peaks.  They suggest that investors could be overly optimistic about 
certain sectors, while issuers may exploit that sectoral mispricing.  So, if issuers – together with 
their investment banks – are able to correctly time the IPO market, they can increase the wealth of 
the firm’s pre-IPO owners by selling overpriced shares at the IPO.  Likewise, Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) argue that market timing benefits ongoing shareholders at the expense of entering and 
exiting ones.  Hence, IPO firms may have no reason to limit the offer size by their firm’s investment 
needs.  Instead, they may sell as many overpriced shares as possible.  In China, the maximum 
number of shares that can be sold at the IPO is approved by the CSRC and is set before 
bookbuilding starts.  Yet, since June 10, 2009, firms also obtained full discretion in fixing the offer 
price.  Hereafter, we further develop the ‘investor-exploitation explanation’ of over-issuance, based 
on behavioral finance theory. 
 
2.4.2. Testable hypotheses 
2.4.2.1. Stock returns in the aftermarket 
If the investor-exploitation explanation is true, IPO stock should be sold at a price above its intrinsic 
value.  Daniel et al. (1998) propose a theory explaining why stocks could be overvalued by 
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investors and how that overvaluation might influence subsequent short-term and long-term stock 
performance.  The theory is built on two premises, both derived from psychological research on 
human behavior.  First, investors are sometimes overconfident about their ability to evaluate a 
stock.  Second, this overconfidence is strengthened when the outcome – i.e. the observed stock 
price – confirms their expectations, i.e. a self-attribution effect arises.  Typically, the investors who 
buy the IPO stock in the primary market are the ones who are highly optimistic about the issuer’s 
prospects.  Because of overconfidence, those highly optimistic investors tend to overestimate the 
precision of their (good) private information about the firm.  They may therefore put too much 
weight on their own (good) information when evaluating the issuer.  When the firm’s stock price 
subsequently goes up in the aftermarket, they become even more confident about their valuation 
ability because of the self-attribution effect.  Hence, they further overweigh their own (good) 
information, which generates an even higher stock price.  When the stock market is dominated by 
such overly optimistic investors, the issuer’s share price will be pushed even higher in a short 
period after the IPO, i.e. short-term overshooting creating upwards momentum.  However, as time 
passes by, the firm’s true value eventually becomes known in the aftermarket and the stock price 
will drop, resulting in long-term underperformance.  In sum, the theory implies that the IPO stocks 
that are bought mostly by overoptimistic investors will perform well shortly after the IPO, but will 
perform poorly in the long run.  Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) empirically examine this 
idea.  They measure the overvaluation of IPO firms by comparing each firm’s financial multiples 
(price-to-sales, price-to-EBITDA, and price-to-earnings) to those of their already-listed industry 
peers in U.S. IPOs between 1980 and 1997.  They conclude that the median IPO firm is overvalued 
at the offer by 14% to 50% relative to its industry peers.  Next, the stocks that were most highly 
overvalued at IPO-time outperformed the other IPO stocks in the first six months after flotation; 
however, those stocks started to underperform as of the end of the sixth post-IPO month up till five 
years after listing. 
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In the context of our study, over-issuance is the multiple of the capital firms actually raised 
in their IPO relative to the amount required for their planned investment projects.  Under the 
investor-exploitation explanation, over-issuance increases with investor over-optimism and thus 
correlates positively with stock overvaluation.  In this way, we should be able to use over-issuance 
as a proxy for stock over-valuation at the time of the IPO.  If the investor-exploitation explanation is 
true, we should be able to form investment portfolios with long–short positions in stocks with 
different levels of over-issuance to realize an abnormal return over a short as well as a long time 
interval after the IPO.  So, we put forward the following hypothesis: 
H1: If the investor-exploitation explanation is true, we can form long–short investment 
portfolios based on over-issuance to realize an abnormal return in the short run as well as in 
the long run. 
 
On the other hand, if agents are rational and markets efficient, all information about the issuer 
should be incorporated into the stock price at the time of first listing.  As over-issuance is public 
information in the aftermarket, no abnormal return should be realizable from portfolios built on 
over-issuance. 
27
  
 
2.4.2.2. The relation between over-issuance, fee rates, and first-day abnormal returns 
Investment banks are repetitive players in the IPO market; they are also active players in the 
secondary market, through their securities investments and brokerage business.  Those activities 
offer investment banks a natural advantage in assessing investor sentiment in the stock market.  So, 
if the investor-exploitation explanation is true, investment banks could help issuers to spot the 
transitory windows of opportunity and to market the IPO shares at an attractive price (Loughran and 
Ritter, 1995).  In the Chinese case, this timing advantage may relate somewhat less to the actual 
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 We need to caution readers that H1 suggest that investor-exploitation leads to both short-term over performance and 
long-term under performance of highly over-issued firms.  Under efficient market and rational agent assumption, the 
aftermarket stock price of highly over-issued firms can underperform in the long run due to their higher cash holding 
and lower required return.  However, in efficient market, higher cash holding should not lead to higher short-term 
aftermarket performance of these firms.  So, we argue that the only explanation to both short-term over performance 
and long-term performance is investor-exploitation.        
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moment of flotation, as the CSRC largely determines the actual listing date, but definitely will 
influence the pricing of IPO stock (and, thus, over-issuance).  Investment banks indeed play a 
crucial role in marketing the offering and in sustaining the firm’s valuation among investors at IPO-
time, especially in a market that is still dominated by retail investors.  To encourage investment 
banks to play this role, issuers may agree to a larger fee rate when investment banks are able to raise 
a larger amount of capital for a given number of shares offered.  As revealed by the largest financial 
newspaper in China, the China Securities Times, there is evidence that issuers actually include an 
over-issuance clause in their underwriting contract with investment banks.  A larger fee rate 
increases the marginal benefit realized by investment banks on every additional Yuan raised and, 
thus, encourages a higher offer price through a better marketing of the IPO.  So, we expect that a 
larger investment-bank fee rate will bring about more over-issuance.  Conversely, higher over-
issuance also implies that issuers and their investment banks take a bigger advantage of the overly 
optimistic investors in the primary market.  This could impose a reputation cost on investment 
banks, for which they may demand compensation by means of a larger fee rate.  Moreover, as the 
number of IPO shares is constrained by the CSRC-approved volume, the only way to enhance over-
issuance is to increase the IPO offer price.  However, a larger offer price also increases the 
likelihood of insufficient investor demand for IPO shares and, thus, the odds that underwriters may 
have to buy any unsold IPO shares.  Investment banks may therefore also have other reasons to ask 
for a larger fee rate as over-issuance increases.  In sum, we expect over-issuance to positively 
influence the investment-bank fee rate as well.  Taken together, our arguments imply that over-
issuance and the fee rate are endogenous under the investor-exploitation explanation; they 
positively influence each other.  Those ideas result in the following hypothesis: 
H2: If the investor-exploitation explanation is true, over-issuance and the investment-bank fee 
rate are endogenous and positively related to each other. 
On the other hand, if agents are rational and markets efficient, over-issuance implies that issuers 
and their investment banks under-estimated firm value at the time of IPO application.  The higher is 
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the over-issuance, the larger is this under-estimation.  Issuers should (at least) not reward 
investment banks by their mistakes.  So, over-issuance and fee rates should not be correlated in this 
case, ceteris paribus. 
Under the investor-exploitation explanation, investment banks will price the IPO shares 
above their intrinsic value, but below the investors’ valuation, i.e. below the maximum price that 
primary-market investors are willing to pay for the issuer’s stock (Ljungqvist et al., 2006).  
Investment banks thus leave a certain profit to primary-market investors, by allowing them to sell 
their IPO shares at a higher price to other overly optimistic investors in the aftermarket.  This profit 
leaves a sweet taste in the mouth of primary-market investors, inciting them to also participate in 
future IPOs underwritten by this same investment bank.  For retail investors, the first-day abnormal 
return can clearly capture this profit.  For institutional investors, the offer price should definitely be 
set low enough compared to the maximum price that primary-market investors are willing to pay.  
Otherwise, they might not be able to sell their allocated IPO shares with a profit once their 90-day 
lock-up period expires.  Besides, pricing the IPO shares below the maximum price that is 
achievable is a self-protection mechanism for underwriters in a firm-commitment offering.  In such 
an IPO, when shares would have been issued at the maximum price, the likelihood that the 
investment bank has to buy any unsold IPO shares is much higher.  Overall, when investment banks 
lower the offer price, the net proceeds from the IPO will be reduced as well and so will over-
issuance.  A higher level of IPO underpricing thus negatively affects over-issuance, everything else 
constant.  Conversely, for a given level of investor overvaluation, if issuers and investment banks 
would like to enchance over-issuance, the only way they can do so is by lowering the IPO’s 
underpricing.  We therefore expect over-issuance and the first-day abnormal return to be 
endogenous and negatively related to each other.  The above arguments result in the following 
hypothesis: 
H3: If the investor-exploitation explanation is true, over-issuance and the first-day abnormal 
return are endogenous and negatively related to each other. 
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On the other hand, under the rational-agents and efficient-markets framework, IPO underpricing is 
largely determined by the degree of asymmetric information between issuers and investors.  Higher 
over-issuance then likely reflects that investors revealed more favorable information about the 
issuer in the process of price inquiry.  To reward investors for their information revelation, 
issuers/investment banks could underprice the IPO to a larger extent (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989).  
This idea is likely to apply even more so in a market where investment banks cannot discretionally 
allocate IPO shares, like in China.  So, if agents are rational and markets efficient, over-issuance 
should correlate positively with the first-day abnormal return, ceteris paribus. 
 
2.5. Empirical results 
In this section, we empirically examine the inferences made in Section 2.4.  We use the data on all 
587 IPOs for the analysis of the stock returns in the aftermarket.  For the analysis of the relation 
among over-issuance, investment-bank fee rates, and first-day abnormal returns, we rely on a 
subsample of 559 IPOs for which all necessary accounting data are available.
28
 
 
2.5.1. Stock returns in the aftermarket 
First, we rely on over-issuance to construct an investment portfolio shortly after the firms’ IPO (the 
short-term portfolio).  Starting from D1, i.e. the 120
th
 trading day (about half a year) after Jan. 1, 
2010, we collect the data on all IPOs listed between 120 days before D1 and D1.  So, on average, 
the issuers included in this portfolio have been listed for about 60 days.  We subsequently take a 
long position in the stocks with over-issuance above the 75% percentile (reflecting high investor 
optimism at IPO-time) and a short position in the ones with over-issuance below the 25% percentile 
(reflecting low investor optimism at IPO-time).  In this way, the portfolio is always a zero-
investment portfolio.  We rebalance this portfolio every 30 trading days.  For example, when we 
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 We find that the average and median over-issuance, fee rate, first-day abnormal return of the firms used in the 
multivariate regression analyses are not significantly different from those removed from the sample. 
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reach the 150
th
 trading day after Jan. 1, 2010 (D2), we repeat the portfolio formation procedure with 
the IPOs issued between 120 days before D2 and D2 and hold this portfolio for another 30 days.  
The last portfolio is formed at the 480
th
 trading day after Jan. 1, 2010.  Our sample indeed only 
includes IPOs up till Dec. 31, 2011.  So, we obtain 390 daily portfolio returns in total. 
Second, we again use over-issuance to construct another investment portfolio, long after the 
firms’ IPO (the long-term portfolio).  Starting from D1, which is now the 360th trading day (about 
18 months) after Jan. 1, 2010, we collect the data on all IPOs listed between 360 days and 240 days 
before D1.  In this way, the stocks included in this long-term portfolio have been listed for about 
300 days.  We now take a short position in the stocks with over-issuance above the 75% percentile 
and a long position in the ones with over-issuance below the 25% percentile.  We again rebalance 
this portfolio every 30 trading days.  The last portfolio is formed at the 720
th
 trading day after Jan. 
1, 2010.  We again obtain 390 daily portfolio returns in total. 
Table 2.5, Panel A reports summary statistics on the daily portfolio returns.  The short-term 
portfolio has an average daily return of 0.08%, which is significantly different from zero.  The 
cumulative return from this investment portfolio over 390 trading days amounts to 31.21%.  The 
long-term portfolio has an average daily return of 0.07%, also statistically significant.  The 
cumulative return over the 390-day window now equals 27.32%.  We warn readers that those 
portfolio returns may vanish once transaction costs are taken into account.  Importantly, we did not 
implement this test to develop an arbitrage strategy for investors.  Rather, the purpose of our test 
was to examine an essential implication of the investor-exploitation explanation for the short-term 
and long-run performance of over-issued IPOs.  The results reveal that investor over-valuation 
indeed existed and was exploitable. 
In a robustness check, we use other windows to form investment portfolios.  For the short-
term portfolio, we employ two different time frames.  One starts at the 160
th
 trading day before D1, 
while the other starts at the 80
th
 trading day before D1.  For the long-term portfolio, one time frame 
starts at the 400
th
 trading day before D1 and ends at the 240
th
 day before D1; the other starts at the 
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320
th
 trading day before D1 and ends at the 240
th
 day before D1.  Table 2.5, Panel B reports the 
results.  They prove highly similar to those in Panel A, although the windows in Panel A seem to 
generate higher returns. 
In another test, like Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004), we rely on relative industry 
multiples to construct investment portfolios.  More precisely, the latter scholars compare the 
multiples of IPO firms with those of their already-listed industry peers, called the P/V ratio.  They 
find that the median issuer’s P/E ratio, calculated at the offer price, is about 1.53 times that of its 
listed industry peers.  We follow their methodology by dividing each issuer’s P/E ratio by the 
industry average P/E ratio in the quarter preceding the IPO.  Interestingly, the average P/V ratio in 
our sample is only 0.96 (median of 1.03), pointing out that Chinese IPOs are typically issued at a 
P/E ratio that is comparable to that of industry peers.
29
  Arguably, investment banks in Chinese 
domestic IPOs seem to help identifying the overvalued industries and then advice potential issuers 
in those industries in their process of listing (see also Pagano et al., 1998).  Possibly, industry 
overvaluation is more persistent than firm-specific overvaluation and thus more predictable, given 
the average six-months approval period for IPOs in China.  Next, once the IPO shares are to be 
priced, investment banks do not (dare to) deviate too much from the average valuation in the 
issuer’s industry, which allows them to hide in the crowd and avoid negative reputation effects.  
The P/V ratio may thus not provide a good indicator of stock over-valuation in the Chinese context 
(see also Kim and Ritter, 1999; Zheng, 2007).  Nonetheless, we did construct investment portfolios 
relying on this P/V ratio.  Table 2.5, Panel C reports the results.  In line with the above arguments, 
we no longer find any evidence of significant portfolio returns, which indicates that over-issuance is 
a far better indicator of issuer overvaluation than the P/V ratio. 
 
 
                                                          
29
 Like Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004), we also calculated this P/V ratio using the P/Sales and P/EBITDA 
multiple.  The average P/V ratio using P/Sales is 0.87 (median of 0.94), while the average P/V ratio using P/EBITDA is 
0.93 (median of 0.95).  When relying on those P/V ratios to form investment portfolios, we obtain similar results as 
when using the P/V ratio from relying on the P/E ratio. 
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Table 2.5 
Summary statistics on the daily portfolio returns 
In this table, we present summary statistics on the daily portfolio returns for the short-term portfolio as well as the long-
term portfolio.  We also report the p-value of a t-test examining whether the daily portfolio returns are significantly 
different from zero.  Finally, we report the cumulative return, measured over the total number of trading days in the 
portfolio formation period. 
In Panel A, for the short-term portfolio, starting from the 120
th
 trading day after Jan. 1, 2010 (D1), we collect the data 
on all IPOs listed between 120 days before D1 and D1.  We subsequently take a long position in the stocks with over-
issuance above the 75% percentile and a short position in the ones with over-issuance below the 25% percentile.  We 
rebalance this portfolio every 30 trading days.  The last portfolio is formed at the 480
th
 trading day after Jan. 1, 2010.  
For the long-term portfolio, starting from the 360
th
 trading day after Jan. 1, 2010 (D1), we collect the data on all IPOs 
listed between 360 days and 240 days before D1.  We now take a short position in the stocks with over-issuance above 
the 75% percentile and a long position in the ones with over-issuance below the 25% percentile.  We again rebalance 
this portfolio every 30 trading days.  The last portfolio is formed at the 720
th
 trading day after Jan. 1, 2010. 
In Panel B, we use exactly the same portfolio formation method, but change the time windows.  For the short-term 
portfolio1, we start from the 160
th
 trading day after Jan. 1, 2010.  For the short-term portfolio2, we start from the 80
th
 
trading day after Jan. 1, 2010.  For the long-term portfolio1, we start from the 400
th
 trading day after Jan. 1, 2010.  For 
the long-term portfolio2, we start from the 320
th
 trading day after Jan. 1, 2010. 
In Panel C, we report the returns using exactly the same portfolio formation procedure and time window as in Panel A; 
the only difference is that we form investment porfolios based on relative industry multiples rather than on over-
issuance (see also Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 2004).  So, we divide each issuer’s P/E ratio by the industry average 
P/E ratio in the quarter preceding the IPO and use this relative mutiple to form investment portfolios. 
 
Panel A 
Variable Obs. 
 
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. t-test 
H0: mean=0 
Cumulative 
return 
Short-term 
portfolio 
390 0.0008  0.0007 0.0074  -0.0354 0.0250  0.040 31.21% 
Long-term 
portfolio 
390 0.0007  0.0001 0.0075 -0.0194 0.0255  0.052 27.32% 
Panel B 
Variable Obs. 
 
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. t-test 
H0: mean=0 
Cumulative 
return 
Short-term 
portfolio1 
360 0.0006  0.0006 0.0062  -0.0151 0.0212  0.070 21.64% 
Short-term 
portfolio2 
450 0.0005 0.0005 0.0048 -0.0305 0.0190 0.081 22.51% 
Long-term 
portfolio1 
360 0.0007 0.0001 0.0063 -0.0251 0.0235 0.090 25.20% 
Long-term 
portfolio2 
450 0.0004  0.0002 0.0045 -0.0394 0.0210  0.120 18.01% 
Panel C 
Variable Obs. 
 
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. t-test 
H0: mean=0 
Cumulative 
return 
Short-term 
portfolio 
390 0.0000  0.0001 0.0030  -0.0148 0.0191  0.921 0.01% 
Long-term 
portfolio 
390 0.0000  0.0000 0.0055 -0.0201 0.0212  0.726 0.00% 
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Table 2.6 
Summary statistics on excess market returns, BMS and HML portfolio returns 
In this table, we present summary statistics on the explanatory variables used in the short-term and the long-term 
investment portfolio daily return regressions.  Excess market return is the daily CSI 300 index return minus the 
corresponding risk-free rate; BMS is calculated as the CSI 100 index daily return minus the CSI 500 index daily return; 
HML is calculated as the CSI value-firm index daily return minus the CSI growth-firm index daily return. 
 
Panel A. Explanatory variables in the short-term investment portfolio return regression  
Variable Obs. 
  
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Excess market 
return 
390 -0.0005  -0.0001 0.0136 -0.0622 0.0369  
BMS 390 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0101 -0.0272 0.0429 
HML 390  -0.00004  -0.0001 0.0054 -0.0104  0.0155  
 
Panel B. Explanatory variables in the long-term investment portfolio return regression 
Variable Obs. 
  
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Excess market 
return 
390 -0.0006  -0.0001 0.0136  -0.0358 0.0489  
BMS 390 0.0004 0 0.0065 -0.0131 0.0348 
HML 390  0.00003  -0.00002 0.0071  -0.0148  0.0158  
 
 
Table 2.7 
Short-term and long-term investment portfolio daily return regressions 
We regress the daily returns from our short-term and long-term investment portfolios on their corresponding excess 
market returns, on the returns of a big-firm minus small-firm portfolio (BMS), on the returns of a high book-to-market 
minus low book-to-market portfolio (HML).  p-values are reported between parentheses.  They are all calculated against 
block bootstrapped errors, we take 5 lags as a block.  Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are marked 
with *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 Constant Excess 
market 
return  
BMS HML Adjusted 
R-square 
p-value of  
wald chi-
square 
Sample size 
Short-term 
portfolio 
0.00065* 
(0.066) 
-0.1403*** 
(<0.001) 
0.0841 
(0.261)  
-0.5341*** 
(<0.001) 
0.1165 <0.0001 390 
Long-term 
portfolio 
0.00065** 
(0.048) 
0.0791*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.0612 
(0.299) 
0.3221*** 
(0.005) 
0.0620 0.0010 390 
 
As one might argue that the positive returns in Panels A and B of Table 2.5 just reflect 
differences in systematic-risk exposure across the stocks that were bought/sold, we subsequently 
run Fama-French (1993) three-factor regression models on the daily returns from the two portfolio 
strategies.
30
  That is, we regress the daily returns of each investment portfolio on the excess market 
return, on a big-minus-small portfolio return (BMS), and on a high book-to-market minus low 
                                                          
30
 In an unreported test, we also used CAPM benchmark, the results are similar to those of Fama-French regression. We 
also run the regressions separately with long and short portfolios, we obtain significant alphas in these regressions.  
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book-to-market portfolio return (HML).  We use the one-year deposit rate published by the People’s 
Bank of China as a proxy for the risk-free rate when calculating the market risk premium (see also 
Drew et al., 2003; Wang and Di Iorio, 2007).  Like those authors, we also use the CSI 300 index to 
calculate the market return, the CSI 100 big-firm index for the big-firm portfolio return, the CSI 500 
small-firm index for the small-firm portfolio return, the CSI value-firm index for the high book-to-
market portfolio return, and the CSI growth-firm index for the low book-to-market portfolio 
return.
31
  All those stock indices are published by China Securities Index Ltd., which is jointly 
operated by the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges.  Table 2.6 presents summary statistics on 
the excess market return, BMS, and HML.  Table 2.7 shows the results from the Fama-French 
regressions.  To address the concern that the daily portfolio returns may be serially correlated, we 
draw our conclusions from bootstrapped standard errors using block bootstrap
32
. 
Table 2.7 reveals that after controlling for the excess market return, BMS, and HML, the 
investment strategies generate a positive alpha for the short-term as well as the long-term portfolio, 
i.e. a significantly positive intercept of 0.00065.  This number corresponds to an abnormal return 
(before deducting any transaction costs) of about 14% per annum.  We further note that the excess 
market return and HML significantly influence the daily portfolio returns, yet with an opposite sign 
across the short-term and long-term portfolios.  This outcome reflects the differences in short and 
long positions in IPO stock, based on over-issuance.  Overall, in line with Daniel et al. (1998), our 
findings imply that highly over-issued IPOs outperform in the short run, but underperform in the 
long run.  The significant return from the long-term investment strategy is even more startling, as 
this portfolio is built on information that is already known in the market for 240 to 360 days.  This 
simple fact thus refutes the rational-agents and efficient-markets hypothesis.  Arguably, our findings 
                                                          
31
 The CSI 100 big-firm index covers the top-100 stocks ranked in terms of their market capitalization in the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen stock markets.  The CSI 500 small-firm index then includes the stocks ranked from 300 to 800 in terms 
of market capitalization.  The CSI value-firm index and the CSI growth-firm index identify value firms and growth 
firms by a Z-score covering the book-to-market ratio, P/E ratio, dividend yield ratio, and cash-flow yield ratio.  For 
details on the composition of these indices, see 
http://www.csindex.com.cn/sseportal_en/csiportal/zs/indexreport.do?type=1. 
32
 We used 3-lags, 5-lags and 10-lags blocks, we obtain similar results.  We report the results by using 5-lag block.  
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suggest that issuers and their investment banks were able to successfully spot investor overvaluation 
and to market the offering.  So, they deliberately decided to exploit stock market investors at IPO-
time by raising more capital than needed, i.e. over-issuance.  To obtain further insights into the 
nature of this process, we need to also examine how over-issuance relates to the investment-bank 
fee rate and the first-day abnormal return. 
 
2.5.2. The relation among over-issuance, fee rates, and first-day abnormal returns 
To identify the relation among over-issuance, investment-bank fee rates, and first-day abnormal 
returns, we adopt a simultaneous equations approach, consisting of three equations.  In the over-
issuance equation, we include the first-day abnormal return and the investment-bank fee rate as 
explanatory variables; and vice versa for the other two equations.  Next, we need to find at least as 
many excluded exogenous variables as the number of endogenous variables in the system to fulfill 
the order condition for identification of this simultaneous equations system.  For the over-issuance 
equation, we scale the firm’s planned investment amount by total assets in the quarter before IPO 
and add this variable as an extra regressor.  When finance requirements arising from prospective 
investment projects are already extensive, we expect IPO firms to find it more difficult to raise even 
more capital at their IPO.  So, we hypothesize a negative coefficient on this variable in the over-
issuance equation.  Besides, we add the ratio of cash to total assets in the quarter before IPO.  The 
reason is that firms with a larger amount of cash at hand may be less keen to accumulate even more 
cash at their IPO. 
As to the fee-rate equation, we add the log of gross IPO proceeds and the square of this 
variable.  Together, those variables account for a potentially U-shaped relation between gross IPO 
proceeds and investment-bank fee rates (see Dunbar, 2000; Altinkihc and Hansen, 2000; Kaserer 
and Kraft, 2003).  Next, we include the proportion of star analysts employed by the IPO’s lead 
manager.  Loughran and Ritter (2004) find that as of the 1990s, issuers in the U.S.A. have put more 
weight on hiring lead managers with highly ranked financial analysts to ensure post-IPO research 
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coverage.  For China, Huyghebaert and Xu (2013) find that the number of star analysts and the 
number of investment banks employing star analysts have increased substantially as of the year 
2004.  Investment banks may ask compensation for this extra service, for example by charging a 
larger fee rate to issuers. 
For the first-day abnormal return regression, we calculate the ratio of fixed assets to total 
assets in the quarter preceding the IPO.  When fixed assets (i.e. PPE) account for a larger fraction of 
total assets, we expect firms are easier to evaluate and, hence, the asymmetric-information problem 
should be smaller.  Under the idea that information asymmetries are a major determinant of IPO 
underpricing, the fixed-assets ratio should correlate negatively with the first-day abnormal return.  
Besides, we follow Beatty and Ritter (1986) to add the number of planned investment projects in 
the IPO application documents as an extra regressor.  According to the latter authors, the larger the 
number of projects, the harder it is for investors to gather sufficient and relevant information on all 
of these and, thus, the higher the information asymmetries surrounding the IPO.  The correlation 
coefficient between the number of investment projects and the planned investment amount is only 
0.02 and insignificant (p-value of 0.435), thereby pointing out that those two variables measure 
different concepts. 
Finally, we add the following explanatory variables in all three regression equations: the log 
of total assets in the quarter before IPO, to account for the influence of firm size;
33
 the standard 
deviation of the daily stock returns in the 120 trading days subsequent to the IPO as a proxy for 
issuer risk;
34
 a dummy equal to one if direct and indirect state ownership in the issuing firm exceeds 
50% at IPO-time, to account for the influence of the government; the last-year market share of the 
investment bank, to control for its reputation; the market return from 30 days to one day before the 
IPO, to proxy for the market sentiment preceding the offering; and a dummy that equals one if the 
                                                          
33
 Another control variable that is commonly used in the IPO literature is firm age.  Yet, we have only information on 
firm age for 156 sample firms.  Moreover, as many issuers in China are re-organized before their IPO to fulfill the 
conditions stipulated by the CSRC, many IPO firms are rather (and artificially) young.  Not surprisingly, a number of 
scholars find that the age of the IPO firm is not significant to explain first-day abnormal returns (e.g., Chan et al., 2004; 
Francis et al., 2009). 
34
 We have also tried with 90 days and 180 days; results prove comparable. 
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firm lists on the Shanghai stock exchange.  We also control for industry and year fixed effects by 
means of industry dummies based on the CSRC industry classification and a year dummy that 
equals one for 2011.  Our regression model thus looks as follows: 
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with: 
Over-issuance: Net IPO proceeds / planned investment amount. 
Fee rate: (Underwriting fee + sponsor fee) / gross IPO proceeds. 
Abnormal return: ((First-day closing price – offer price) / offer price) – first-day market 
return. 
Planned investment: Planned investment amount / total assets in the quarter before IPO. 
Cash ratio: Issuer cash and cash equivalents / total assets in the quarter before IPO. 
Gross proceeds: IPO proceeds before deducting any IPO-related costs. 
Star analyst: Fraction of star analysts employed by the lead manager in the year before IPO. 
Fixed assets ratio: Issuer fixed assets / total assets in the quarter before the IPO. 
Project number: Number of planned investment projects in the IPO application documents. 
Assets: Issuer total assets in the quarter before IPO. 
Volatility: The standard deviation of the issuer’s daily stock returns from 1st to 120th trading 
day after the IPO. 
SOE dummy: Dummy equal to one if the Chinese state controls more than 50% of the firm’s 
shares before the IPO, zero otherwise. 
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Market share: Total gross proceeds of the IPOs underwritten by the lead manager relative to 
the total gross proceeds raised in all IPOs in the previous year. 
Market return: Return on the market index from 30 days to 1 day before the IPO; the market 
index is either the Shanghai or the Shenzhen composite index, depending on the firm’s 
listing. 
Market dummy: Dummy equal to one if the issuer lists in Shanghai, zero otherwise. 
Ids: Industry dummies according to the CSRC industry classification code. 
Year: Dummy equal to one for the year 2011, zero for the year 2010. 
 
Table 2.8 reports summary statistics on the various test and control variables, whereas Table 
2.9 shows the 3SLS regression output.  We implemented the Hansen J-test equation by equation; as 
all p-values are well above 0.10, the validity of our instruments seems supported.  Besides, Stock 
and Yogo (2005) point out that the instrumental regression estimators will be biased when the 
instruments are not strong, i.e. when the instruments can explain only a limited portion of the 
variance in the endogenous variables.  They argue that an F-statistic above ten in the first-stage 
regression is an indication of strong instruments.  Table 2.9 reveals that those F-statistics, equation 
by equation, are all well above ten. 
Next, the results in Table 2.9 support our hypotheses arising from the investor-exploitation 
rationale.  Specifically, we find that a larger investment-bank fee rate significantly enhances over-
issuance, which confirms the idea that a larger fee rate encourages investment banks to actively 
time the IPO market.  Meanwhile, over-issuance also significantly enlarges the fee rate.  So, 
investment banks themselves seem to benefit from a better timing of the IPO market, too.  The latter 
finding also verifies what was reported by the Chinese media, i.e. issuers intentionally include an 
over-issuance clause in their underwriting contract with investment banks to reward them for higher 
over-issuance.  The coefficient on over-issuance in the fee-rate equation equals 0.005, indicating 
that if over-issuance can be increased from one to two, issuers would pay their investment banks an 
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additional 0.5 cents on every Yuan raised.  As the average over-issuance in our sample amounts to 
2.55, this corresponds to an extra 0.75% fee rate.  As total IPO proceeds raised in 2010–2011 equal 
RMB 582 billion, we infer that issuers paid an additional RMB 4.37 billion in fees to investment 
banks as a result of over-issuance.  This translates into an extra fee of RMB 7.44 million for the 
average IPO.  In sum, we find strong empirical support for Hypothesis 2. 
Keeping the investment-bank fee rate constant, we find that over-issuance and the first-day 
abnormal return significantly negatively influence each other.  The over-issuance regression shows 
that a 10 percentage points increase in the first-day abnormal return reduces over-issuance by 0.70.  
The average first-day abnormal return equals 33%; a 10 percentage points increase is thus a 30.0% 
increase from the mean.  The average over-issuance in our sample is 2.55; a reduction by 0.70 is 
thus a 27.5% reduction from the mean.  Together, those results confirm Hypothesis 3, i.e. 
investment banks need to find a balance between raising more capital for issuers and rewarding 
primary-market investors to ensure their participation in future IPOs.  As a result, over-issuance and 
the first-day abnormal return tend to correlate negatively with each other. 
Overall, the above findings comply with the investor-exploitation explanation and fail to 
support the rational-agents and efficient-markets theory.  Our results further show that once 
accounting for investor exploitation, the issuing amount, the investment-bank fee rate, and the first-
day abnormal return become endogenous.  A correct empirical approach should thus account for 
this endogeneity.  Although not conjectured, we also find a significant positive impact of the 
investment-bank fee rate on the first-day abnormal return.  This outcome is in line with earlier 
findings by Chen and Mohan (2002).  Yet, it also provides further support to the investor-
exploitation explanation: with a larger fee rate, investment banks likely market the IPO more 
aggressively and thus induce a higher investor valuation of the IPO firm, thereby enlarging the first-
day abnormal return, everthing else constant. 
The coefficients on the control variables are largely as expected.  Firms with a larger 
planned investment amount and a larger amount of cash reserves engage less in over-issuance, 
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although the cash ratio is only marginally significant (p-value of 0.13).  Next, in line with the 
literature, the fee rate bears an U-shaped relation with gross IPO proceeds (Dunbar, 2000; Altinkihc 
and Hansen, 2000).  However, the fraction of star analysts has no effect on fee rates (p-value of 
0.66).  The fixed assets ratio correlates negatively, while the number of investment projects 
correlates positively with the first-day abnormal return.  In line with theoretical arguments, those 
results thus indicate that the higher the information asymmetries surrounding the offering, the more 
IPOs are underpriced. 
The riskiness of the issuer, as measured by its daily stock return volatility, significantly 
positively influences over-issuance.  As the volatility of stock returns can also be considered as a 
measure of the divergence in opinion among investors about the issuer’s true worth, this finding 
might reflect that a larger volatility allows to better exploit stock market investors, without investors 
being able to detect such an abuse.  Next, the issuer’s stock return volatility also significantly 
positively influences the first-day abnormal return, in line with the IPO literature.  However, the 
riskiness of the IPO firm does not influence the investment-bank fee rate.  Under the rational-agents 
and efficient-markets theory, investment banks should demand a larger fee rate when the issuer is 
riskier, to compensate them ex ante for their higher probability of ending up with buying unsold 
IPO shares.  Riskier firms are indeed harder to value.  In contrast, under the investor-exploitation 
explanation, even when investment banks value the issuer too high by mistake, as long as they can 
correctly assess and positively influence investor sentiment about the offering, they might still be 
able to sell the IPO shares to primary-market investors.  So, the riskiness of the IPO firm should not 
necessarily increase the investment-bank fee rate under the investor-exploitation rationale. 
Next, state-owned IPO firms are associated with higher over-issuance, suggesting that a 
stock market quotation by itself cannot put financial discipline on SOEs, which usually have a long 
tradition in enjoying soft budget constraints.  This result also indicates that the intension of raising 
large cash to reduce bankruptcy risk unlikely explain over-issuance.  SOEs enjoy soft budget 
constrains; if buffering bankruptcy risk indeed drives over-issuance, we should observe SOEs to 
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associate with lower over-issuance instead of higher.  Our observation clearly points to the 
opposite. Next, SOEs pay a lower fee rate to their investment banks, everything else constant.  
Maybe the latter finding can be related to the fact that the government is repetitively involved in 
listing its SOE firms, which provides it with extra bargaining power vis-à-vis investment banks 
when it comes to negotiating fee rates.  Finally, in line with the existing literature, the IPOs of 
Chinese SOEs are associated with a huge first-day abnormal return (e.g., Guo and Brooks, 2008; 
Huyghebaert and Quan, 2009). 
The investment bank’s market share bears no significant relation to over-issuance, thereby 
indicating that big and small investment banks behave similarly in exploiting stock market 
investors.  Yet, market share does have a significant positive effect on investment-bank fee rates, 
pointing at a market-power premium for big investment banks.  However, in contrast to Western 
economies (Booth and Smith, 1986; Carter and Manaster,1990), we find that investment banks with 
a higher market share cannot reduce first-day abnormal returns in China.  Although prior research 
has considered investment-bank market share as a proxy for the underwriter’s reputation, 
Huyghebaert and Xu (2013) show that investment banks in China never gained market share by 
certifying issuer quality; in the Chinese case, a higher market share may therefore not necessarily be 
an indicator of the bank’s reputation. 
The market return before the IPO positively influences over-issuance as well as the first-day 
abnormal return.  As the pre-IPO market return captures overall investor sentiment in the stock 
market, it is not surprising to find that this variable correlates positively with both variables.  
Interestingly, the market dummy, which proved significant univariately in Table 2.1, becomes 
insignificant to explain over-issuance after controlling for issuer-specific variables. 
Due to the big differences between the IPOs of state-owned enterprises and private-
controlled firms, we subsequently split our sample based upon the identity of the firm’s controlling 
shareholder and re-run the above model.  Table 2.10 reports the results.  Interestingly, the full-
sample regression results as to the interactions among over-issuance, investment-bank fee rates, and 
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first-day abnormal returns show up in both subsamples.  Next, the investment banks with a higher 
market share were able to secure a larger fee rate from their private-controlled clients, but not from 
their SOE clients.  This outcome is in line with our earlier conjecture that as the Chinese state is a 
repetitive participant in the IPO market, SOEs have greater bargaining power when it comes to 
negotiating fee rates. 
 
Table 2.8. 
Summary statistics on the variables used in over-issuance, fee rate and first-day abnormal 
return regressions. 
In this table, we provide summary statistics on the variables used in the regressions of Tables 9 and 10.  The sample includes the 
firms listed between January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2011, excluding any financial institutions.  Over-issuance is net IPO 
proceeds divided by total planned investment amount.  Fee rate is the sum of underwriting fees and sponsor fees, divided by gross 
IPO proceeds.  Abnormal return is the first-day abnormal return of every IPO.  Planned investment is the planned investment amount 
divided by the firm’s total assets before IPO.  Cash ratio is the total of cash and cash equivalents divided by the firm’s total assets at 
the end of the quarter before IPO.  Gross proceeds is total gross IPO proceeds, in RMB billion.  Star analyst is the fraction of star 
analysts employed by the lead manager relative to the total number of star analysts in the year before IPO.  Fixed assets ratio is total 
fixed assets divided by total assets in the quarter before IPO.  Project number is the total number of planned investment projects 
disclosed in the IPO application documents.  Assets is the firm’s total assets before IPO, in RMB billion.  Volatility is the standard 
deviation of daily stock returns in the 120 trading days after the IPO.  SOE dummy is a dummy equal to one if the Chinese state 
controles more than 50% of the issuer’s voting rights before IPO.  Market share is the market share of the lead manager in the year 
before IPO, calculated by dividing the total gross IPO proceeds an investment bank raised in a particular year by the total gross 
proceeds raised in all IPOs in that year.  Market return is the market return in the 30 days before IPO.  Market dummy equals one if 
the firm lists on the Shanghai stock exchange and zero otherwise. 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Over-issuance 560 2.552 2.372 1.155 0.361 11.694 
Fee rate 560 0.055 0.052 0.020 0.013 0.136 
Abnormal return 560 0.330 0.231 0.374 -0.111 2.671 
Planned investment 560 0.593 0.520 0.373 0.021 3.775 
Cash ratio 560 0.205 0.156 0.157 0.017 0.850 
Gross proceeds 560 1.022 0.720 1.150 0.171 13.500 
Star analyst 560 0.037 0.147 0.047 0.0000 0.182 
Fixed assets ratio 560 0.255 0.254 0.159 0.004 0.859 
Project number 560 2.875 3 1.714 1 24 
Assets 560 1.568 0.548 7.770 0.093 160.686 
Volatility 560 0.028 0.028 0.006 0.012 0.052 
SOE dummy 560 0.131 - - - - 
Market share 560 0.036 0.024 0.047 0.000 0.344 
Market return 560 -0.002 -0.010 0.083 -0.209 0.207 
Market dummy 560 0.0875 - - - - 
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Table 2.9.  Over-issuance, fee rate and first-day abnormal return regressions 
This table reports the 3SLS regression output of a simultaneous equation system consisting of three equations.  In each equation, we use over-
issuance (Over-issuance), the investment-bank fee rate (Fee rate), or the first-day abnormal return (Abnormal return) as dependent variable.  We then 
put the two other variables on the right-hand-side and control for some other variables.  Planned investment is the planned investment amount divided 
by the firm’s total assets before IPO.  Cash ratio is the total of cash and cash equivalents divided by the firm’s total assets at the end of the quarter 
before IPO.  Gross proceeds is total gross IPO proceeds, in RMB billion.  Star analyst is the fraction of star analysts employed by the lead manager 
relative to the total number of star analysts in the year before IPO. Fixed assets ratio is fixed assets divided by total assets in the quarter before IPO.  
Project number is the total number of planned investment projects disclosed in the IPO application documents.  Assets is the firm’s total assets before 
IPO, in RMB billion. Volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock returns in the 120 trading days after the IPO.  SOE dummy is a dummy equal to 
one if the Chinese state controls more than 50% of the issuer’s voting rights before IPO.  Market share is the market share of the lead manager in the 
year before IPO, calculated by dividing the total gross IPO proceeds an investment bank raised in a particular year by the total gross proceeds raised 
in all IPOs in that year.  Market return is the market return in the 30 days before IPO.  We take the CSRC industry classification to construct industry 
dummies.  Market dummy equals one if the firm lists on the Shanghai stock exchange and zero otherwise.  We also include a year dummy for 2011.  
Hansen’s J test is based on equation by equation instrumental regressions. F-statistics are the calculated equation by equation on the first-stage 
regressions, with H0 hypothesis that all instrumental variables have zero influence on the endogenous variables.  Coefficients significant at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level are marked with *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 Over-issuance Fee rate Abnormal return 
Intercept -6.939 0.184 -0.840 
 (0.441) (0.522) (0.132) 
Over-issuance - 0.005*** -0.060*** 
  (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Fee rate 134.411*** - 9.171*** 
 (<0.001)  (<0.001) 
Abnormal return -7.054*** 0.097 - 
 (<0.001) (0.725)  
Ln(Planned investment) -0.388***  - 
 (<0.001)   
Cash ratio -0.077   
  (0.130)   
Ln(Gross proceeds) - -0.007*** - 
  (0.795)  
Ln(Gross proceeds) squared - 0.001*** - 
  (0.800)  
Star analyst - -0.020 - 
  (0.661)  
Fixed assets ratio - - -0.003*** 
   (<0.001) 
Project number - -  0.002* 
   (0.06) 
Ln(Assets) -0.033 -0.002 0.017 
 (0.937) (0.125) (0.461) 
Volatility 370.548*** -2.226 22.858*** 
 (<0.001) (0.802) (<0.001) 
SOE dummy 2.832*** -0.017*** 0.175*** 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.003) 
Market share -4.125 0.047* -0.293 
 (0.347) (0.056) (0.371) 
Market return 20.919*** -0.122 1.279*** 
 (<0.001) (0.120) (<0.001) 
Market dummy 1.524 -0.009 0.093 
 (0.162) (0.131) (0.120) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes 
p-value of Chi-square test <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
p-value of Hansen’s J-test 0.224 0.631 0.801 
F-statistic 326 11.20 17.12 
Number of observations 560 560 560 
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Table 2.10 
Over-issuance, fee rate and first-day abnormal return regressions: The role of owner identity 
This table reports the 3SLS regression output of a simultaneous equation system consisting of three equations.  In each equation, we use over-
issuance (Over-issuance), the investment-bank fee rate (Fee rate), or the first-day abnormal return (Abnormal return) as dependent variable.  We then 
put the two other variables on the right-hand-side and control for some other variables.  Planned investment is the planned investment amount divided 
by the firm’s total assets before IPO.  Cash ratio is the cash and cash equivalents divided by the firm’s total assets at the end of the quarter before 
IPO.  Gross proceeds is total gross IPO proceeds, in RMB billion.  Star analyst is the fraction of star analysts employed by the lead manager relative 
to the total number of star analysts in the year before IPO.  Fixed assets ratio is fixed assets divided by total assets in the quarter before IPO.  Project 
number is the total number of planned investment projects disclosed in the IPO application documents.  Assets is the firm’s total assets before IPO, in 
RMB billion.  Volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock returns in the 120 trading days after the IPO.  Market share is the market share of the 
lead manager in the year before IPO, calculated by dividing the total gross IPO proceeds an investment bank raised in a particular year by the total 
gross proceeds raised in all IPOs in that year.  Market return is the market return in the 30 days before IPO.  Market dummy equals one if the firm 
lists on the Shanghai stock exchange and zero otherwise.  We take the CSRC industry classification to construct industry dummies.  We also include 
a year dummy for 2011.  We split our whole sample into Private-controlled firms and SOEs.  Private-controlled firms have non-state owners 
controlling more than 50% of the firm’s voting rights before IPO; if not, they are classified as SOEs.  Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level are marked with *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 Private-controlled firms State-controlled firmss 
 
Over-
issuance 
Fee rate 
Abnormal 
return 
Over-
issuance 
Fee rate 
Abnormal 
return 
Intercept 
-12.216 
(0.232) 
0.948* 
(0.086) 
-0.751 
(0.120) 
36.955 
(0.133) 
1.238 
(0.340) 
1.750 
(0.391) 
Over-issuance - 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.045*** 
(<0.001) 
- 
0.003* 
(0.080) 
-0.096*** 
(0.002) 
Fee rate 
177.301*** 
(0.001) 
- 
8.429*** 
(<0.001) 
90.367*** 
(<0.001) 
- 
5.024*** 
(0.001) 
Abnormal return 
-10.004*** 
(<0.001) 
0.088 
(0.925) 
- 
-6.818*** 
(0.001) 
0.056 
(0.353) 
- 
Ln(Planned investment) 
-0.270*** 
(<0.001) 
 - 
-0.131* 
(0.070) 
- - 
Cash ratio 
-0.377 
(0.181) 
- - 
-0.486* 
(0.095) 
- - 
Ln(Gross proceeds)  
-0.079*** 
(<0.001) 
  
-0.091 
(0.462) 
 
Ln(Gross proceeds) 
squared 
 
0.002** 
(0.050) 
- - 
0.002** 
(0.046) 
- 
Star analyst - 
-0.014 
(0.683) 
- - 
0.009 
(0.205) 
- 
Fixed assets ratio - - 
-0.019*** 
(<0.001) 
- - 
-0.034 
(0.822) 
Project number - - 
-0.001 
(0.140) 
- - 
0.005 
(0.105) 
Ln(Assets) 
-0.209 
(0.615) 
-0.001 
(0.946) 
-0.001 
(0.675) 
1.543 
(0.241) 
-0.003 
(0.193) 
0.070 
(0.402) 
Volatility 
493.156*** 
(<0.001) 
 2.009 
(0.702) 
22.375*** 
(<0.001) 
274.860*** 
(0.001) 
1.986 
(0.350) 
41.376*** 
(0.001) 
Market share 
-5.598 
(0.335) 
0.050*** 
(0.004) 
-0.275 
(0.369) 
0.167 
(0.974) 
0.014 
(0.676) 
0.164 
(0.820) 
Market return 
27.338*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.104 
(0.201) 
1.234*** 
(0.001) 
15.931*** 
(0.001) 
0.137* 
(0.071) 
2.072*** 
(0.001) 
Market dummy 
2.499 
(0.138) 
0.011 
(0.611) 
0.112 
(0.750) 
0.205 
(0.869) 
0.005 
(0.531) 
-0.016 
(0.924) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
p-value of Chi-square test <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Number of obs. 486 486 486 74 74 74 
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2.6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we start from the startling observation that during the period Jan. 1, 2010 – Dec. 31, 
2011, the average Chinese domestic IPO firm raised equity 2.55 times the amount of capital needed 
for its planned investment projects, i.e. over-issuance.  By examining the usage of over-issued 
capital after the firm’s first listing, we find evidence that it is indeed excessive, i.e. corresponding to 
no real investment projects.  On average, 78% of the capital raised by issuers at IPO-time remains 
kept in the cash and cash equivalents account two years after listing.  When trying to explain this 
phenomenon, we find empirical support for the investor-exploitation explanation, based on 
behavioral finance theory.  Specifically, we provide compelling evidence to support the arguments 
raised by Loughran and Ritter (1995) that issuers and their investment banks take advantage of 
transitory windows of opportunity by issuing equity when, on average, the firm’s shares are 
substantially overvalued.  We offer evidence that issuers and investment banks tend to exploit 
investors in IPOs, which corresponds to what has been argued by Rajan and Servaes (1993), Baker 
and Wurgler (2002), and Ljungqvist et al. (2006), among others.  More specifically, and in line with 
Pagano et al. (1998), investment banks seem to identify the overvalued industries and then advice 
potential issuers in those industries about the process of listing.  Also, we show that investor 
overoptimism gives rise to short-term overshooting and long-term underperformance of those 
overvalued IPO stocks.  Finally, we demonstrate that once accounting for the investor-exploitation 
intention, the issue amount, the investment-bank fee rate, and the first-day abnormal return are 
endogenously related to one another.  We thus conclude that issuers and investment banks in 
Chinese domestic IPOs took huge advantage of the overoptimism of stock market investors and 
successfully sold overpriced IPO shares during the period 2010–2011.  Overall, rational-agents and 
efficient-markets theory is hard to reconcile with our findings. 
Our paper has several policy implications.  First, we suggest the regulator to encourage 
long-term investors, by such policies as waiving the capital-gains tax on investors who hold on to 
their IPO shares for a minimum period.  Our analysis shows that market sentiment is transitory; it 
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induces a short-term boost of market prices, but this effect ultimately wanes and drags down stock 
prices.  Long-term investors have to focus more on analyzing the firm’s fundamentals when buying 
IPO shares rather than relying on the (transitory) market sentiment.  Encouraging the participation 
of long-term investors could therefore bring more rationality to the IPO market and reduce over-
issuance.  Second, we suggest the regulator to forbid a linkage between investment-bank fee rates 
and over-issuance in underwriting contracts.  Such linkages encourage investment banks to raise 
unnecessary capital in IPOs.  Yet, investment banks should not be rewarded for over-issuance but 
for offering appropriate certification and advice/support to issuing firms.  Third, our analyses show 
that investment banks with a higher market share are not associated with lower over-issuance.  This 
finding thus indicates that up till now, Chinese investment banks have built their market share by 
helping issuers to raise more funds, rather than by establishing their reputation as ‘safeguard’ of 
investors’ interests.  So, regulation and law enforcement should be strengthened in the Chinese 
domestic IPO market.  Fourth, our analyses reveal that SOEs are associated with higher over-
issuance in the primary market.  As a repetitive issuer in the IPO market, the government should 
voluntarily restrain its SOEs from raising excessive capital, especially when stock market investors 
remain overenthusiastic about privatization IPOs. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Does IPO underwriting influence the post-IPO earnings forecasts of affiliated 
financial analysts? Evidence from a Chinese natural experiment. 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
In the financial analysts literature, a stream of research focuses on the investment advice of a 
specific group of financial analysts: the affiliated analysts, i.e. the analysts that are employed by an 
investment bank/brokerage firm that maintains another relationship with the firm being covered.
35
  
This research has shown that those affiliated financial analysts tend to issue more positively biased 
investment recommendations, earnings forecasts, and target prices than non-affiliated analysts do 
(for a good review, see Mehran and Stulz, 2007 and Ramnath et al., 2008).  However, this research 
was not yet able to conclude on the exact mechanism(s) that drive this relative bias.  Specifically, it 
is possible that affiliated financial analysts are genuinely more optimistic about the firms they 
cover.  Alternatively, affiliated analysts may intentionally distort their investment advice because of 
inappropriate incentives.  Gaining more insights into the mechanisms underlying this relative 
forecast bias clearly is important, particularly for investors and regulators. 
To examine this research question in more detail, we focus on the affiliation resulting from 
IPO underwriting, which is one of the most important relationships between investment banks and 
firms becoming listed for the first time.  IPO underwriting may facilitate an investment bank’s 
access to subsequent business with this same firm, such as from seasoned equity offerings, M&A 
advice, etc. (James, 1992; Krigman et al., 2001).  Moreover, successfully managing an IPO can be 
considered as a proof of the investment bank’s capabilities, thereby positively affecting its market 
share in future IPOs as well (Ritter and Rydqvist, 1994).  In general, IPO candidates tend to choose 
their IPO underwriter(s) in a beauty contest, considering the various conditions that investment 
                                                          
35
 Sell-side financial analysts are analysts working at investment banks/brokerage firms that offer investment advice to 
their clients.  Buy-side financial analysts work for institutional investors at the investor’s own account.  Likewise most 
literature on financial analysts, we only consider sell-side financial analysts in this article.  So, in the remainder of this 
paper, the term ‘financial analyst’ or ‘analyst’ uniquely refers to those sell-side financial analysts. 
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banks offer.  Investment banks that value the issuer more highly likely are willing to endorse a 
higher offer price and to accept a lower IPO fee rate.  Correspondingly, those investment banks tend 
to be selected as (lead) manager for the firm’s IPO, ceteris paribus.  As the corporate finance 
department and the research department of investment banks often work closely together in IPOs to 
generate synergies (Eccles and Dwight, 1988), it is intuitively plausible that the financial analysts 
employed by the IPO lead manager are naturally more optimistic about the issuer, given that their 
bank obtained the IPO underwriting mandate, i.e. a self-selection effect arises.  Correspondingly, 
those affiliated financial analysts may also release more positively biased reports shortly after the 
IPO than non-affiliated analysts do.  We call this explanation the ‘analyst-optimism view’. 
Next, we also need to consider that, just because of the IPO underwriting mandate, analysts 
affiliated with the IPO lead manager are able to establish more intense contacts with firm 
management and can accumulate a more in-depth understanding of the issuer’s business.  Hence, 
those affiliated financial analysts could obtain a more accurate view as to the IPO firm during the 
underwriting process and, thus, are able to issue more precise forecasts shortly after the IPO than 
non-affiliated analysts do.  If those affiliated financial analysts subsequently rely on their private 
information to establish their forecasts, we can expect that their forecast errors, if any, will be small 
and random, i.e. not in one direction.  In contrast, the forecasts of non-affiliated financial analysts 
will be based on other, less precise inputs; hence, they might be influenced by the prevailing market 
conditions (see also Bergman and Roychowdhury, 2008; Walther and Willis, 2013).  As a result, 
non-affiliated analysts might exhibit positive forecast errors in times of bullish stock market 
conditions and negative forecast errors when stock markets are bearish.  We call this explanation 
the ‘information-advantage view’. 
Finally, building on Michaely and Womack (1999) and James and Karceski (2006), affiliated 
financial analysts could intentionally release a (more) positively distorted opinion as to the IPO firm 
in order to provide post-IPO price support.  Post-IPO price support, which has been defined as 
underwriters’ activities to keep the aftermarket stock price above the IPO offer price in a short 
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period after the firm’s listing, is a common practice among underwriters in U.S. IPOs (e.g., Hanley 
et al., 1998; Aggarwal, 2000).  The IPO underwriting contract between issuers and their investment 
bank(s) often explicitly foresees in post-IPO price support as a way to stabilize the issuer’s stock 
price in the aftermarket; in the U.S.A., this is usually for the first 30 days after listing (Aggarwal, 
2000).  Then, investment banks actually have engaged in a contract that imposes some obligations 
on them.  Alternatively, investment banks may also face a self-imposed rationale to support the 
issuer’s stock price in the aftermarket.  As the IPO offer price is usually fixed by the IPO lead 
manager, primary-market investors could blame the lead manager for having set the offer price too 
high once the stock price drops below the IPO offer price in the aftermarket and, hence, lose their 
interest to participate in any future IPOs organized by this same underwriter.  To maintain their 
reputation among primary-market investors, IPO underwriters may decide to offer post-IPO price 
support, at least in a short period after the IPO (see also Lewellen, 2006).  To achieve a stable stock 
price in the aftermarket, underwriters may require their analysts to be more positive as to the IPO 
firm in their investment recommendations, earnings forecasts, and target prices, particularly when 
the issuer’s stock price comes under pressure in the aftermarket.  Lacking this same rationale, non-
affiliated financial analysts do not face any incentives to distort their investment advice in a way to 
provide post-IPO price support.
36
  We call this view the ‘post-IPO price-supporting view’. 
In this paper, we test the empirical validity of the above three rationales – i.e. affiliated 
analysts are truly more optimistic, affiliated analysts have more accurate information, and/or 
affiliated analysts’ incentives are distorted – by relying on the annual earnings forecasts of IPO 
firms that were released shortly after the firm’s first listing in a Chinese domestic stock market.  
China indeed proves interesting for this research, because of the major regulatory change that took 
                                                          
36
 We do not say that non-affiliated financial analysts face no incentives whatsoever to release a positively biased 
investment advice.  For example, as pointed out by James and Karceski (2006) and Mehran and Stulz (2007), both 
affiliated and non-affiliated analysts may positively distort their opinion to attract future investment banking and 
brokerage business, to keep a good relationship with firm managers, etc.  However, those incentives are common 
among affiliated and non-affiliated analysts; so, if the behavior of affiliated analysts is driven only by those incentives, 
we do not expect to find any differences between the forecasts of affiliated analysts and non-affiliated analysts.  What 
we argue is that the post-IPO price-supporting incentive is unique to affiliated financial analysts, which could incite 
those analysts to release a more positively biased opinion as to the IPO firm than non-affiliated analysts do. 
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place as regards IPO pricing on June 10, 2009.  Specifically, on June 10, 2009, investment banks in 
Chinese domestic IPOs – for the first time – became fully responsible for fixing the IPO offer price, 
together with issuers; before that, the IPO offer price was largely set by the regulator, by applying a 
maximum P/E ratio to the issuer’s earnings.  After June 10, 2009, this P/E ratio cap was formally 
abolished and the IPO offer price henceforth became fully determined by issuers and their 
investment banks after a bookbuilding procedure among institutional investors.  Arguably, the 
regulatory change of June 10, 2009 seems to offer a good natural experiment to test the causal 
relation between the need to provide post-IPO price support and affiliated-analysts’ forecast bias.  If 
financial analysts affiliated with the IPO lead manager only exhibit optimism and/or are better 
informed relative to non-affiliated analysts, they should not behave differently (relative to non-
affiliated analysts) after the regulatory change.  So, if the analyst-optimism view is true, the 
forecasts issued by affiliated financial analysts should be more positive than those of non-affiliated 
analysts, both before and after the regulatory change.  Likewise, if the information-advantage view 
applies, affiliated financial analysts should persistently release less biased and more accurate 
forecasts than non-affiliated ones do.  In contrast, the regulatory change of June 10, 2009 has 
hugely affected IPO underwriters’ incentives to provide post-IPO price support.  Obviously, the 
pre-condition for offering post-IPO price support is that the issue price should be set at least in part 
by the IPO lead manager; otherwise, investment banks take no responsibility as to the IPO offer 
price. 
In this article, we examine the EPS forecasts issued by affiliated and non-affiliated financial 
analysts in the first year after IPO for the firms becoming listed in Mainland China during 2004–
2011.  So, the EPS forecasts in our sample were released during the period 2004–2012.  Although 
the stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen were already re-established at the beginning of the 
1990s, the business of financial analysis in China has only a short history.  The first regulation on 
this type of activity was published only in 1999.  Also, the first ranking of financial analysts was 
made publicly available only at the end of 2003.  Overall, the data quality as regards financial 
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analysts was rather poor before 2004.  However, together with the fast development of Chinese 
domestic stock markets, the business of financial analysis has grown rapidly.  According to the data 
we compiled, 90 investment banks/brokerage firms employed 1,630 financial analysts in the year 
2012; together, they published 112,945 earnings forecasts on 1,931 listed companies.  Chinese 
analysts usually release their opinion on a firm by means of annual EPS forecasts and investment 
recommendations.  However, over 90% of the recommendations in our dataset appeared to be either 
‘buy’ or ‘strong buy’.  This lack of variation in investment recommendations prevented us from 
making a meaningful analysis on this type of analyst output, which is the main reason why we focus 
on earnings forecasts in this study.  Yet, at the same time, the huge number of ‘buy’ and ‘strong 
buy’ recommendations already suggests that the investment advice of financial analysts could be 
hugely distorted in China. 
Our empirical findings overwhelmingly confirm the view that the wish to provide post-IPO 
price support incites financial analysts affiliated with the IPO lead manager to release more 
positively biased earnings forecasts than non-affiliated analysts do.  Specifically, we find that over 
the full sample period (2004–2012), both affiliated and non-affiliated financial analysts issue 
severely positively distorted forecasts.  However, we detect no significant difference in the forecast 
bias between affiliated and non-affiliated analysts before the regulatory change.  Conversely, after 
the regulatory change, the forecast error of analysts affiliated with the IPO lead manager is on 
average 33 percentage points bigger than that of non-affiliated analysts.  Moreover, in the 90 days 
after listing, this relative bias even increases to 63 percentage points and enlarges further when the 
issuer’s stock price dropped below the IPO offer price in the aftermarket.  Arguably, our results 
cannot be reconciled with the view that affiliated financial analysts unintentionally release more 
positively biased forecasts than non-affiliated ones because of their relative optimism on issuing 
firms.  Under the latter view, affiliated financial analysts should always issue more positively biased 
forecasts than non-affiliated ones, no matter before or after the regulatory change, in or out the lock-
up period, with a high or low issuer share price in the aftermarket.  Our results also refute the view 
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that the presumed information advantage enjoyed by affiliated analysts incites them to offer less 
biased forecasts.  Moreover, our forecast-accuracy regressions show that affiliated financial analysts 
also do not release more accurate forecasts than non-affiliated analysts do, thereby rejecting the idea 
that those affiliated analysts are better informed as to the issuing firm.  Finally, we find that 
affiliated financial analysts tend to distort especially the EPS forecasts of fiscal years further away 
from the forecast release date.  From this finding, we conclude that affiliated analysts actually try to 
strategically mask their post-IPO price-supporting activities, as the distortion of long-run forecasts 
is less likely to be noticed by investors than that of short-term forecasts.  Together, our findings 
point out that affiliated financial analysts intentionally distort their EPS forecasts to offer post-IPO 
price support. 
Interestingly, using U.S. data, Michaely and Womack (1999) find that shortly after a firm’s 
IPO, financial analysts affiliated with the IPO lead underwriter tend to offer more positive 
investment recommendations than non-affiliated analysts do.  Likewise, James and Karceski (2006) 
show that affiliated financial analysts release higher target prices than non-affiliated analysts do.  
When explaining their observations, they intuitively assume that affiliated analysts aim to provide a 
‘boost shot’ to the stock price of IPO firms in the aftermarket.  However, they do not further explain 
why affiliated financial analysts may wish to offer this ‘boost shot’; neither do they test this ‘boost-
shot’ assumption.  To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to explicitly put forward the post-
IPO price-supporting view to explain affiliated analysts’ forecast distortion, trying to differentiate it 
from other rationales.  By relying on the natural experiment that took place in the Chinese domestic 
IPO market, we find overwhelming empirical support for such a price-supporting incentive. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In Section 3.2, we briefly review the 
institutional aspects of Chinese domestic IPOs that are relevant to our analysis and to the 
development of the financial-analysts service industry in China.  In Section 3.3, we develop our 
hypotheses based on the current literature.  In Section 3.4, we empirically examine those hypotheses 
and discuss our main findings.  Finally, Section 3.5 concludes the paper. 
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3.2. Institutional background 
3.2.1. The development of the Chinese IPO mechanism 
The Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges were re-established in 1990 and 1991, respectively.  
By the end of 2011, 2,342 firms became listed in these two markets, with a total market 
capitalization of RMB 21.48 trillion (USD 3.4 trillion).  Since June 24, 1993, with the publication 
of ‘The circulation on enhancing the role of securities underwriters and professional intermediaries 
in stock offerings’ by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), every IPO issuer has to 
assign an investment bank as lead manager for its IPO.  Upon receiving a qualification from the 
CSRC, investment banks have to organize the whole IPO process, including performing the due 
diligence on the listing candidate and preparing the IPO application documents to be submitted with 
the CSRC.  From 2004 to 2011, about 70 investment banks were active in the IPO underwriting 
market.  Investment banks thus had to compete for IPO underwriting mandates, which is a lucrative 
business.  The fee rate indeed averaged 4.2% of gross IPO proceeds over our sample period. 
On June 10, 2009, a major regulatory change took place, with the publication of ‘The guiding 
advice on further reform of the IPO pricing method’, when the CSRC publicly announced that it 
would no longer interfere in the pricing of IPO shares and henceforth left the fixing of IPO offer 
prices to investment banks, issuers, and investors.  Typically, the offer price now is set after 
conducting a bookbuilding exercise among institutional investors.  However, before June 10, 2009, 
the IPO offer price had always been capped by a fixed P/E ratio.  Every year, this fixed P/E ratio 
cap was set by the CSRC and applied to all IPOs in that year.  To attract the interest of the general 
public for IPOs, the CSRC deliberately set the P/E ratio cap considerably below the prevailing 
market P/E ratio.  P/E ratio caps were within the range of 13 to 16 during 1994–1999, much below 
the secondary-market P/E ratio of 15 to 58 (Francis et al., 2009).  During 2000–2004, the P/E ratio 
cap was about 20, while the market P/E ratio was between 24 and 58 (Tian, 2010).  After Dec. 31, 
2004, with the publication of Circulation No. 162, this official P/E ratio cap was given up.  
However, before June 10, 2009, the CSRC continued to manage IPO offer prices to some extent, 
  
106 
 
relying on an implicit P/E ratio cap of 30 for most IPOs (Gao, 2010).  So, before June 10, 2009, the 
IPO offer price was mainly determined by the regulator; issuers and their investment banks had 
only little to say about the final offer price. 
The above IPO pricing mechanism has provoked extremely high first-day abnormal returns.  
According to the numbers compiled on Jay Ritter’s website, the first-day abnormal return in 
Chinese domestic IPOs is the third largest in the world, averaging to 133% in 1990–2010.  Yet, 
studies report different numbers in different time periods.  Su and Fleisher (1999) obtain 949% in 
1987–1995, while Chi and Padgett (2005) find 129% in 1996–2000; Guo and Brooks (2008) report 
93.49% between 2001 and 2005.  The data we compiled show that the average first-day abnormal 
return for the firms listed from Jan. 1, 2004 to June 10, 2009 amounts to 87% (median of 79%).  
Those extremely high first-day abnormal returns have created a ‘new-issue fetish’, as it was called 
by the Chinese media.  Investors blindly bought any new issues, paying only little attention to the 
quality of the IPO firm, as the CSRC almost guaranteed them to make money.  The artificially low 
IPO offer price also reduced the odds that the issuer’s stock price would drop below the offer price 
shortly after the IPO.  According to our analysis, out of the 383 firms that became listed between 
Jan. 1, 2004 and June 10, 2009, only 60 issuers (15.7% of this subsample) saw their stock price 
declining below the IPO offer price at least once in the 90 days after listing.  More importantly, 
during that period, issuers and investors had no reason to connect IPO offer prices to the pricing 
ability of investment banks, as IPO underwriters did not have much to say about the final offer 
price.  In line with this idea, Huyghebaert and Xu (2013) find that the correct/incorrect underpricing 
of IPO shares never significantly influenced the market share of investment banks in Chinese 
domestic IPOs in that time frame.  Correspondingly, before June 10, 2009, investment banks had 
only little incentives to offer post-IPO price support. 
The real change came on June 10, 2009, with the enforcement of ‘The guiding advice on 
further reform of the IPO pricing method’.  With this guideline, the CSRC henceforth left the fixing 
of IPO offer prices to investment banks, issuers, and investors.  Ever since, we notice several 
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interesting changes in the Chinese domestic IPO market.  First, the average first-day abnormal 
return for the firms becoming listed after June 10, 2009 up till the end of 2011 declined to 28% 
(median of 22%).  Second, out of the 711 firms becoming listed in that time frame, 306 issuers 
(43% of this subsample) saw their stock price dropping below the IPO offer price at least once in 
the 90 days after listing.  Unlike in Western markets, investment banks in Chinese domestic IPOs 
have only scarcely used the green-shoe mechanism to stabilize the issuer’s stock price in the 
aftermarket.
37
  In fact, the green-shoe mechanism requires underwriters to take a short position in 
the issuer’s stock, which was not allowed in China until March 31, 2010.  Besides, Huyghebaert and 
Xu (2014) find evidence that issuers and investment banks may have aggressively priced IPO shares 
after June 10, 2009, thereby taking advantage of the overly optimistic investors in the stock market.  
All this evidence points in the same direction, i.e. investors face bigger chances of losing money 
when buying shares in an IPO after June 10, 2009. 
Unlike retail investors, who can flip their initially allocated shares immediately after listing, 
institutional investors face a 90-day lock-up period for the IPO shares they obtained in the primary 
market.
38
  Institutional investors in China – which include mutual funds, insurance companies, and 
pension funds – are thus exposed to a considerable price risk.  Next, retail investors also play an 
important role in the secondary market.  A report issued by the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSC) claims that retail investors hold a 83% stake of total market 
capitalization in China and contribute to 86% of total trading volume in 2010.  Moreover, the 2011 
year book of the China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation (CSDCC) shows that by the 
end of 2010, individual investors held 151 million stock accounts in Shanghai and Shenzhen, while 
institutional investors held only 0.58 million accounts. 
 
 
                                                          
37
 Among the IPO firms in our sample, only one firm used it. 
38
 In this 90-day window, only retail investors are allowed to sell their initially allocated shares.  This is not to imply 
that trading volumes are low; in fact, for IPOs in the period 2004–2011, 52% of the shares sold at IPO-time were 
already traded on the first listing date. 
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3.2.2. The development of the financial analysis industry 
In China, the business of financial analysis developed together with the stock exchanges.  In the 
year 1999, a licensing system for financial analysts was established and since then, ‘financial 
analyst’ formally emerged as a specific career path in Chinese domestic stock markets.  In July 
2001, a disciplinary committee was created under the auspices of the Securities Association of 
China (SAC), to supervise those financial analysts.  In the same year, the committee published ‘The 
code of conduct for Chinese financial analysts’, which serves as a guideline for the activities of 
financial analysts.  The guideline stresses that financial analysts should guard their integrity; their 
advice should not be distorted by the interests of other departments within their organization, of 
securities issuers, or of institutional investors. 
According to the data we compiled, the number of financial analysts and the earnings 
forecasts they release have grown exponentially since 2004.  In 2004, only 360 financial analysts 
issued 2,595 earnings forecasts on 430 listed firms (31% of the population of listed firms); by 2012, 
1,630 financial analysts released 112,945 EPS forecasts on 1,931 listed firms (84% of the 
population).  In total, from 2004 to 2012, 3,484 financial analysts issued 421,221 earnings forecasts; 
an average analyst followed 8 firms and issued 40 EPS forecasts per year.  For comparison, the 
average U.S. analyst followed 6 firms and released 20 EPS forecasts per year during the period 
1983–2002 (Fang and Yasuda, 2009). 
Most financial analysts are employed by investment banks and brokerage firms.  In 2012, 90 
investment banks/brokerage firms employed at least one financial analyst.  The average investment 
bank/brokerage firm employed 20 financial analysts.  Independent research firms are still rather 
scarce in China.  In our dataset, we find only one major independent research firm whose 34 
analysts (2% of the number of financial analysts) released 2,406 earnings forecasts in 2012 (2% of 
EPS forecasts).  Six other independent research firms published no more than four research reports 
each. 
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The first ranking of financial analysts was published in 2003, by the financial magazine New 
Fortune, considering the assessments of analyst performance by institutional investors in the 
previous year.  Since then, New Fortune publishes this list at the end of every year.  The first list 
included only 24 star analysts, while the 2012 list comprised 127 star analysts.  New Fortune’s list 
has become the most influential ranking of financial analysts in China.
39
  Yet, turnover in the list is 
quite high.  Among the 326 analysts who appeared at least once in the rankings between 2003 and 
2012, 190 analysts (60% of the population) stayed on the list for less than two years.  Only 58 
analysts (18% of the population) appeared on the list for more than five years.  Obviously, financial 
analysts in China may need more time to build their reputation. 
 
3.3. Hypotheses 
The current literature has clearly pointed out the existence of self-interested incentives among 
financial analysts, which may influence both affiliated and non-affiliated financial analysts when 
preparing their investment advice.  In general, prior research has indicated that investment banks 
may require their analysts to write highly optimistic reports on current and potential future 
customers to attract lucrative corporate finance business, such as from securities underwriting, 
merger and acquisition advising, etc. (Dugar and Nathan, 1995; Lin and McNichols, 1998).  
Besides, financial analysts may be under pressure to produce bullish research reports to stimulate 
stock trading in order to generate additional brokerage commissions for their employers (Agrawal 
and Chen, 2004; Cowen et al., 2006).  In a lot of countries, including China, (some) investors face 
short-selling constraints such that pessimistic research reports cannot produce the same trading 
volumes as optimistic reports.  Analysts may also spread favourable opinions on the firms they 
cover to keep/develop a good relationship with firm management, so as to ease their access to 
valuable information about the firm (Das and Saudagaran, 1998; Lim, 2001). 
                                                          
39
 Two other rankings of financial analysts exist: Sky Eye and 21Century.  Both started after 2004 and have only limited 
influence. 
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However, if the above incentives are the only incentives that affect the behavior of financial 
analysts, we may not observe any differences between the EPS forecasts of affiliated vs. non-
affiliated analysts.  As Mehran and Stulz (2007) point out, with or without an underwriting 
relationship, the wish to generate future business and/or to develop/maintain a good relationship 
with firm management exist equally among affiliated and non-affiliated financial analysts.  For 
example, regardless of whether investment banks have established a prior relationship with a listed 
firm, banks need to compete for future corporate finance and trading business and, thus, may wish 
to please firm managers by inciting their financial analysts to release highly favorable research 
reports.  So, in order to attract future investment banking business, financial analysts who are not 
affiliated with the IPO lead manager have no smaller incentives to release a positively biased advice 
than affiliated analysts do.  As Ramnath et al. (2008) point out, more research is needed to answer 
what is special about the IPO underwriting relationship and how that relationship might affect the 
earnings forecasts released by affiliated analysts. 
To answer this question, we first need to clearly identify those affiliated analysts.  Following 
prior research (e.g., Lin and McNichols, 1998; Michaely and Womack, 1999, Jacob et al., 2008), 
we define an affiliated analyst as a financial analyst who is employed by the IPO firm’s lead 
manager at the time of listing.  As Michaely and Womack (1999) argue, the IPO lead manager plays 
the most important role in an IPO.  First, the IPO lead manager performs the due diligence on the 
issuing firm and, hence, financial analysts employed by that lead manager may obtain more 
accurate information as to the issuer.  Second, the IPO lead manager typically takes responsibility 
as to fixing the final offer price and generally offers post-IPO price support (Aggarwal, 2000).  In 
China, the IPO lead manager takes full responsibility to prepare the IPO application documents and 
to submit the IPO application with the regulator (see also Huyghebaert and Xu, 2013).  So, 
identifying the affiliated financial analysts as the analysts that are employed by the IPO lead 
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manager seems the most natural way to explore how the IPO underwriting relationship affects the 
EPS forecasts of affiliated financial analysts.
40
 
We put forward three potential explanations as to how and why the IPO underwriting 
relationship might influence the EPS forecasts released by affiliated financial analysts.  We also 
develop testable hypotheses in order to examine their empirical validity. 
First, Eccles and Dwight (1988) point out that within investment banks, in order to share 
expertise and to reduce costs, the corporate finance department and the research department often 
work closely together in IPOs.
41
  An investment bank’s view on an IPO firm is thus largely 
determined by the view of its financial analysts as to the issuer.  Listing candidates, when chosing 
their IPO underwriter(s) in a beauty contest, will consider the contract terms that various investment 
banks are willing to offer (Lin and McNichols, 1998).  Investment banks that value the issuer more 
highly are more inclined to endorse a higher offer price and to accept a lower IPO fee rate.  
Correspondingly, the investment bank(s) that hold a more optimistic view about the IPO firm are 
more likely to obtain the IPO underwriting mandate, ceteris paribus.  Because of such a self-
selection effect, affiliated analysts may thus truly hold a more optimistic view on issuing firms than 
non-affiliated analysts do.  Correspondingly, affiliated analysts may also release more positive 
earnings forecasts on IPO firms, without an intention to bias their forecasts.  In the rest of the paper, 
we call this view the ‘analyst-optimism view’.  If the analyst-optimism view holds true, we should 
observe that with or without incentives to support the issuer’s stock price in the aftermarket, 
affiliated analysts always release more positive EPS forecasts than non-affiliated analysts do.  The 
                                                          
40
 For all earnings forecasts in our sample, 2,076 are issued by a financial analyst employed by the IPO lead manager, 
while only 106 are released by a financial analyst employed by an IPO co-underwriter.  In the main test, we classify the 
financial analysts employed by co-underwriters as non-affiliated financial analysts; in an unreported robustness test, we 
excluded the EPS forecasts of co-underwriter analysts and find that results do not change. 
41
 However, in the 2003 Great Settlement between the SEC and the top-ten U.S. investment banks, the SEC demanded a 
clear separation between the corporate finance department and the research department in investment banks (SEC 
release 2003-54).  Correspondingly, affiliated analysts in the U.S.A. are now forbidden to participate in ‘pitches’ and 
‘road shows’ in IPOs and to receive compensation that relates to the investment bank’s corporate finance business.  The 
new regulation does not prohibit those analysts to do research on the companies that will issue new shares.  Those 
affiliated analysts can thus still value IPO candidates and share their research results with internal and external clients.  
Moreover, during our sample period, the Chinese regulator never forbade sharing services between an investment 
bank’s corporate finance department and its research department. 
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regulatory change of June 10, 2009 should thus not have engendered any changes in the (potential) 
gap between the EPS forecasts of affiliated vs. non-affiliated financial analysts; we henceforth call 
this gap the relative bias.  Moreover, under the analyst-optimism view, this relative bias should not 
be associated with the issuer’s stock price in the aftermarket.  Affiliated analysts should thus not 
release more positively biased EPS forecasts when the issuer’s stock price dropped after the firm’s 
first listing.  As Michaely and Womack (1999) point out, the change in the aftermarket stock price 
should bear no relation with the relative optimism of affiliated analysts compared to non-affiliated 
analysts.  So, if it is the optimism of affiliated analysts (relative to non-affiliated ones) that provokes 
a relative forecast bias for affiliated analysts, the difference in EPS forecasts between affiliated and 
non-affiliated analysts should be uncorrelated with the aftermarket stock price, no matter before or 
after the regulatory change.  We postulate the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: If the analyst-optimism view is true: 
1A. The earnings forecasts released by affiliated financial analysts should be more positively 
biased than the forecasts of non-affiliated analysts, regardless of whether the firm became 
listed before or after June 10, 2009. 
1B. The positive relative bias in earnings forecasts should not be associated with the issuer’s 
stock price movement in the aftermarket, regardless of whether the firm became listed before 
or after June 10, 2009. 
 
Second, Jacob et al. (2008) suggest that by performing the due diligence on the IPO firm, 
financial analysts affiliated with the IPO lead manager typically obtain a better understanding about 
the IPO firm than non-affiliated analysts do.  Moreover, by IPO underwriting, lead managers also 
establish a close relationship with firm management.  This relationship may subsequently benefit 
the investment bank’s research department, by giving its financial analysts access to timelier and 
more accurate information about the issuer after its stock market listing.  Using U.S. data from 1995 
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to 2003, Jacob et al. (2008) find that affiliated financial analysts release more accurate forecasts 
than non-affiliated analysts do.  Surely, forecast accuracy does not equal forecast bias.
42
  However, 
it is not unreasonable to assume that when enjoying an information advantage, affiliated financial 
analysts better understand the issuer’s true quality and, thus, can base their forecasts more on the 
company’s fundamentals.  Correspondingly, we can expect that the forecast errors made by 
affiliated financial analysts, if any, will be small and random, i.e. not in one direction.  In contrast, 
non-affiliated financial analysts, because of their lack of precise information, may base their 
forecasts more on personal judgment, which could be subject to prevailing market conditions.  As a 
result, they could exhibit positive forecast errors in times of bullish stock markets and negative 
forecast errors when stock market conditions are bearish (e.g., Bergman and Roychowdhury, 2008; 
Walther and Willis, 2013).  We therefore contend that affiliated analysts may offer not only more 
accurate, but also less biased forecasts than non-affiliated analysts do.  We call this view the 
‘information-advantage view’. 
As the information advantage enjoyed by affiliated financial analysts arises from their close 
contacts with firm management, and those contacts are unlikely to be affected by the regulatory 
change of June 10, 2009, we expect that the affiliated analysts’ information advantage – if any – 
will be as strong before as after the regulatory reform.  Hence, if affiliated analysts issue less biased 
and more accurate EPS forecasts because of an information advantage, we can expect this behavior 
to hold, regardless of whether the firm became listed before or after June 10, 2009.  In sum, we put 
forward the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: If the information-advantage view is true: 
2A: The earnings forecasts released by affiliated financial analysts should be less biased than 
the earnings forecasts of non-affiliated analysts, regardless of whether the firm became listed 
before or after June 10, 2009. 
                                                          
42
 An analyst who makes big but random errors issues less biased forecasts than an analyst who constantly makes small 
but positive forecast errors.  However, in terms of forecast accuracy (no matter whether it is measured by the mean 
squared error or by the absolute error), the former analyst is less accurate than the latter. 
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2B: The earnings forecasts released by affiliated analysts should be more accurate than the 
earnings forecasts of non-affiliated analysts, regardless of whether the firm became listed 
before or after June 10, 2009. 
 
Third, Aggarwal (2000) points out that the IPO underwriting contract between issuers and 
their investment banks could explicitly foresee in post-IPO price support, typically during the first 
30 days after listing.  Then, the IPO lead manager actually engages in a contract that imposes some 
obligations on it.  Moreover, Ljungqvist et al. (2006) emphasize that it takes time for institutional 
investors to sell out their initially allocated IPO shares.  If the issuer’s stock price declines too fast 
after the IPO, those institutional investors may incur a loss on their initial investment in IPO shares.  
When the IPO offer price is ultimately set by the IPO lead manager, institutional investors could 
blame that investment bank for having set the issue price too high and, thus, lose their interest to 
participate in any future IPOs organized by this same investment bank.  Likewise, firms considering 
an IPO may no longer want their offering to be underwritten by an investment bank that has proved 
unable to fix IPO offer prices.  So, investment banks may wish to provide post-IPO price support 
shortly after the firm’s first listing, particularly when the firm’s stock price dropped in the 
aftermarket.  In this sense, the pressure to offer post-IPO price support can positively influence 
affiliated analysts’ EPS forecasts relative to those of non-affiliated analysts.  In the rest of the paper, 
we call this view the ‘post-IPO price-supporting view’. 
To examine this post-IPO price-supporting view, it would be ideal if we could randomly 
assign price-supporting incentives to certain financial analysts and take away those incentives from 
others.  In real life, we do not have the luxury to set up such an experiment.  However, we argue 
that the regulatory change of June 10, 2009 created – for the first time – strong incentives for IPO 
lead managers in China to offer post-IPO price support.  Lewellen (2006) points out the existence of 
two rationales underlying post-IPO price support: to reward primary-market investors for revealing 
their private information and, thus, help investment banks to properly price the offering and/or to 
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disguise IPO overpricing if the underwriter priced the offer too high.  Obviously, the pre-condition 
for both motivations to exist is that the IPO offer price should be set (at least in part) by IPO 
underwriters.  Without this pre-condition, investment banks take no responsibility as to the offer 
price and, thus, have no specific reason to provide price support in the aftermarket.  As already 
pointed out in Section 3.2, investment banks in China had only little to say about IPO offer prices 
before the regulatory change.  So, when an issuer’s stock price dropped in the aftermarket, primary-
market investors were unlikely to blame underwriters for having priced the IPO too high.  
Moreover, the huge first-day abnormal return (87%) and the small likelihood of the aftermarket 
price dropping below the IPO offer price (15.7%) made post-IPO price support less necessary.  In 
contrast, investment banks obtained a more prominent role in fixing IPO offer prices after the 
regulatory change.  Also, IPO underwriters – as specialists and repetitive participants in the IPO 
market – could be held responsible by primary-market investors once the issuer’s stock price 
dropped shortly after the IPO.  If primary-market investors, especially the large institutional ones 
who repetitively participate in IPOs and who invest considerable amounts, would incur such losses 
in the aftermarket, they could blame the IPO lead manager for having set the IPO offer price too 
high.  Consequently, they may lose interest to participate in any future IPOs organized by this same 
investment bank.  Losing the attention of institutional investors is problematic for an investment 
bank, as those investors play a crucial role in the bookbuilding process by providing their tentative 
price indications when the final IPO offer price is to be set.  Some scholars even argue that an 
investment bank’s network of institutional investors is its most valuable asset (Eccles and Dwight, 
1988; Morrison and William, 2007).  Arguably, after June 10, 2009, IPO lead managers obtained 
strong incentives to maintain issuer stock prices sufficiently high after the firm’s first listing to 
allow primary-market investors, especially their institutional clients, to realize a positive return on 
their initially allocated shares.  As the green-shoe mechanism has been used only rarely in Chinese 
domestic IPOs, investment banks may have relied upon positively biased investment 
recommendations and EPS forecasts to provide such post-IPO price support.  We therefore expect 
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financial analysts affiliated with the IPO lead manager to issue more positively biased earnings 
forecasts than non-affiliated analysts only after the regulatory change.  We also expect this price-
supporting incentive to be stronger in the 90 days after first listing, which is when institutional 
investors face a lock-up period for their initially allocated IPO shares.  The other direct implication 
of the post-IPO price-supporting view is that affiliated analysts’ EPS forecasts should become even 
more positively distorted when the issuer’s stock price drops in the aftermarket. 
Next, under the price-supporting view, we expect that affiliated financial analysts may bias 
especially their forecasts on future-year EPS rather than on current-year EPS in order not to harm 
their reputation too much among investors.  Financial analysts indeed usually release forecasts on 
the annual EPS of IPO firms for different fiscal years after the firm’s first listing.  For example, 
forecasts issued on March 1, 2009 may relate to the annual EPS for fiscal years 2009, 2010, 2011 or 
even further.  As Lin and McNichols (1998) and Bessler and Stanzel (2009) point out, more 
information becomes available on the issuer as time reaches the end of the forecast horizon.  
Correspondingly, it becomes harder to continue distorting forecasts without alarming investors.  
Moreover, if affiliated financial analysts wish to disguise their post-IPO price-supporting 
incentives, they should not distort their forecasts on current-year EPS too much compared to those 
of non-affiliated financial analysts.  Otherwise, their post-IPO price-supporting intention can be 
easily detected by stock market investors once the firm announces its realized EPS.  However, they 
can still release more positively biased EPS forecasts for future years and adjust these forecasts 
slowly over time, as the end of the forecast horizon approaches.  When future-year EPS realizes, 
investors, especially retail ones, may not even remember what affiliated analysts forecasted shortly 
after the IPO.  Thus, a largely biased forecast on future-year EPS tends to be less harmful to the 
reputation of affiliated analysts than a largely biased forecast on current-year EPS.  Hence, we 
expect that affiliated analysts will prefer distorting their forecasts on future-year EPS when facing 
incentives to provide post-IPO price support.  So, if the post-IPO price-supporting view is true, the 
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relative bias for affiliated analysts should be bigger for the future-year EPS forecasts than for their 
current-year EPS forecasts. 
In sum, using the change in regulation as a natural experiment to examine the post-IPO price 
supporting view, we put forward the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: If the post-IPO price-supporting view is true: 
3A. For the firms listed before June 10, 2009, the earnings forecasts released by affiliated 
financial analysts are no more positively biased than the forecasts of non-affiliated analysts. 
3B. For the firms listed after June 10, 2009, the earnings forecasts of affiliated financial 
analysts are more positively biased than the forecasts of non-affiliated analysts.  This relative 
bias is stronger in the 90-day lock-up period and when the issuer’s stock price dropped 
relative to the issue price in the aftermarket.  Morever, affiliated analysts will bias especially 
their future-year forecasts rather than their current-year forecasts. 
 
The three views we propose are not mutually exclusive.  An affiliated analyst who holds an 
optimistic view as to an IPO firm can also obtain access to more accurate information about the 
issuer during the process of IPO underwriting and, at the same time, be required by his employer 
(the IPO lead manager) to provide post-IPO price support for the issuer.  However, a fundamental 
difference between the post-IPO price-supporting view and the other two views is that the post-IPO 
price-supporting view assumes that analysts intentionally distort their forecasts, while the other two 
views presume that analysts report their forecasts honestly.  It is here that the regulatory change of 
June 10, 2009 can help to identify what is driving the bigger relative forecast bias of affiliated 
analysts, if any, in the context of IPO underwriting.  Indeed, this regulatory change affected neither 
affiliated analysts’ relative optimism nor their access to information, but likely has hugely 
influenced their incentives. 
  
118 
 
So, we rely on the regulatory change of June 10, 2009 as a natural experiment to examine our 
three conjectures.  When using a real-life event as natural experiment, researchers always face a 
concern about whether the results from the experiment are really exogenous to the event itself.  We 
contend that this is indeed the case in the context of the regulatory change that we examine.  The 
purpose of the June 10, 2009 reform was to improve the market mechanism in the primary market; 
analyst behavior in the secondary market clearly was not an issue in this reform.  Actually, nothing 
was said about financial analysts in the ‘The guiding advice on further reform of the IPO pricing 
method’ published by the CSRC on June 10, 2009.  So, this reform can be considered as an 
exogenous shock for financial analysts and their investment advice.  If we divide Chinese analysts’ 
EPS forecasts into two groups, those for the IPOs initiated before June 10, 2009 and those for the 
IPOs after June 10, 2009, we can compare the forecasts of affiliated financial analysts with those of 
non-affiliated analysts in these two time frames.  The results should inform us about the 
applicability of the analyst-optimism view, the information-advantage view, and the price-
supporting view.  This experiment opportunity is unique.  To the best of our knowledge, IPO 
underwriters indeed have always taken full responsibility as to IPO offer prices in any other major 
market, thereby provoking strong post-IPO price-supporting incentives. 
 
3.4. Empirical examination 
3.4.1. Data and methodology 
3.4.1.1. Data collection 
We relied on the CSMAR database to collect the annual earnings forecasts on the firms that became 
publicly listed in Mainland China between 2004 and 2011.  For each of these firms, we downloaded 
its annual EPS forecasts released in the year following its IPO, by affiliated as well as non-affiliated 
financial analysts.
43
  In our article, we identify an affiliated financial analyst as an analyst employed 
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 In the U.S.A., affiliated analysts cannot release any investment recommendations and earnings forecasts in the 40 to 
90 days after first listing (the ‘quite period’).  However, this regulation is non-exist in China during our sample period.  
So, in our analysis, we use all forecasts released in the first year after the IPO. 
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by the issuer’s lead manager in the IPO.  Our sample period for EPS forecasts is thus from Jan. 1, 
2004 to Dec. 31, 2012.  All EPS forecasts relate to the company’s annual earnings rather than to its 
quarterly earnings, given that the latter forecasts are only scarcely published in China.  We decided 
to limit our sample to the forecasts issued in the year following the firm’s first listing, as is a typical 
approach in the literature (see Michaely and Womack, 1999; James and Karceski, 2006; Ljungqvist 
et al., 2007).  This restriction is indeed important, as other corporate finance activities – e.g., SEOs, 
M&As – may take place if the post-IPO period over which the forecasts are issued is extended for 
too long.  Then, researchers may find it difficult to set up a clear test on the effects of the IPO 
underwriting relationship.  Moreover, both the information advantage obtained in IPO underwriting 
and post-IPO price-supporting incentives tend to diminish as time lapses after the IPO.  So, we use 
the forecasts released in the first listing year in all analyses hereafter.
44
  Nonetheless, some of the 
forecasts may relate to the EPS of the listing year, while others may involve the EPS in the second 
or third year after IPO.  The latter feature of our dataset is interesting, as it enables us to compare 
forecasts across different forecast horizons.  From 2004 to 2011, 969 issuers (88% of the total 
number of IPO firms) were followed by at least one financial analyst in their first listing year, 319 
firms in the subperiod of 2004–June 9, 2009 and 650 firms in the subperiod of June 10, 2009–2011.  
In total, 1,627 analysts employed by 90 investment banks/brokerage firms released 36,885 earnings 
forecasts on these firms in the first year after IPO. 
Next, following prior research (e.g., Lin and McNichols, 1998; Jacob et al., 2008), we further 
restrict our sample to the IPO firms that were followed by at least one affiliated financial analyst.  
For the 969 IPO firms on which we have analyst coverage data released during the first post-IPO 
year, 384 firms (39.6% of the sample) were covered by at least one financial analyst employed by 
the firm’s IPO lead manager, containing 80 firms in the first subperiod (25% of the sample) and 304 
firms in the second subperiod (46.9% of the sample).    As a result, our final sample reduces to 
21,499 earnings forecasts, i.e. 58.3% of the total number of 36,885 EPS forecasts.  Arguably, the 
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 In a non-reported robustness test, we used forecasts released in the two years after IPO; results prove similar as when 
using the one-year time frame. 
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IPO firms in our sample are amongst the most widely followed issuers.  On average, an issuer in our 
sample is followed by 10 financial analysts (median of 8).  Anyway, as the decision of the IPO lead 
manager to cover an issuer by means of financial research is not a random one, this sample selection 
criterion may engender a potential sample selection bias.  We therefore adopt a Heckman (1976) 
two-step regression model to deal with this potential problem. 
Following Bessler and Stanzel (2009) and Bartholdy and Feng (2013), we define the forecast 
error (FEj,i,t) as: (FEPSj,i,t – AEPSi,t) / |AEPSi,t|, where FEPSj,i,t is the forecast of earnings per share 
by analyst j on firm i for year t.  AEPSi,t is the reported earnings per share by firm i for year t.  We 
define forecast accuracy (FAj,i,t) as the absolute value of FEj,i,t.
45
  So, a bigger FAj,i,t means a less 
accurate forecast.  We winsorize FE at 5% and 95% and FA at 95% to remove outliers.
46
  Table 3.1 
reports summary statistics on the forecast error and forecast accuracy variables.  Over the full-
sample period, the forecasted earnings per share is on average 130% bigger than the reported EPS 
number (median of 40%).  We further notice that in both subperiods, the earnings forecasts released 
by affiliated as well as non-affiliated financial analysts are severely positively biased.  t-tests and 
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests confirm that the average and median forecast error are significantly larger 
than zero in both subperiods.  Next, Table 3.1 reveals that the mean and median forecast errors in 
the first subperiod are 1.129 and 0.165; in the second subperiod, they reach 1.335 and 0.540, both 
significantly bigger than in the first subperiod..  Similar patterns arise as to forecast accuracy: the 
magnitude and significance level of the mean and median FA are quite similar to those of FE.  We 
note that only 3,843 out of the 21,499 EPS forecasts (17.8% of the sample) turn out smaller than the 
actually reported EPS number, which renders the statistics on FE and FA highly comparable.  
Arguably, throughout the sample period, analysts in Chinese domestic stock markets did not 
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 We follow the financial analysts literature to define forecast accuracy in this way (e.g., Jackson 2005; Jacob et al., 
2008; Fang and Yasuda, 2009).  However, we also calculated the mean squared forecast error to measure forecast 
accuracy in an unreported robustness check.  Results prove similar to those reported in the paper. 
46
 We also winsorized the data at 1% and 99%; results prove similar.  There is no need to censor FA at the left-hand side 
of its distribution, as FA by nature is limited to zero at the lowest level. 
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correctly forecast the firms’ earnings per share and their EPS forecasts were, on average, severely 
positively biased.  
We also notice that in both subperiods, the mean/median FE (FA) of affiliated analysts are 
significantly bigger than those of non-affiliated analysts.  However, forecast error and forecast 
accuracy are influenced by other factors such as firm characteristics and forecasting horizon.  To 
making a better comparison between affiliated and non-affiliated analysts’ forecasts, we should 
further control for firm characteristic and for reporting horizon.  We compare the forecast errors of 
affiliated and non-affiliated financial analysts by IPO firm.  So, for every issuer, we compare the 
average forecast error on EPS for the same year by affiliated and non-affiliated financial analysts.  
This test should allow us to control for individual firm-specific characteristics that may potentially 
influence the forecasts of financial analysts.  Suppose two affiliated analysts and two non-affiliated 
analysts follow firm A; each of them releases a forecast on the EPS of the IPO year and a forecast 
on the EPS of the year after IPO.  We subsequently calculate the average of the forecast errors made 
by the two affiliated analysts; we do this separately for the EPS of the IPO year and for the EPS of 
the year after IPO.  We next subtract the corresponding average forecast error of the two non-
affiliated analysts to obtain the relative bias in the IPO year and in the year thereafter.  We repeat 
this same procedure for all 384 IPO firms in our sample.  Table 3.2 reports summary statistics on 
this relative bias for the firms becoming listed from 2004 to June 9, 2009 and for the firms 
becoming listed from June 10, 2009 to 2011.  For each subperiod, we further divide the forecasts 
into those for the IPO year (IPO year) and those for the fiscal years thereafter (Future years).  We 
use a t-test and a Wilcoxon rank-sum test to examine whether or not the average and median 
relative bias equal zero.  Before June 10, 2009, the average and median relative bias are not 
significantly different from zero.  However, after the regulatory change, the average and median 
relative bias do become significantly positive.  This outcome thus indicates that the regulatory 
change has incited affiliated financial analysts to produce more positively distorted EPS forecasts 
than non-affiliated analysts do.  Interestingly, we also find that the significantly positive relative 
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bias after June 10, 2009 arises from the EPS forecasts for years after the IPO year.  As the EPS 
forecasts included in our sample were all issued in the first year after listing, this finding thus 
suggests that affiliated financial analysts may strategically distort their forecasts on future-year EPS 
rather than on current-year EPS, in order to mask their self-interested post-IPO price supporting 
behavior. 
 
3.4.1.2. The regression model on FE and FA 
Next, we perform multivariate analyses to compare the forecast error and forecast accuracy across 
affiliated and non-affiliated financial analysts, in both subperiods.  For that purpose, we run OLS 
regressions using FE and FA as dependent variables in order to identify the affiliated-analyst effect.  
As to the explanatory variables, we create a dummy equal to one if the earnings forecast is from an 
analyst who is employed by the issuer’s IPO lead manager, and zero otherwise (Affiliated dummy).  
The coefficient on this dummy should thus capture whether affiliated financial analysts are 
associated with a bigger forecast error (or better forecast accuracy) than non-affiliated analysts, 
everything else constant.  Like James and Karceski (2006), we also construct a variable to capture 
the issuer’s stock price in the aftermarket relative to the IPO offer price (Relative price).  That is, 
we subtract the offer price from the stock’s closing price at the day before the forecast is released 
and divide it by the offer price at IPO.  From the primary-market investors’ point of view, Relative 
price thus captures how much they have gained (lost) from having bought one IPO share at the offer 
price up till the day before the forecast is released.  To examine whether the positive relative bias of 
affiliated financial analysts increases when the issuer’s stock price dropped considerably below the 
IPO offer price in the aftermarket (Hypotheses 1B and 3B), we generate an interaction term between 
Affiliated dummy and Relative price. 
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Table 3.1 
Summary statistics on forecast error and forecast accuracy 
In this table, we present summary statistics on forecast error (FEi,j,t) and forecast accuracy (FAi,j,t).  FE,j,i,t is defined as (FEPSj,i,t – AEPSi,t) / |AEPSi,t|, where FEPSj,i,t is the forecast of 
earnings per share on firm i in year t by analyst j.  AEPSi,t is the reported earnings per share by firm i for year t.  FE is winsorized at 95% and 5%, while FA is winsorized at 95%.  All 
forecasts are released in the first year after IPO. 
 
Period Type of 
analysts 
Number 
of 
earnings 
forecasts 
Mean 
FE 
Median 
FE 
Min FE Max FE p-value t-
test 
 
p-value 
Wilcoxon 
test 
 
Mean 
FA 
Median 
FA 
Min 
FA 
Max 
FA 
p-value t-
test 
 
p-value 
Wilcoxon 
test 
 
2004–June 9, 2009 Affiliated 
analysts 
360 1.5942 0.2043 -0.2996 7.6345 <0.0001 <0.0001 1.6520 0.2043 0 7.6410 <0.0001 <0.0001 
 Non-affiliated 
analysts 
3,209 1.0567 0.1517 -0.2996 7.6345 <0.0001 <0.0001 1.1254 0.2187 0 7.6410 <0.0001 <0.0001 
 Total 3,569 1.1289 0.1650 -0.2996 7.6345 <0.0001 <0.0001 1.1972 0.2197 0 7.6410 <0.0001 <0.0001 
June 10, 2009–2012 Affiliated 
analysts 
1,744 1.6143 0.7142 -0.2996 7.6345 <0.0001 <0.0001 1.6716 0.7142 0 7.6410 <0.0001 <0.0001 
 Non-affiliated 
analysts 
16,186 1.2867 0.5228 -0.2996 7.6345 <0.0001 <0.0001 1.3465 0.5228 0 7.6410 <0.0001 <0.0001 
 Total 17,930 1.3354 0.5398 -0.2996 7.6345 <0.0001 <0.0001 1.3956 0.5398 0 7.6410 <0.0001 <0.0001 
2004–2012 Affiliated 
analysts 
2,104 1.6108 0.6823 -0.2996 7.6345 <0.0001 <0.0001 1.6682 0.6823 0 7.6410 <0.0001 <0.0001 
 Non-affiliated 
analysts 
19,395 1.2486 0.3809 -0.2996 7.6345 <0.0001 <0.0001 1.3099 0.3809 0 7.6410 <0.0001 <0.0001 
 Total 21,499 1.3012 0.4012 -0.2996 7.6345 <0.0001 <0.0001 1.3626 0.4012 0 7.6410 <0.0001 <0.0001 
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Table 3.2 
Comparison of forecast errors by affiliated and non-affiliated analysts on the same IPO firm 
In this table, we present summary statistics for the comparison of the forecast error across affiliated and non-affiliated financial analysts (relative bias).  We summarize earnings 
forecasts by firms and by fiscal years.  For the same firm and same fiscal year, we subtract the average forecast error made by non-affiliated analysts from the average forecast error 
made by affiliated analysts to obtain the relative bias.  We split the full sample into the period before June 10, 2009 and the period after June 10, 2009.  In each subperiod, we further 
divide the sample into the forecasts on EPS of the IPO year (IPO year) and the forecasts on EPS of fiscal years after the IPO year (Future years).  We use a t-test and a Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test to examine the null hypothesis that the mean and median relative bias equal zero, respectively.  We report the p-values of these two tests in the last two columns of the 
table. 
 
Period Fiscal year Number of 
observations 
Mean relative 
bias 
Median 
relative bias 
Standard 
deviation 
Min Max p-value 
t-test 
p-value 
Wilcoxon test 
2004–June 9,2009 IPO year 23 0.0390 0.0192 0.4715 -0.5740 0.9621 0.4719 0.8282 
 Future years 76 -0.0061 0.0053 0.3644 -0.9721 1.0530 0.8787 0.3752 
 Total 99 0.0044 0.0092 0.3429 -0.9721 1.0530 0.8842 0.4527 
June 10, 2009–2012 IPO year 153 0.0180 0.0020 0.2891 -1.0320 2.6064 0.4394 0.7195 
 Future years 347 0.2141 0.0511 1.4622 -5.0573 6.2486 0.0077 0.0200 
 Total 500 0.1540 0.0132 1.2210 -5.0573 6.2486 0.0031 0.0531 
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As the literature has shown that EPS forecast errors can be influenced by many other factors, 
we include a number of control variables.  First, we account for the reputation of the financial 
analyst by means of a dummy variable that equals one if the analyst is included in the star analyst 
list of New Fortune in the year before the forecast was released, and zero otherwise (Analyst 
ranking).  Jackson (2005) and Fang and Yasuda (2009) argue that reputation is extremely important 
to financial analysts and, thus, may help them to resist conflicts of interest.  To better separate 
analyst reputation from analyst experience, we also include the total number of forecasts, on IPO 
firms as well as on already-listed firms, released by the financial analyst till the forecast under 
consideration (Analyst experience).  The first forecast in our database is from 2001; so, we obtained 
the variable Analyst experience by counting all forecasts made by a certain financial analyst from 
2001 to the forecast under consideration.  We subsequently take the log of one plus this total 
number of forecasts.  Second, reputation concerns by the investment bank that employs the 
financial analyst could also help to mitigate conflicts of interest.  So, in line with Fang and Yasuda 
(2009), we further include the investment bank’s market share in IPO underwriting in the year 
before the forecast was released (Market share).  The market share of investment bank i in year t is 
calculated by dividing the total gross proceeds of the IPOs in which bank i served as lead manager 
in year t by the total gross proceeds raised in all IPOs in year t.
47
  As some investment banks may 
focus their business model on providing valuable research coverage, they may employ a larger team 
of financial analysts.  Those investment banks may then also care more about the reputation of their 
financial analysts and, hence, ensure that their analysts are able to provide independent research 
coverage.  We therefore control for the total number of financial analysts employed by the analyst’s 
investment bank at the start of the forecasting year (Number of analysts). 
Next, we control for a number of issuer-specific characteristics.  We include three variables 
relating to the firm’s equity-issuing activities: the fee rate that the firm paid to its investment 
bank(s) for its IPO (Fee rate), the first-day abnormal return on its IPO (Abnormal return), and a 
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 We also used the average market share of investment bank i in years t, t-1 and t-2, but find that results do not change. 
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dummy that indicates a seasoned equity offering(s) in the three years following the IPO (SEO 
dummy).  The issuer that paid a larger fee rate for its IPO might also be prepared to pay more fees in 
future corporate finance transactions.  Hence, affiliated as well as non-affiliated financial analysts 
could produce more positively biased EPS forecasts to compete for future business with this firm.  
Conversely, when IPO underwriters underprice the offering to a larger extent, thereby allowing for 
a bigger first-day abnormal return, this might reflect that the IPO is surrounded by more uncertainty 
(Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Rock, 1986).  The first-day abnormal return might then also correlate 
positively with our FA variable.  The SEO dummy, which equals one if the IPO firm made a 
seasoned equity offering (SEO) in the three years after IPO, and zero otherwise, might be positively 
correlated with FA.  This will be the case when investment banks compete for future corporate 
finance business by means of positively distorted earnings forecasts.
48
  With this specification, we 
thus assume that investment banks in general are able to anticipate whether or not an IPO firm will 
implement a SEO after its stock market quotation. 
Next, as the IPO literature has shown that larger firms have more stable earnings, the earnings 
of those firms may be easier to forecast.  Besides, bigger firms may also release more information.  
So, we add the log of the issuer’s total assets at the end of the pre-IPO year (Assets).  We further 
include a dummy equal to one if the Chinese state controls more than 50% of the firm’s direct and 
indirect voting rights before the IPO, and zero otherwise (SOE dummy).  Private owners may care 
more about their firm’s stock price in the aftermarket than state owners, as they usually have 
invested a large fraction of their personal wealth in the IPO firm, while state owners hold a much 
more diversified investment portfolio.  On the other hand, as a repetitive player in the IPO market, 
the state may not like a declining stock price for one of its IPOs either, as this could jeopardize the 
success of its future privatization IPOs.  Moreover, the earnings of SOEs likely are easier to predict, 
as SOEs have a longer history and usually benefit from some monopoly power in their business 
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 We do not have any data on the IPO firm’s M&As nor on the brokerage trading business that an issuer generates for 
each investment bank.  So, we cannot control for the incentives to provide positively biased EPS forecasts to generate 
these two types of future business for investment banks. 
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segment(s).  Correspondingly, the room left for EPS forecast distortion tends to be smaller, thereby 
reducing the forecast error for SOEs.  In sum, the relation between state ownership and the forecast 
error is an empirical question. 
Finally, Lin and McNichols (1998) and Bessler and Stanzel (2009) find that a forecast that is 
released much before the end of the fiscal year is associated with a larger positive forecast error.  
The reason is that when financial analysts intend to positively distort their earnings forecasts, they 
can do this far more easily without causing any suspicion among investors long before the end of 
the forecast period, i.e. at a time when annual earnings are still highly uncertain.  As the forecast 
horizon shortens, more information becomes available on the firm and, thus, it becomes harder to 
continue distorting the forecasts without making investors wary of such distortions and, thus, 
harming the analyst’s reputation.  So, we add the Forecast horizon in our regression model; it is 
calculated as the number of days between the release of the forecast and the end of the fiscal year to 
which the forecasted EPS relates.
49
 
To account for potential industry effects, we include Industry dummies based on the CSRC 
industry classification code.  We also control for year fixed effects by means of Year dummies.  We 
run the same regression model to explain the forecast error (FE) and forecast accuracy (FA): 
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Table 3.3 presents summary statistics for all variables used in the regressions.  Because of 
missing values on some variables, we were able to retain only 3,098 (86%) out of 3,596 forecasts in 
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 Firms do not declare their EPS immediately at the end of their fiscal year.  In China, the audited annual report is 
released in March or April.  It would be ideal to obtain the official EPS release day to calculate Forecast horizon.  
However, we do not have the data on the exact date of the annual reports release.  So, we have to use the end of the 
fiscal year to calculate Forecast horizon. 
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the first subperiod and 12,838 (72%) out of 17,903 forecasts in the second subperiod.  However, the 
average and median FE and FA of the dropped-out forecasts are not significantly different from 
those for the retained forecasts.  When comparing the variables in the two subperiods, we find that 
Relative price and Abnormal return are much lower in the second subperiod.  In the first subperiod, 
the average Relative price is about 100%, while it equals only 30% in the second subperiod.  The 
average first-day abnormal return equals 87.6% in the first subperiod, while it is only 28.8% in the 
second subperiod.  The declining values of Relative price and Abnormal return may indicate that 
the value of post-IPO price support has become much more important over time.  Table 3.3 also 
shows that 82.6% of IPO firms are state-owned in the first subperiod, while this fraction drops to 
22.6% in the second subperiod.  Table 3.4 reports the correlations among all explanatory variables; 
most correlations are below 0.1.  The highest correlation arises between Assets and SOE dummy 
(0.68), in the first subperiod. 
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Table 3.3 
Summary statistics for the variables used in the regressions 
This table reports summary statistics on all variables used in the forecast-error and forecast-accuracy regressions.  In Panels A and B, 
the summary statistics cover the two subperiods: 2004–June 9, 2009 and June 10, 2009–2012, respectively.  FE is the forecast error, 
FA is forecast accuracy. Affiliated dummy equals one if the forecast is issued by an analyst affiliated with the IPO lead manager, zero 
otherwise.  Relative price is calculated by subtracting the IPO offer price from the aftermarket stock price on the day before the 
forecast is released, divided by the IPO offer price.  Analyst ranking equals one if the analyst is ranked as a star analyst in the list of 
New Fortune in the year before the forecast is released.  Analyst experience is the log of one plus the total number of forecasts issued 
by the analyst before the current EPS forecast.  Market share is the market share of the analyst’s investment bank in IPO 
underwriting in the previous year.  Number of analysts is the total number of analysts employed by the investment bank at which the 
analyst works at the beginning of the current year.  Fee rate is the IPO fee rate (underwriting fee plus sponsor fee) charged by the 
lead manager in the firm’s IPO.  Abnormal return is the first-day abnormal return calculated as (first-day closing price – offer price)/ 
offer price – first-day market return.  SEO dummy equals one if the IPO firm makes a seasoned equity offering in the three years 
after listing.  Assets is the log of total assets before IPO.  SOE dummy equals one if the state controls more than 50% of the firm’s 
direct and indirect voting rights before the IPO, zero otherwise.  Forecast horizon is the number of days between the release of the 
forecast and the end of the forecast period. 
Panel A: 2004–June 9, 2009 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
FE 3,098 1.0804 0.1521 2.0964 -0.2996 7.6345 
FA 3,098 1.1518 0.2295 4.8815 0.0000 7.6410 
Affiliated dummy 3,098 0.0881     
Relative price 3,098 1.0043 0.6392 1.3795 -0.6193 11.5296 
Analyst ranking 3,098 0.1094     
Analyst experience 3,098 3.7912 4.1700 1.1889 0.0000 6.6800 
Market share 3,098 0.0814 0.0132 0.0996 0.0000 0.3345 
Number of analysts 3,098 34.9435 34.0000 16.4920 3.0000 86.0000 
Fee rate 3,098 0.0222 0.0180 0.0128 0.0075 0.0741 
Abnormal return 3,098 0.8761 0.7781 0.6022 -0.0123 3.7934 
SEO dummy 3,098 0.2541     
Assets 3,098 24.5726 25.6861 3.0831 18.7133 29.4966 
SOE dummy 3,098 0.8260     
Forecast horizon 3,098 511.4078 484.0000 375.9846 -35.0000* 1929.0000 
Panel B: June 10, 2009–2012 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
FE 12,838 1.3474 0.5301 1.9974 -0.2996 7.6345 
FA 12,838 1.4023 0.5681 3.2071 0.0000 7.6410 
Affiliated dummy 12,838 0.0986     
Relative price 12,838 0.3042 0.1731 0.4864 -0.5800 4.8422 
Analyst ranking 12,838 0.1558     
Analyst experience 12,838 5.3601 5.2900 1.1871 0.0000 8.3101 
Market share 12,838 0.0542 0.0392 0.0636 0.0000 0.3438 
Number of analysts 12,838 40.5027 38.0000 19.9458 1.0000 92.0000 
Fee rates 12,838 0.0462 0.0450 0.0187 0.0082 0.1330 
Abnormal return 12,838 0.2875 0.2251 0.3182 -0.1864 1.8101 
SEO dummy 12,838 0.0991     
Assets 12,838 20.8798 20.3457 1.9237 18.3506 29.8148 
SOE dummy 12,838 0.2260     
Forecast horizon 12,838 372.5381 338.0000 266.2988 -28.0000* 1218.0000 
* As Chinese firms publish their audited financial statements in March or April of the subsequent year, forecasts can still be made after the end of the 
forecast period. 
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Table 3.4 
Correlation among explanatory variables 
This table reports the correlation among the explanatory variables used in the forecast-error and forecast-accuracy regressions.  
Those variables are defined in Table 3.3.  In Panels A and B of the table, the summary statistics cover the two subperiods: 2004–
June 9, 2009 and June 10, 2009–2012, respectively. 
 
Panel A: 2004–June 9, 2009 
 Affiliated 
dummy 
Relative 
price 
Analyst 
ranking 
Analyst 
expe-
rience 
Market 
share 
Number 
of 
analysts 
Fee rate Abnorma
l return 
SEO 
dummy 
Assets SOE 
dummy 
Relative price 0.0149 
       
   
Analyst ranking 0.1020 -0.0647 
      
   
Analyst experience 0.0137 -0.2069 0.1978 
     
   
Market share -0.0117 -0.1282 0.0377 0.0548 
    
   
Number of analysts 0.2223 -0.0966 0.2182 0.1481 -0.0132 
   
   
Fee rate 0.1839 0.2905 0.0118 -0.0476 -0.3123 0.0424 
  
   
Abnormal return 0.0603 0.1226 0.0878 0.1438 0.058 0.083 0.2594 
 
   
SEO dummy -0.0059 0.182 -0.0922 0.0057 -0.2036 -0.038 -0.0572 -0.1615    
Assets -0.1837 -0.2762 -0.0338 -0.0636 0.1083 -0.0394 -0.5756 -0.4514 0.2057   
SOE dummy -0.2066 -0.2836 -0.029 -0.0738 0.2452 -0.0604 -0.5105 -0.3579 0.0855 0.6773  
Forecast horizon 0.0514 -0.0466 -0.0582 0.0975 -0.0694 0.0683 0.2292 0.1455 -0.0838 -0.2464 -0.2628 
Panel B: June 10, 2009–2012           
 Affiliated 
dummy 
Relative 
price 
Analyst 
ranking 
Analyst 
expe-
rience 
Market 
share 
Number 
of 
analysts 
Fee rate Abnorma
l return 
SEO 
dummy 
Assets SOE 
dummy 
Relative price 0.0163 
       
   
Analyst ranking 0.0207 0.0112 
      
   
Analyst experience -0.0455 -0.1055 0.4121 
     
   
Market share 0.0304 0.261 0.0141 -0.0454 
    
   
Number of analysts 0.2376 0.0232 0.1685 0.0475 0.0456 
   
   
Fee rate 0.0372 0.0208 -0.0384 0.0751 -0.0703 -0.0533 
  
   
Abnormal return 0.0301 0.5954 -0.0107 -0.0736 0.275 0.0233 0.0703 
 
   
SEO dummy -0.0138 0.1433 0.0159 -0.0326 0.1257 0.0358 -0.1262 0.0304    
Assets -0.0299 -0.2333 0.0557 -0.0327 0.0107 0.0619 -0.6092 -0.2526 0.1358   
SOE dummy -0.0161 -0.0203 0.0183 -0.0645 0.1547 0.0499 -0.4877 -0.0645 0.1152 0.6194  
Forecast horizon 0.0038 0.1209 0.0066 -0.0607 0.0362 0.0479 -0.1004 0.0678 0.0462 0.0393 0.0725 
 
 
3.4.1.3. The Heckman (1976) two-step model 
In this paper, we are interested in comparing the EPS forecast error and forecast accuracy across 
affiliated and non-affiliated financial analysts.  Following prior research (e.g., Lin and McNichols, 
1998; Jacob et al., 2008; Bartholdy and Feng, 2013), we restricted our sample to the IPO firms that 
are covered by at least one financial analyst employed by the issuer’s lead manager in the year after 
IPO.  However, analysts of IPO lead managers may not randomly decide on which firms to follow.  
So, limiting the sample to the IPO firms that are covered by their lead manager’s financial 
analyst(s) may raise questions as to whether the choice of IPO firm follow-up by affiliated 
analyst(s) confounds with their forecast error.  This problem has been largely ignored in the 
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literature to date, maybe also because most IPO firms in Western economies are covered by the IPO 
underwriter’s analysts after listing.  As an example, Cliff and Denis (2004) point out that 80% of 
IPO firms becoming listed in the U.S.A. during 1993–2000 are covered by at least one financial 
analyst employed by the issuer’s lead underwriter.  However, in China, for the 969 firms on which 
we have analyst-coverage data in the first post-IPO year, only 384 firms (39.6%) are covered by 
their IPO lead manager’s financial analysts.  So, we need to deal with a potential sample-selection 
bias. 
We adopt Heckman’s (1976) two-step method to deal with this potential bias.  In the first 
step, we run a probit regression model for the probability that the IPO firm will be covered by an 
affiliated financial analyst.  We set the Follow-up dummy equal to one if  the IPO firm is followed 
by at least one financial analyst employed by its IPO lead manager, and zero otherwise.
50
  We 
regress the Follow-up dummy on the following variables.  First, we include the total number of 
financial analysts employed by the issuer’s lead manager at the beginning of the IPO year 
(Underwriter analyst number).  We expect that IPO lead managers employing a larger number of 
financial analysts are more likely to provide post-IPO research coverage, ceteris paribus.  Second, 
we add the issuing P/E ratio, from which we subtract the market P/E ratio at the time of the IPO 
(Pricing aggressiveness).
51
  Stocks issued at a higher P/E ratio may need more post-IPO research 
coverage to sustain a higher price in the aftermarket.  We expect this effect to be significant 
especially in the second subperiod, when the issuing P/E ratio cap was abolished and investment 
banks thus obtained a larger responsibility in setting IPO offer prices.  We further control for a 
number of IPO-related factors, by means of Fee rate and Abnormal return.  If, as suggested by 
Loughran and Ritter (2004), issuers attach great importance to research coverage and are willing to 
pay a higher fee rate for it to their investment bank as well as to accept a larger first-day abnormal 
                                                          
50
 In our sample, all firms that are followed by their lead manager’s financial analysts are also covered by at least one 
non-affiliated financial analyst.  So, we can exclude the possibility that the firm is covered only by its lead manager’s 
analyst(s). 
51
 We separately use the Shanghai and Shenzhen market P/E ratio for the firms listed in the corresponding market.  The 
market P/E ratios are obtained from the websites of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets. 
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return, the odds of underwriter-analyst follow-up may increase with those two factors.  Next, we 
include the SEO dummy as an explanatory variable, as underwriters may be more willing to cover 
IPO firms with plans to raise seasoned equity.  As in the main regression, we also control for firm-
specific characteristics by means of Assets and the SOE dummy.  Bigger firms likely provide more 
opportunities for future investment-banking business and, thus, may find it easier to attract research 
coverage by their underwriter’s financial analyst(s).  Investment banks may also be more willing to 
cover SOEs, as the Chinese state is a repetitive participant in the IPO market.  We again include 
industry and year fixed effects by means of Industry dummies and Year dummies.  Our first-step 
regression model thus looks as follows: 
1 2 3 4
12
5 6 7
1 1
_ _ _ Pr _ _ _
_ _ _ _
n
i i i
i i
Follow up dummy C Underwriter analyst Number icing aggressiveness Fee rate Abnormal return
SEO dummy Assets SOE dummy Industry dummies Year dummies
   
     
 
     
      
 
From the above regression, we calculate Heckman’s (1976) inverse Mills ratio and add it as an 
extra control variable in the second-step regression, relying only on the EPS forecasts for the firms 
that are followed by at least one of their lead manager’s financial analysts. 
 
3.4.2. Empirical results 
Table 3.5 shows the results from the forecast-error (FE) regressions, while Table 3.6 displays the 
results from the forecast-accuracy (FA) regressions.  In Panel A, the results relate to the period 
before June 10, 2009; Panel B then shows the results for the period after June 10, 2009.  In each 
subperiod, we use all forecasts issued in the first year after the IPO.  In addition, we run the 
regressions using all forecasts released in the 90-day lock-up period.  For each regression, the first 
column shows the results using simple OLS, while the subsequent two columns show the Heckman 
(1976) two-step results. 
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Table 3.5 
The forecast error regression 
In this table, we report the regression results on forecast error (FE) using a simple OLS regression and using Heckman’s (1976) two-
step regression model.  In Panel A, we show the regression results for the period before June 10, 2009; Panel B then reports the 
regression results for the period after June 10, 2009.  In both panels, we present the regression results using all forecasts issued in the 
90 days after IPO (90 days) and using all forecasts issued in the first year after IPO (One year).  For each regression, the first column 
shows the results using simple OLS (OLS), the subsequent two columns shows the Heckman (1976) two-step results (Heckman).  
The test and control variables have been defined in Table 3.3.  The regression models also include Industry dummies according to the 
CSRC 13 industry classification and Year dummies.  For the first-step Heckman regressions, we run a probit regression model on 
whether the IPO firm is followed by at least one analyst affiliated with the IPO lead manager.  The explanatory variables in this 
regression model include the following: the number of analysts employed by the IPO underwriter at the beginning of the IPO year 
(Underwriter analyst number); the issuing P/E ratio minus the market P/E ratio (Pricing aggressiveness); Fee rate, Abnormal return, 
SEO dummy, Assets, and SOE dummy.  We also include Industry dummies and Year dummies.  We calculate the inverse Mills ratio 
based upon this probit regression and include it in the second-step regression.  The variables in the second-step regressions are the 
same as those in the OLS model.  We always cluster the errors by financial analysts.  The coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level are indicated with ***, **, *, respectively. 
 
Panel A: 2004–June 9, 2009 
 One year 90 days 
 OLS Heckman OLS Heckman 
  First step Second step  First step Second step 
Intercept 5.7848*** -5.3017*** 7.5885*** 1.8927 -7.2600*** 1.2600 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.50) (0.00) (0.62) 
Underwriter analyst number  0.0210***   0.0296***  
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
Pricing aggressiveness  0.0130***   0.0130**  
  (0.00)   (0.04)  
Affiliated dummy  0.2928  0.2040 -0.2002  -0.4191 
 (0.19)  (0.15) (0.37)  (0.33) 
Affiliated dummy * Relative 
price 
-0.1248  -0.1278 0.1503  0.1702 
 (0.37)  (0.20) (0.65)  (0.59) 
Relative price 0.1801  0.1721 0.1571  0.1039 
 (0.15)  (0.16) (0.40)  (0.61) 
Analyst ranking -0.2524  -0.2512 -0.2174  -0.1791 
 (0.24)  (0.24) (0.31)  (0.49) 
Analyst experience 0.0546  0.0604 0.0074  -0.0128 
 (0.25)  (0.15) (0.91)  (0.84) 
Market share -2.5542***  -2.7718*** -2.5331**  -2.2160** 
 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.04)  (0.01) 
Number of analysts 0.0014  0.0015 -0.0036  -0.0062 
 (0.68)  (0.50) (0.15)  (0.47) 
Fee rate -4.4755 12.6818*** -8.7861 14.9531 6.0118** 9.0780 
 (0.55) (0.00) (0.40) (0.40) (0.03) (0.54) 
Abnormal return -0.0182 0.1863*** 0.0344 -0.2684 0.0169 -0.3012 
 (0.89) (0.00) (0.68) (0.40) (0.92) (0.15) 
SEO dummy 0.9721*** 0.3756*** 0.9904*** 0.5686** 0.4864*** 0.7697*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) 
Assets -0.1888*** 0.3256*** -0.2551*** 0.0479 0.4403*** 0.0109 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.64) (0.00) (0.91) 
SOE dummy -1.6932*** 0.2099*** -1.682*** -2.0838*** 0.8221*** -1.6842*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Forecast horizon 0.0012***  0.0012*** 0.0012***  0.0013*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Inverse Mills ratio   0.3782   0.5576* 
   (0.20)   (0.06) 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
p-value of F-test/ Chi2 test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Adjusted R-square 0.32 0.44  0.37 0.53  
Number of observations 3,098 5,647 3,098 576 1,097 576 
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Panel B: June10, 2009–2012  
 One year 90 days 
 OLS Heckman OLS Heckman 
  First step Second step  First step Second step 
Intercept 1.2973* -8.2861*** 1.8490*** -3.1269** -9.5669*** -2.5359** 
 (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.03) 
Underwriter analyst number  0.0234***   0.0269***  
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
Pricing aggressiveness  0.0109***   0.0060***  
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
Affiliated dummy  0.3298**  0.3441*** 0.6308***  0.6805*** 
 (0.03)  (0.00) (0.01)  (0.00) 
Affiliated dummy * Relative 
price 
0.0662  0.0389 -0.9300**  -1.0573*** 
 (0.78)  (0.68) (0.03)  (0.00) 
Relative price 0.3093  0.3003 0.3885  0.3990 
 (0.21)  (0.20) (0.14)  (0.21) 
Analyst ranking -0.0835  -0.0749* -0.0386  -0.0068 
 (0.39)  (0.09) (0.81)  (0.95) 
Analyst experience 0.0460  0.0501 0.1206  0.1242 
 (0.75)  (0.70) (0.15)  (0.20) 
Market share -2.2347***  -2.1411*** -2.1985**  -1.1951 
 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.04)  (0.13) 
Number of analysts -0.0015  -0.0015* -0.0015  -0.0011 
 (0.31)  (0.06) (0.57)  (0.51) 
Fee rate 1.7307* 2.0802*** 0.5090 5.3303** 3.8829*** 5.0335** 
 (0.07) (0.00) (0.62) (0.05) (0.01) (0.03) 
Abnormal return -0.2259 0.2237*** -0.2042 -0.2010 0.3255*** -0.1820 
 (0.17) (0.00) (0.20) (0.36) (0.00) (0.27) 
SEO dummy 0.4955*** 0.0009 0.4510*** 0.5338*** 0.2446*** 0.4182*** 
 (0.00) (0.99) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Assets -0.0994*** 0.2856*** -0.1260*** 0.0403 0.3300*** -0.0093 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.53) (0.00) (0.82) 
SOE dummy -0.0250 0.1240*** -0.0818 -0.2178* 0.2640*** -0.0851 
 (0.83) (0.00) (0.26) (0.07) (0.00) (0.21) 
Forecast horizon 0.0039***  0.0039*** 0.0042***  0.0042*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Inverse Mills ratio   0.1112*   0.1910** 
   (0.07)   (0.04) 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
p-value of F-test/ Chi2 test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Adjusted R-square 0.32 0.22  0.37 0.23  
Number of observations 12,838 20,369 12,838 2,716 4,381 2,716 
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Table 3.6 
The forecast accuracy regressions 
In this table, we report the regression results on forecast accuracy (FA) using a simple OLS regression and using Heckman’s (1976) 
two-step regression model.  In Panel A, we show the regression results for the period before June 10, 2009; Panel B then reports the 
regression results for the period after June 10, 2009.  In both panels, we present the regression results using all forecasts issued in the 
90 days after IPO (90 days) and using all forecasts issued in the first year after IPO (One year).  For each regression, the first column 
shows the results using simple OLS (OLS), the subsequent two columns shows the Heckman (1976) two-step results (Heckman).  
The test and control variables have been defined in Table 3.3.  The regression models also include Industry dummies according to the 
CSRC 13 industry classification and Year dummies.  For the first-step Heckman regressions, we run a probit regression model on 
whether the IPO firm is followed by at least one analyst affiliated with the IPO lead manager.  The explanatory variables in this 
regression model include the following: the number of analysts employed by the IPO underwriter at the beginning of the IPO year 
(Underwriter analyst number); the issuing P/E ratio minus the market P/E ratio (Pricing aggressiveness); Fee rate, Abnormal return, 
SEO dummy, Assets, and SOE dummy.  We also include Industry dummies and Year dummies.  We calculate the inverse Mills ratio 
based upon this probit regression and include it in the second-step regression.  The variables in the second-step regressions are the 
same as those in the OLS model.  We always cluster the errors by financial analysts.  The coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level are indicated with ***, **, *, respectively. 
 
Panel A: 2004–June 9, 2009 
 One year 90 days 
 OLS Heckman OLS Heckman 
  First step Second step  First step Second step 
Intercept 6.7850*** -5.3017*** 7.8404*** 2.1209 -7.2600*** 1.2932 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.35) (0.00) (0.43) 
Underwriter analyst 
number 
 0.0210***   0.0296***  
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
Pricing aggressiveness  0.0130***   0.0130**  
  (0.00)   (0.04)  
Affiliated dummy  0.2950  0.2121 -0.2312  -0.4390 
 (0.20)  (0.15) (0.30)  (0.28) 
Affiliated dummy * 
Relative price 
-0.1278  -0.1330 0.1212  0.1895 
 (0.35)  (0.21) (0.61)  (0.61) 
Relative price 0.1902  0.1870 0.1871  0.1200 
 (0.17)  (0.17) (0.39)  (0.76) 
Analyst ranking -0.6734**  -0.7196** -0.2520  -0.1681 
 (0.02)  (0.02) (0.29)  (0.78) 
Analyst experience 0.0501  0.0721 0.0090  -0.0209 
 (0.28)  (0.15) (0.80)  (0.55) 
Market share -2.7621***  -2.9300*** -2.721**  -2.5320** 
 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.05)  (0.01) 
Number of analysts 0.0010  0.0012 -0.0021  -0.0039 
 (0.81)  (0.31) (0.27)  (0.40) 
Fee rate -4.4012 12.6818*** -8.531 14.9651 6.0118** 9.3760 
 (0.50) (0.00) (0.37) (0.29) (0.03) (0.32) 
Abnormal return -0.0170 0.1863*** -0.0314 -0.2610 0.0169 -0.2917 
 (0.79) (0.00) (0.68) (0.36) (0.92) (0.19) 
SEO dummy 0.9621*** 0.3756*** 0.9721*** 0.5486** 0.4864*** 0.7370*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) 
Assets -0.1932*** 0.3256*** -0.2735*** 0.0370 0.4403*** 0.0123 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.78) (0.00) (0.71) 
SOE dummy -1.7135*** 0.2099*** -1.7026*** -2.1390*** 0.8221*** -1.6511*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Forecast horizon 0.0011***  0.0011*** 0.0012***  0.0013*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Inverse Mills ratio   0.3610   0.5620* 
   (0.20)   (0.06) 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
p-value of F-test/ Chi2 test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Adjusted R-square 0.32 0.44  0.37 0.53  
Number of observations 3,098 5,647 3,098 576 1,097 576 
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Panel B: June10, 2009–2012 
 One year 90 days 
 OLS Heckman OLS Heckman 
  First step Second step  First step Second step 
Intercept 1.3210* -8.2861*** 1.970*** -3.1001** -9.5669*** -2.2515** 
 (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.04) 
Underwriter analyst number  0.0234***   0.0269***  
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
Pricing aggressiveness  0.0109***   0.0060***  
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
Affiliated dummy  0.3521**  0.3761*** 0.6710***  0.6991*** 
 (0.03)  (0.00) (0.01)  (0.00) 
Affiliated dummy * Relative 
price 
0.0632  0.0360 -0.9090**  -0.9760*** 
 (0.80)  (0.79) (0.04)  (0.00) 
Relative price 0.3130  0.3214 0.4108  0.4210 
 (0.21)  (0.25) (0.17)  (0.19) 
Analyst ranking -0.2981*  -0.3210* -0.0371  -0.0059 
 (0.08)  (0.06) (0.81)  (0.97) 
Analyst experience 0.0470  0.0520 0.1310  0.1300 
 (0.75)  (0.65) (0.17)  (0.20) 
Market share -2.3210***  -2.2120*** -2.3009**  -1.301* 
 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.04)  (0.10) 
Number of analysts -0.0012  -0.0013* -0.0012  -0.0014 
 (0.29)  (0.07) (0.60)  (0.31) 
Fee rate 1.9607* 2.0802*** 0.5085 5.6908** 3.8829*** 5.129** 
 (0.06) (0.00) (0.62) (0.05) (0.01) (0.03) 
Abnormal return -0.2241 0.2237*** -0.1760 -0.1951 0.3255*** -0.1654 
 (0.17) (0.00) (0.25) (0.38) (0.00) (0.29) 
SEO dummy 0.4890*** 0.0009 0.4328*** 0.5176*** 0.2446*** 0.3980*** 
 (0.00) (0.99) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Assets -0.0965*** 0.2856*** -0.1109** 0.0352 0.3300*** -0.0087 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.60) (0.00) (0.83) 
SOE dummy -0.0231 0.1240*** -0.0790* -0.2153* 0.2640*** -0.0838 
 (0.89) (0.00) (0.09) (0.07) (0.00) (0.28) 
Forecast horizon 0.0038***  0.0038*** 0.0042***  0.0042*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Inverse Mills ratio   0.1087*   0.2076** 
   (0.08)   (0.05) 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
p-value of F-test/ Chi2 test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Adjusted R-square 0.32 0.22  0.37 0.23  
Number of observations 12,838 20,369 12,838 2,716 4,381 2,716 
 
 
As to the forecast-error (FE) regression, the coefficient on Affiliated dummy is never 
significant before June 10, 2009.  So, we find no evidence whatsoever that affiliated financial 
analysts issue more positively biased EPS forecasts than non-affiliated ones in the first subperiod.  
Likewise, the interaction term between Affiliated dummy and Relative price is never significant 
either in this time frame.  After June 10, 2009, regardless of the time interval in which the EPS 
forecast was released (one year or 90 days), the earnings forecasts released by affiliated financial 
analysts are significantly larger than those of non-affiliated analysts.  For forecasts issued in the 
first post-IPO year, the forecast error made by affiliated financial analysts is on average 33 
  
137 
 
percentage points bigger than that of non-affiliated analysts (35 percentage points in the Heckman 
regression).  For forecasts issued in the first 90 days after IPO, this difference even increases to a 
stunning 63 percentage points (68 percentage points in the Heckman regression).  The latter 
outcome thus reveals that affiliated financial analysts release even more positively biased forecasts 
during the 90-day lock-up period, which is when post-IPO price support likely is needed most.
52
 
Next, while we find no evidence that the positive bias of affiliated financial analysts grows 
larger as the post-IPO stock price declines in the first post-IPO year, we do detect that the 
coefficient on the interaction term between Affiliated dummy and Relative price becomes negative 
and significant at the 5% level (1% level in the Heckman regression) after June 10, 2009.  In other 
words, when the aftermarket stock price declines by one percentage point relative to the IPO offer 
price in the 90-day lock-up period, the forecast errors made by affiliated financial analysts are on 
average 0.93 percentage points more positive than the forecast errors of non-affiliated analysts 
(1.06 percentage points in the Heckman regression).  The coefficient on Relative price itself is 
never significant, thereby indicating that non-affiliated financial analysts do not positively distort 
their EPS forecasts depending upon how the issuer’s stock price in the aftermarket relates to the 
IPO offer price. 
The results from the forecast-accuracy (FA) regression are very similar to those from the 
forecast-error (FE) regression.  Before June 10, 2009, we do not find a significant negative 
coefficient on Affiliated dummy.  Thus, the presumed information advantage that affiliated financial 
analysts enjoy because of IPO underwriting does not result in more accurate EPS forecasts.  In 
contrast, in the period after June 10, 2009, affiliated financial analysts make significantly bigger 
absolute forecast errors than non-affiliated analysts do.  This accuracy gap between affiliated and 
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 As a robustness check on this 90-day window, we also used the forecasts released in the 30 days and 120 days after 
IPO for the firms becoming listed after June 10, 2009.  The coefficient on Affiliated dummy equals 0.32 for the 30-day 
regression (significant at the 5% level) and 0.45 for the 120-day regression (significant at the 1% level).  Together, 
those results reveal that affiliated financial analysts provide post-IPO price support especially in the 90-day window 
after listing. 
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non-affiliated financial analysts is most pronounced in the 90-day lock-up period and grows even 
larger as the issuer’s stock price in the aftermarket drops relative to the IPO offer price. 
Overall, the results show that when a post-IPO price-supporting incentive did not exist (i.e. 
before June 10, 2009), affiliated financial analysts did not release more positively biased EPS 
forecasts than non-affiliated ones.  But once the post-IPO price-supporting incentive emerges (i.e. 
after June 10, 2009), affiliated financial analysts tend to issue more positively biased EPS forecasts 
than non-affiliated ones.  Moreover, when this post-IPO price-supporting incentive is especially 
strong (i.e. in the 90-day lock-up period and when the aftermarket stock price dropped), this relative 
bias becomes even stronger.  Thus, the results of the Chinese natural experiment allow us to 
conclude that the relative bias of affiliated financial analysts is positively affected by their 
incentives to provide post-IPO price support.  Moreover, the results clearly refute the ‘analyst-
optimism view’, which predicts that the relative bias should neither change with the regulatory 
reform nor depend on the aftermarket stock price (Hypotheses 1A and 1B).  The results also indicate 
that the ‘information-advantage view’ may not apply in Chinese domestic stock markets.  
According to the ‘information-advantage view’, when affiliated as well as non-affiliated financial 
analysts issue a positively distorted forecast, a less biased forecast means that the expected forecast 
error of affiliated analysts is less positive than the expected forecast error of non-affiliated analysts.  
Likewise, when affiliated as well as non-affiliated financial analysts issue a negatively distorted 
forecast, a less biased forecast means that the expected forecast error of affiliated analysts is less 
negative than that of non-affiliated analysts.  So, under the ‘information-advantage view’, the 
expected sign of the coefficient on Affiliated dummy depends upon whether the analysts – affiliated 
as well as non-affiliated – issue positively or negatively distorted forecasts.  In our sample, both 
affiliated and non-affiliated analysts release positively biased forecasts in both subperiods (Table 
3.1).  Building on the ‘information-advantage view’, the sign of the parameter estimate for 
Affiliated dummy should be negative in both subperiods.  However, we find an insignificant 
coefficient in the first subperiod and a significant but positive coefficient in the second superiod.  
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From these results, we thus can refute Hypothesis 2A.  Overall, using Chinese data, we find 
compelling evidence that the relative bias shown by affiliated financial analysts is due to an 
intentional distortion rather than to unintentional optimism. 
Next, we briefly discuss the results as to the control variables in the forecast-error (FE) 
regressions.  Star analysts do not seem to issue less biased forecasts than non-star analysts do before 
June 10, 2009.  However, after June 10, 2009, we find some evidence that star analysts’ forecasts 
are less biased, but only for EPS forecasts issued in the first listing year (and when using the 
Heckman model).  As the ranking of financial analysts was not yet very stable over our sample 
period, this result may not be so surprising after all.  The analyst’s experience (Analyst experience) 
cannot help to reduce forecast errors either.  Yet, the average financial analyst in our sample only 
had a 3.3 years track record (median of 3) by the end of 2012.  Such a short track record may not 
have been enough yet to establish a credible reputation.  Next, we do observe that investment banks 
with a higher market share in IPO underwriting (Market share) are associated with less positively 
biased EPS forecasts.  We conjecture that in order to compete against bigger IPO underwriters, 
investment banks with a smaller market share could incite their financial analysts to release more 
favorable forecasts.  We also find some evidence that the investment banks employing a larger 
number of financial analysts issue less biased forecasts, yet this effect is not consistently significant.  
Combining our findings on analyst-specific characteristics (Analyst ranking, Analyst experience) 
and bank-specific characteristics (Market share, Number of analysts), we conclude that the behavior 
of financial analysts in Chinese domestic stock markets is determined mostly by their employers 
rather than by the analysts themselves, i.e. the boss talks. 
We further find that the issuers that paid a higher IPO fee rate to their investment bank(s) are 
rewarded by more positively biased EPS forecasts, but only in the second subperiod.  We find no 
significant influence of the first-day abnormal return on the forecast error.  Nonetheless, financial 
analysts release more positively biased EPS forecasts for the firms that subsequently initiate a 
seasoned equity offering (SEO).  This finding is in line with the idea that investment banks may 
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rely upon their analysts’ EPS forecasts to compete for future underwriting business in subsequent 
SEOs.  Next, bigger issuers (Assets) are associated with less positively biased EPS forecasts, in line 
with the idea that those firms have more stable earnings and release more information to the public.  
Correspondingly, it may be more difficult for financial analysts to distort their earnings forecasts on 
these firms.  However, the coefficient on Assets is not significant during the 90-day lock-up 
period.
53
  State-owned enterprises (SOEs) receive significantly less positively biased forecasts than 
private-controlled firms do in the first subperiod, but this effect seems to have declined over time.  
Compared to private-controlled firms, SOEs have more stable earnings and usually enjoy some 
monopoly power in their industry.  The earnings of SOEs are thus easier to predict and, hence, little 
room is left to further distort the earnings forecasts for SOEs.  It is also possible that private owners 
care more about their firm’s stock price in the aftermarket, thereby inciting financial analysts to 
issue more positively biased forecasts.  Finally, like Lin and McNichols (1998) and Bessler and 
Stanzel (2009), we find that the Forecast horizon significantly positively influences the forecast 
error in both subperiods.  Indeed, the longer the time interval between the release of the forecast 
and the end of the fiscal year to which the EPS forecast relates, the easier it is for financial analysts 
to manipulate their EPS forecasts without causing suspicion among investors. 
Overall, the results on the control variables in the forecast-accuracy (FA) regression are 
largely comparable to those in the forecast-error (FE) regression, so we do not discuss them in 
detail.  The only difference that we find is that Analyst ranking significantly improves forecast 
accuracy in the FA regression.  So, although star analysts in general have a forecast error that is as 
big as that of non-star analysts, they do release more accurate forecasts. 
The inverse Mills ratio, resulting from the first-step regression of the Heckman model, is 
always significant, except in the one-year FE and FA regression in the time frame before June 10, 
2009.  This outcome thus indicates that the choice of the IPO lead manager’s analyst(s) to cover the 
issuing firm generally correlates with the forecast error and forecast accuracy.  More importantly, 
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 When using the log of the firm’s market capitalization before IPO as a robustness check, we find that the coefficient 
on firm size remains non-significant (p-value=0.578). 
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the results from the second-step Heckman regression model are very similar to those from the OLS 
regression model.  We thus can conclude that our results and inferences are not uniquely 
determined by the follow-up decision of the IPO underwriter’s financial analysts. 
As a further direct test of Hypothesis 3B, we divide the EPS forecasts in each subperiod into 
forecasts on the EPS of the same fiscal year as the forecast is released (same-year EPS), and 
forecasts on the EPS of the fiscal year after the year that the forecast is released (next-year EPS).
54
  
We focus on the forecasts released in the 90-day lock-up period, when post-IPO price-supporting 
incentives are strongest.  We run a Heckman (1976) two-step regression model for this purpose.  
Table 3.7 shows the results.  To simplify the output, we do not include the first-step regression 
results in this table; they are similar to those in Table 3.5.  We neither show the regression results as 
to forecast accuracy, as they are again similar to those from the FE regressions. 
The results confirm our conjectures.  Before June 10, 2009, when post-IPO price-supporting 
incentives were absent, we cannot find any significant difference in the EPS forecasts of affiliated 
and non-affiliated financial analysts, no matter whether their EPS forecasts relate to the same year 
as the forecasting year or a subsequent year.  After June 10, 2009, both same-year EPS forecasts 
and future-year EPS forecasts released by affiliated financial analysts are significantly more 
positive than those of non-affiliated analysts, yet the magnitude of the effect is largely different.  
The next-year EPS forecasts of affiliated financial analysts are on average 106 percentage points 
bigger than those of non-affiliated analysts; as regards the same-year EPS forecasts, the difference 
equals only 19 percentage points, but is significant.  Moreover, the significant negative coefficient 
on the interaction term between Affiliated dummy and Relative price in the next-year EPS 
regressions after June 10, 2009 reveals that affiliated financial analysts strongly distort their EPS 
forecasts for future years when the aftermarket stock price declines.  The effect for EPS in the same 
accounting year is also significant, but the effect is generally smaller.  Our results thus confirm 
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 We also checked the EPS forecasts for the fiscal years after the first post-IPO year; we find that results are similar.  
For the EPS forecasts relating to the fiscal years after the first post-IPO year, affiliated analysts are on average 124 
percentage points more positively biased than non-affiliated analysts (p-value=0.01). 
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Hypothesis 3B, revealing that affiliated financial analysts mainly distort their future-year EPS 
forecasts when post-IPO price support is needed most. 
Table 3.7 
The forecast error regressions using the forecasts for different fiscal years 
In this table, we report the regression results on forecast error (FE) using Heckman’s (1976) two-step regression model.  All EPS 
forecasts are released in the 90 days after IPO.  We divide the full sample into 2004–June 9, 2009 and June 10, 2009–2012.  For each 
subperiod, we further divide the sample into the forecasts relating to the EPS of the same fiscal year as the forecast is made (Same 
Year) and the forecasts on the EPS of the fiscal year after the forecast is made (Next Year).  The test and control variables have been 
defined in Table 3.3.  The regression models also include Industry dummies according to the CSRC 13 industry classification and 
Year dummies.  We calculate the inverse Mills ratio from the prediction of the first-step regression and put the ratio into the second-
step regression.  We always cluster errors by financial analysts.  The coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are 
indicated with ***, **, *, respectively. 
 
 2004–June 9, 2009 June 10, 2009–2012 
 Same Year Next Year Same Year Next Year 
Intercept 1.2971 6.5100* -0.5328 -2.3752 
 (0.68) (0.06) (0.31) (0.23) 
Affiliated dummy 0.1238 -0.8457 0.1864*** 1.0582*** 
 (0.82) (0.16) (0.00) (0.00) 
Affiliated dummy * Relative 
price 
0.0076 0.4738 -0.3044** -1.6137*** 
 (0.99) (0.34) (0.04) (0.00) 
Relative price 0.3011 -0.1673 0.1885** 0.065 
 (0.26) (0.54) (0.01) (0.01) 
Analyst ranking -0.1590 -0.1961 0.0072 0.0291 
 (0.64) (0.59) (0.87) (0.86) 
Analyst experience -0.0192 0.0033 0.0110 0.206*** 
 (0.83) (0.97) (0.45) (0.00) 
Market share -5.0791*** -1.3480** -0.8995** -1.9532** 
 (0.00) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) 
Number of analysts -0.0020 -0.0044 -0.0008 -0.0012 
 (0.75) (0.51) (0.31) (0.68) 
Fee rate 15.8215 -9.8191 5.0216*** 5.4487** 
 (0.45) (0.63) (0.00) (0.02) 
Abnormal return 0.0315 -0.0774 -0.1977 -0.3391 
 (0.92) (0.15) (0.21) (0.24) 
SEO dummy 0.7524** 1.0748*** 0.0524 0.7441*** 
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.36) (0.00) 
Assets -0.0720 -0.3760** 0.0070 -0.0404 
 (0.56) (0.05) (0.71) (0.57) 
SOE dummy -0.4451 -1.7806*** -0.0068 -0.1327* 
 (0.44) (0.00) (0.90) (0.07) 
Forecast horizon 0.0033** 0.0020*** 0.0031*** 0.0037*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Inverse Mills ratio 1.2421** 1.2092*** 0.0307 0.2689** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.69) (0.07) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
p-value of Chi2-test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 169 128 1,050 871 
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3.5. Conclusions 
The current literature agrees that financial analysts typically have an incentive to distort their 
earnings forecasts to help their employers – the investment banks – to attract future corporate 
finance business, to generate trading business, and to maintain a good relationship with firm 
management.  However, this literature is still rather vague as to how and why affiliated financial 
analysts may distort their earnings forecasts even more than non-affiliated analysts do.  In this 
paper, we address this research question by examining how the IPO underwriting relationship 
influences the opinion of affiliated financial analysts.  By doing so, we echo the call by Ramnath et 
al. (2008) that “Further research is needed to sort out the effects of affiliation and investment 
banking on analysts’ optimism/pessimism.” 
We put forward and tested three possible explanations, thereby finding support for the view 
that affiliated financial analysts may strategically distort their earnings forecasts upwards to offer 
post-IPO price support for the issuer’s stock in the aftermarket.  On the other hand, we find no 
evidence that analyst optimism or the information advantage presumably enjoyed by analysts 
affiliated with the IPO lead manager influence those analysts’ EPS forecasts.  We use Chinese data, 
as they offer a natural experiment with/without post-IPO price-supporting incentives.  To the best 
of our knowledge, such a natural-experiment opportunity is non-existent in any other major IPO 
market, where underwriters always take full responsibility as to the IPO offer price.  We divided the 
entire sample period into two subperiods, from Jan. 1, 2004 to June 9, 2009 and from June 10, 2009 
to Dec. 31, 2012.  Before the regulatory reform, we find that affiliated financial analysts exhibit no 
difference in their forecast error or forecast accuracy when compared to non-affiliated financial 
analysts.  However, after June 10, 2009, affiliated financial analysts issue significantly more 
positively biased EPS forecasts than non-affiliated analysts do (relative bias); their forecast 
accuracy is also significantly lower than that of non-affiliated analysts.  During the 90-day lock-up 
period, when post-IPO price support is needed most, this relative bias is even bigger, while their 
relative accuracy is worse.  We also find that when using EPS forecasts to provide post-IPO price 
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support, analysts tend to distort especially the EPS forecasts of fiscal years further away from the 
forecast release date.  Such findings reveal that affiliated analysts try to strategically mask their 
post-IPO price-supporting activities.  All this evidence shows that the relative forecast error among 
affiliated analysts results from post-IPO price-supporting incentives rather than from analysts’ 
genuine optimism.  We do not find any evidence that the information advantage helped affiliated 
analysts to produce more accurate or less biased forecasts.  Our research contributes to the financial 
analysts’ literature by presenting and verifying a unique self-serving incentive that affiliated 
analysts have when releasing their opinion, that is to offer post-IPO price support.  We also 
contribute to the IPO literature by exploring a possible way for underwriters to offer price support. 
The results from our research have several policy implications.  First, like in the U.S.A., 
before the Global Settlement was reached in April 2003, the impact of self-serving behavior on the 
earnings forecasts issued by affiliated financial analysts in China is substantial.  The pressure to 
offer post-IPO price support severely distorted the earnings forecasts issued by affiliated financial 
analysts.  The Chinese regulator should follow the example of the SEC to further investigate such 
behavior and to enforce a clear separation between the corporate finance department and the 
research department of investment banks.  Second, we notice that by the end of 2012, independent 
research institutions are still rather scarce in China.  In the absence of any pressure to 
generate/safeguard other business activities, financial analysts employed by independent research 
institutions may provide more objective forecasts.  So, we recommend the regulator to also design 
policies favoring the development of such independent research.  Third, we suggest further research 
on the compensation scheme of financial analysts employed by investment banks.  As we find in 
our article, analysts’ behavior seems largely determined by their employers.  It is therefore 
interesting to check whether the compensation scheme used by investment banks induces wrong 
incentives on the part of their analysts.  Fourth, as affiliated financial analysts tend to use especially 
long-term EPS forecasts to provide post-IPO price support, we suggest investors to be particularly 
cautious when relying on the latter forecasts.  
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General Conclusions and discussion 
Overall, this dissertation does not paint a positive picture about the role of investment banks in 
Chinese IPOs from 1995 to 2011.   We find that before 2005, investment banks gain their market 
share only by political connection.  After that (from 2005 to 2010), with the gradual abolishment of 
government direct intervention into IPO underwriting market, the influence of political connection 
reduced, investment banks have been able to gain market share by charging low underwriting fees.  
However, due to the issuing price intervention (P/E cap), investment banks never gain market share 
by offering better certification on issuing firms.  On the contrary, they have to compete by 
complying with the earnings exaggeration of issuers.  Moreover, properly pricing IPOs never 
played a role in determining market share of investment banks. 
From 2010 to 2011, in the two years after the total abolishment of issuing price intervention, 
we find that investment banks help issuers to exploit overoptimistic investors by raising huge 
amount of capital exceeding that is needed (over-issuance).  For the 587 IPO firms listed in 2010 
and 2011, the average over-issuance equals 2.55 (median of 2.36).  In total, RMB 299 billion of 
capital was raised without corresponding investment projects. We also find that the compensation 
of investment banks—underwriting fee rates, increases with over-issuance.  We estimate that 
issuers paid an additional RMB 4.37 billion in fees to investment banks as a result of over-issuance.  
This translates into an extra fee of RMB 7.44 million for an average IPO.  Our results indicate that 
investment banks have gain huge benefit in these two years by helping issuers to exploit primary 
market investors. 
Coherent with what we find in over-issuance, we observe that ever since the abolishment of 
P/E cap, the financial analysts hired by IPO underwriters (affiliated analysts) offer significantly 
more optimistic earnings forecasts on IPO firms than do the analysts hired by non-underwriters.  
The earnings forecasts released by affiliated financial analysts are on average 33 percentage points 
more positively biased than those of non-affiliated analysts.  Moreover, in the 90 days after first 
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listing, this relative bias even increases to 63 percentage points and enlarges further when the 
issuer’s stock price dropped after the IPO.  On the contrary, we do not find any significant 
difference in the earnings forecast between affiliated and non-affiliated analysts before the 
regulatory change.  These findings lead us to conclude that ever since the regulatory change, 
investment banks use the earnings forecasts to offer post-IPO price support to the firms that they 
underwrote.     
These observations are presented separately in the three chapters, but when looking at them 
as a whole piece, I obtain some further thoughts about free markets mechanism and about 
regulatory intervention.  Those thoughts are definitely not the conclusions of this dissertation; 
rather, they are interesting for future researches.         
 First, we notice that those bad behaviours of investment banks in IPO markets are not 
unique in China.  Many literatures studying the Western market make similar findings.  However, 
an interesting difference from the Western market is that seems in China, the bad behaviour of 
investment banks are all helping issuers to exploit investors.  While in the Western market, 
investment banks may help investors to exploit issuers.  For example, Loughren and Ritter (2004) 
suggest that in the US market, underwriters may intentionally price the IPO shares too low and 
allocate those cheap initial shares to their close clients. We also notice that in China, retail investors 
dominate the market. A report by the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSC) 
shows that retail investors held 83% of market capitalization and were responsible for 86% of 
trading volume in 2010.  While in the US, institutional investors dominate the market by obtaining 
over 90% of initial shares and by generating 98% of trading volume.  In other words, in Chinese 
IPO market, the buyers (investors) are much weaker than the sellers (issuers) in terms of their 
bargaining power, their capacity to collect/analysis information, to make rational judgements, to 
obtain legal protection and to exercise political influence. While in the US market it is obviously 
the opposite.  Our research, when comparing with the research in the US market, thus show an 
interesting but often neglected aspect in intermediary’s behaviour:  the intermediaries, when 
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maximizing their own benefits by serving sellers and buyers in a market, may intentionally help one 
party to exploit the other party.  Which party the intermediary helps/exploits depends on the relative 
strength 
55
 of the two parties.  When buyers are stronger (as in the case in the US IPO market), the 
intermediary may help buyers to exploit sellers; when sellers are stronger (as in the case of Chinese 
IPO market), the intermediary helps sellers to exploit buyers.  In the markets where exists severe 
power asymmetry between sellers and buyers, free market mechanism may not lead to Pareto 
improvement even with the existence of intermediary between seller and buyers.  Such markets 
exist everywhere.  For example, in labour market, recruiters are often in a much stronger position 
than the job-seekers are.  In these markets, regulatory protection on the weaker party becomes 
indispensible.   
My second thought is: markets are connected, when making regulatory interventions in one 
market, the regulator must be very much alert of how these interventions affect other closely linked 
markets.  In our research, there exits two closely connected markets: the IPO market, where issuers 
(sellers) sell their initial shares to investors (buyers); the IPO underwriting market, where 
investment banks (sellers) sell their IPO underwriting service to issuers (buyers). After 2005, the 
Chinese regulator largely loosed its intervention in the IPO underwriting market, so as to allow the 
‘invisible hand’ to regulate the behaviour of the investment banks.  But we show that investment 
banks failed to properly behave under the ‘invisible hand’.  The reason is: the regulator still keeps 
its intervention in a closely linked market, i.e. the IPO market, by determining issue price.  As a 
result of this issue-price intervention in IPO market, in IPO underwriting market, investors have no 
intention to seek certification from investment banks and issuers do not value the pricing skills of 
investment banks. Consequently, the free market mechanism in IPO underwriting market failed to 
offer proper incentive to investment banks and thus became ineffective. This is a typical example 
showing that the regulatory intervention in one market may distort the behaviour of the agents in 
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 By ‘strength’ I mean the bargaining power against the intermediary, the capacity to collect and analyze information, 
the capacity to obtain legal protection and to exercise political influence.     
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other closely linked markets.  Regulators must be aware of those effects when making market 
intervention.   
Overall, what I have learnt from this research is that free market has its limits; regulatory 
intervention also has its limits.  To achieve efficient resource allocation and to maximize social 
welfare, a good combination of free market and regulatory intervention is indispensible.   
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